the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第93部分

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be　a　phenomenon　and　belong　to　the　empirical　world？　Is　it　not　rather
possible　that；　although　every　effect　in　the　phenomenal　world　must　be
connected　with　an　empirical　cause；　according　to　the　universal　law　of
nature；　this　empirical　causality　may　be　itself　the　effect　of　a
non…empirical　and　intelligible　causality…　its　connection　with
natural　causes　remaining　nevertheless　intact？　Such　a　causality　would
be　considered；　in　reference　to　phenomena；　as　the　primal　action　of　a
cause；　which　is　in　so　far；　therefore；　not　phenomenal；　but；　by　reason
of　this　faculty　or　power；　intelligible；　although　it　must；　at　the
same　time；　as　a　link　in　the　chain　of　nature；　be　regarded　as
belonging　to　the　sensuous　world。
　　A　belief　in　the　reciprocal　causality　of　phenomena　is　necessary；　if
we　are　required　to　look　for　and　to　present　the　natural　conditions　of
natural　events；　that　is　to　say；　their　causes。　This　being　admitted　as
unexceptionably　valid；　the　requirements　of　the　understanding；　which
recognizes　nothing　but　nature　in　the　region　of　phenomena；　are
satisfied；　and　our　physical　explanations　of　physical　phenomena　may
proceed　in　their　regular　course；　without　hindrance　and　without
opposition。　But　it　is　no　stumbling…block　in　the　way；　even　assuming　the
idea　to　be　a　pure　fiction；　to　admit　that　there　are　some　natural　causes
in　the　possession　of　a　faculty　which　is　not　empirical；　but
intelligible；　inasmuch　as　it　is　not　determined　to　action　by
empirical　conditions；　but　purely　and　solely　upon　grounds　brought
forward　by　the　understanding…　this　action　being　still；　when　the
cause　is　phenomenized；　in　perfect　accordance　with　the　laws　of
empirical　causality。　Thus　the　acting　subject；　as　a　causal
phenomenon；　would　continue　to　preserve　a　plete　connection　with
nature　and　natural　conditions；　and　the　phenomenon　only　of　the
subject　（with　all　its　phenomenal　causality）　would　contain　certain
conditions；　which；　if　we　ascend　from　the　empirical　to　the
transcendental　object；　must　necessarily　be　regarded　as　intelligible。
For；　if　we　attend；　in　our　inquiries　with　regard　to　causes　in　the　world
of　phenomena；　to　the　directions　of　nature　alone；　we　need　not　trouble
ourselves　about　the　relation　in　which　the　transcendental　subject；
which　is　pletely　unknown　to　us；　stands　to　these　phenomena　and　their
connection　in　nature。　The　intelligible　ground　of　phenomena　in　this
subject　does　not　concern　empirical　questions。　It　has　to　do　only　with
pure　thought；　and；　although　the　effects　of　this　thought　and　action
of　the　pure　understanding　are　discoverable　in　phenomena；　these
phenomena　must　nevertheless　be　capable　of　a　full　and　plete
explanation；　upon　purely　physical　grounds　and　in　accordance　with
natural　laws。　And　in　this　case　we　attend　solely　to　their　empirical　and
omit　all　consideration　of　their　intelligible　character　（which　is　the
transcendental　cause　of　the　former）　as　pletely　unknown；　except　in
so　far　as　it　is　exhibited　by　the　latter　as　its　empirical　symbol。　Now
let　us　apply　this　to　experience。　Man　is　a　phenomenon　of　the　sensuous
world　and；　at　the　same　time；　therefore；　a　natural　cause；　the　causality
of　which　must　be　regulated　by　empirical　laws。　As　such；　he　must　possess
an　empirical　character；　like　all　other　natural　phenomena。　We　remark
this　empirical　character　in　his　actions；　which　reveal　the　presence
of　certain　powers　and　faculties。　If　we　consider　inanimate　or　merely
animal　nature；　we　can　discover　no　reason　for　ascribing　to　ourselves
any　other　than　a　faculty　which　is　determined　in　a　purely　sensuous
manner。　But　man；　to　whom　nature　reveals　herself　only　through　sense；
cognizes　himself　not　only　by　his　senses；　but　also　through　pure
apperception；　and　this　in　actions　and　internal　determinations；　which
he　cannot　regard　as　sensuous　impressions。　He　is　thus　to　himself；　on
