the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第95部分

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causes　in　themselves…　but　it　cannot　produce　any　difference　in　the
relation　in　which　the　action　stands　to　the　faculty　of　reason。
　　Thus；　then；　in　our　investigation　into　free　actions　and　the　causal
power　which　produced　them；　we　arrive　at　an　intelligible　cause；
beyond　which；　however；　we　cannot　go；　although　we　can　recognize　that　it
is　free；　that　is；　independent　of　all　sensuous　conditions；　and　that；　in
this　way；　it　may　be　the　sensuously　unconditioned　condition　of
phenomena。　But　for　what　reason　the　intelligible　character　generates
such　and　such　phenomena　and　exhibits　such　and　such　an　empirical
character　under　certain　circumstances；　it　is　beyond　the　power　of　our
reason　to　decide。　The　question　is　as　much　above　the　power　and　the
sphere　of　reason　as　the　following　would　be：　〃Why　does　the
transcendental　object　of　our　external　sensuous　intuition　allow　of　no
other　form　than　that　of　intuition　in　space？〃　But　the　problem；　which　we
were　called　upon　to　solve；　does　not　require　us　to　entertain　any　such
questions。　The　problem　was　merely　this…　whether　freedom　and　natural
necessity　can　exist　without　opposition　in　the　same　action。　To　this
question　we　have　given　a　sufficient　answer；　for　we　have　shown　that；　as
the　former　stands　in　a　relation　to　a　different　kind　of　condition
from　those　of　the　latter；　the　law　of　the　one　does　not　affect　the　law
of　the　other　and　that；　consequently；　both　can　exist　together　in
independence　of　and　without　interference　with　each　other。

　　The　reader　must　be　careful　to　remark　that　my　intention　in　the
above　remarks　has　not　been　to　prove　the　actual　existence　of　freedom；
as　a　faculty　in　which　resides　the　cause　of　certain　sensuous　phenomena。
For；　not　to　mention　that　such　an　argument　would　not　have　a
transcendental　character；　nor　have　been　limited　to　the　discussion　of
pure　conceptions…　all　attempts　at　inferring　from　experience　what
cannot　be　cogitated　in　accordance　with　its　laws；　must　ever　be
unsuccessful。　Nay；　more；　I　have　not　even　aimed　at　demonstrating　the
possibility　of　freedom；　for　this　too　would　have　been　a　vain　endeavour；
inasmuch　as　it　is　beyond　the　power　of　the　mind　to　cognize　the
possibility　of　a　reality　or　of　a　causal　power　by　the　aid　of　mere　a
priori　conceptions。　Freedom　has　been　considered　in　the　foregoing
remarks　only　as　a　transcendental　idea；　by　means　of　which　reason　aims
at　originating　a　series　of　conditions　in　the　world　of　phenomena　with
the　help　of　that　which　is　sensuously　unconditioned；　involving
itself；　however；　in　an　antinomy　with　the　laws　which　itself
prescribes　for　the　conduct　of　the　understanding。　That　this　antinomy　is
based　upon　a　mere　illusion；　and　that　nature　and　freedom　are　at　least
not　opposed…　this　was　the　only　thing　in　our　power　to　prove；　and　the
question　which　it　was　our　task　to　solve。

　　　　IV。　Solution　of　the　Cosmological　Idea　of　the　Totality　of
　　　　　　　　　　the　Dependence　of　Phenomenal　Existences。

　　In　the　preceding　remarks；　we　considered　the　changes　in　the　world
of　sense　as　constituting　a　dynamical　series；　in　which　each　member　is
subordinated　to　another…　as　its　cause。　Our　present　purpose　is　to　avail
ourselves　of　this　series　of　states　or　conditions　as　a　guide　to　an
existence　which　may　be　the　highest　condition　of　all　changeable
phenomena；　that　is；　to　a　necessary　being。　Our　endeavour　to　reach；
not　the　unconditioned　causality；　but　the　unconditioned　existence；　of
substance。　The　series　before　us　is　therefore　a　series　of
conceptions；　and　not　of　intuitions　（in　which　the　one　intuition　is
the　condition　of　the　other）。
　　But　it　is　evident　that；　as　all　phenomena　are　subject　to　change　and
conditioned　in　their　existence；　the　series　of　dependent　existences
cannot　embrace　an　unconditioned　member；　the　existence　of　which　would
be　absolutely　necessary。　It　follows　that；　if　phenomena　were　things
in　themselves；　and…　as　an　immediate　consequence　from　this　supposition…
condition　and　conditioned　belonged　to　the　same　series　of　phenomena；
the　existence　of　a　necessary　being；　as　the　condition　of　the
existence　of　sensuous　phenomena；　would　be　perfectly　impossible。
　　An　important　distinction；　however；　exists　between　the　dynamical
and　the　mathematical　regress。　The　latter　is　engaged　solely　with　the
bination　of　parts　into　a　whole；　or　with　the　division　of　a　whole
into　its　parts；　and　therefore　are　the　conditions　of　its　series　parts
of　the　series；　and　to　be　consequently　regarded　as　homogeneous；　and　for
this　reason；　as　consisting；　without　exception；　of　phenomena。　If　the
former　regress；　on　the　contrary；　the　aim　of　which　is　not　to
establish　the　possibility　of　an　unconditioned　whole　consisting　of
given　parts；　or　of　an　unconditioned　part　of　a　given　whole；　but　to
demonstrate　the　possibility　of　the　deduction　of　a　certain　state　from
its　cause；　or　of　the　contingent　existence　of　substance　from　that　which
exists　necessarily；　it　is　not　requisite　that　the　condition　should　form
part　of　an　empirical　series　along　with　the　conditioned。
　　In　the　case　of　the　apparent　antinomy　with　which　we　are　at　present
dealing；　there　exists　a　way　of　escape　from　the　difficulty；　for　it　is
not　impossible　that　both　of　the　contradictory　statements　may　be　true
in　different　relations。　All　sensuous　phenomena　may　be　contingent；
and　consequently　possess　only　an　empirically　conditioned　existence；
and　yet　there　may　also　exist　a　non…empirical　condition　of　the　whole
series；　or；　in　other　words；　a　necessary　being。　For　this　necessary
being；　as　an　intelligible　condition；　would　not　form　a　member…　not　even
the　highest　member…　of　the　series；　the　whole　world　of　sense　would　be
left　in　its　empirically　determined　existence　uninterfered　with　and
uninfluenced。　This　would　also　form　a　ground　of　distinction　between　the
modes　of　solution　employed　for　the　third　and　fourth　antinomies。　For；
while　in　the　consideration　of　freedom　in　the　former　antinomy；　the
thing　itself…　the　cause　（substantia　phaenomenon）…　was　regarded　as
belonging　to　the　series　of　conditions；　and　only　its　causality　to　the
intelligible　world…　we　are　obliged　in　the　present　case　to　cogitate
this　necessary　being　as　purely　intelligible　and　as　existing　entirely
apart　from　the　world　of　sense　（as　an　ens　extramundanum）；　for　otherwise
it　would　be　subject　to　the　phenomenal　law　of　contingency　and
dependence。
　　In　relation　to　the　present　problem；　therefore；　the　regulative
principle　of　reason　is　that　everything　in　the　sensuous　world　possesses
an　empirically　conditioned　existence…　that　no　property　of　the　sensuous
world　possesses　unconditioned　necessity…　that　we　are　bound　to
expect；　and；　so　far　as　is　possible；　to　seek　for　the　empirical
condition　of　every　member　in　the　series　of　conditions…　and　that
there　is　no　sufficient　reason　to　justify　us　in　deducing　any
existence　from　a　condition　which　lies　out　of　and　beyond　the
empirical　series；　or　in　regarding　any　existence　as　independent　and
self…subsistent；　although　this　should　not　prevent　us　from
recognizing　the　possibility　of　the　whole　series　being　based　upon　a
being　which　is　intelligible；　and　for　this　reason　free　from　all
empirical　conditions。
　　But　it　has　been　far　from　my　intention；　in　these　remarks；　to　prove
the　existence　of　this　unconditioned　and　necessary　being；　or　even　to
evidence　the　possibility　of　a　purely　intelligible　condition　of　the
existence　or　all　sensuous　phenomena。　As　bounds　were　set　to　reason；
to　prevent　it　from　leaving　the　guiding　thread　of　empirical
conditions　and　losing　itself　in　transcendent　theories　which　are
incapable　of　concrete　presentation；　so　it　was　my　purpose；　on　the　other
band；　to　set　bounds　to　the　law　of　the　purely　empirical
understanding；　and　to　protest　against　any　attempts　on　its　part　at
deciding　on　the　possibility　of　things；　or　declaring　the　existence　of
the　intelligible　to　be　impossible；　merely　on　the　ground　that　it　is　not
available　for　the　explanation　and　exposition　of　phenomena。　It　has　been
shown；　at　the　same　time；　that　the　contingency　of　all　the　phenomena
of　nature　and　their　empirical　conditions　is　quite　consistent　with
the　arbitrary　hypothesis　of　a　necessary；　although　purely
intelligible　condition；　that　no　real　contradiction　exists　between　them
and　that；　consequently；　both　may　be　true。　The　existence　of　such　an
absolutely　necessary　being　may　be　impossible；　but　this　can　never　be
demonstrated　from　the　universal　contingency　and　dependence　of　sensuous
phenomena；　nor　from　the　principle　which　forbids　us　to　discontinue
the　series　at　some　member　of　it；　or　to　seek　for　its　cause　in　some
sphere　of　existence　beyond　the　world　of　nature。　Reason　goes　its　way　in
the　empirical　world；　and　follows；　too；　its　peculiar　path　in　the　sphere
of　the　transcendental。
　　The　sensuous　world　contains　nothing　but　phenomena；　which　are　mere
representations；　and　always　sensuously　conditioned；　things　in
themselves　are　not；　and　cannot　be；　objects　to　us。　It　is　not　to　be
wondered　at；　therefore；　that　we　are　not　justified　in　leaping　from　some
member　of　an　empirical　series　beyond　the　world　of　sense；　as　if
empirical　representations　were　things　in　themselves；　existing　apart
from　their　transcendental　ground　in　the　human　mind；　and　the　cause　of
whose　existence　may　be　sought　out　of　the　empirical　series。　This
would　certainly　be　the　case　with　contingent　things；　but　it　cannot　be
with　mere　representati