the　one　hand；　a　phenomenon；　but　on　the　other　hand；　in　respect　of
certain　faculties；　a　purely　intelligible　object…　intelligible；　because
its　action　cannot　be　ascribed　to　sensuous　receptivity。　These　faculties
are　understanding　and　reason。　The　latter；　especially；　is　in　a　peculiar
manner　distinct　from　all　empirically…conditioned　faculties；　for　it
employs　ideas　alone　in　the　consideration　of　its　objects；　and　by
means　of　these　determines　the　understanding；　which　then　proceeds　to
make　an　empirical　use　of　its　own　conceptions；　which；　like　the　ideas　of
reason；　are　pure　and　non…empirical。
　　That　reason　possesses　the　faculty　of　causality；　or　that　at　least
we　are　pelled　so　to　represent　it；　is　evident　from　the
imperatives；　which　in　the　sphere　of　the　practical　we　impose　on　many　of
our　executive　powers。　The　words　I　ought　express　a　species　of
necessity；　and　imply　a　connection　with　grounds　which　nature　does　not
and　cannot　present　to　the　mind　of　man。　Understanding　knows　nothing
in　nature　but　that　which　is；　or　has　been；　or　will　be。　It　would　be
absurd　to　say　that　anything　in　nature　ought　to　be　other　than　it　is
in　the　relations　of　time　in　which　it　stands；　indeed；　the　ought；　when
we　consider　merely　the　course　of　nature；　bas　neither　application　nor
meaning。　The　question；　〃What　ought　to　happen　in　the　sphere　of　nature？〃
is　just　as　absurd　as　the　question；　〃What　ought　to　be　the　properties　of
a　circle？〃　All　that　we　are　entitled　to　ask　is；　〃What　takes　place　in
nature？〃　or；　in　the　latter　case；　〃What　are　the　properties　of　a
circle？〃
　　But　the　idea　of　an　ought　or　of　duty　indicates　a　possible　action；　the
ground　of　which　is　a　pure　conception；　while　the　ground　of　a　merely
natural　action　is；　on　the　contrary；　always　a　phenomenon。　This　action
must　certainly　be　possible　under　physical　conditions；　if　it　is
prescribed　by　the　moral　imperative　ought；　but　these　physical　or
natural　conditions　do　not　concern　the　determination　of　the　will
itself；　they　relate　to　its　effects　alone；　and　the　consequences　of
the　effect　in　the　world　of　phenomena。　Whatever　number　of　motives
nature　may　present　to　my　will；　whatever　sensuous　impulses…　the　moral
ought　it　is　beyond　their　power　to　produce。　They　may　produce　a
volition；　which；　so　far　from　being　necessary；　is　always　conditioned…　a
volition　to　which　the　ought　enunciated　by　reason；　sets　an　aim　and　a
standard；　gives　permission　or　prohibition。　Be　the　object　what　it
may；　purely　sensuous…　as　pleasure；　or　presented　by　pure　reason…　as
good；　reason　will　not　yield　to　grounds　which　have　an　empirical　origin。
Reason　will　not　follow　the　order　of　things　presented　by　experience；
but；　with　perfect　spontaneity；　rearranges　them　according　to　ideas；
with　which　it　pels　empirical　conditions　to　agree。　It　declares；　in
the　name　of　these　ideas；　certain　actions　to　be　necessary　which
nevertheless　have　not　taken　place　and　which　perhaps　never　will　take
place；　and　yet　presupposes　that　it　possesses　the　faculty　of
causality　in　relation　to　these　actions。　For；　in　the　absence　of　this
supposition；　it　could　not　expect　its　ideas　to　produce　certain
effects　in　the　world　of　experience。
　　Now；　let　us　stop　here　and　admit　it　to　be　at　least　possible　that
reason　does　stand　in　a　really　causal　relation　to　phenomena。　In　this
case　it　must…　pure　reason　as　it　is…　exhibit　an　empirical　character。
For　every　cause　supposes　a　rule；　according　to　which　certain
phenomena　follow　as　effects　from　the　cause；　and　every　rule　requires
uniformity　in　these　effects；　and　this　is　the　proper　ground　of　the
conception　of　a　cause…　as　a　faculty　or　power。　Now　this　conception
（of　a　cause）　may　be　termed　the　empirical　character　of　reason；　and　this
character　is　a　permanent　one；　while　the　effects　produced　appear；　in
conformity　with　the　various　conditions　which　acpany　and　partly
limit　them；　in　various　forms。
　　Thus　the　volition　of　every　man　has　an　empirical　character；　which
is　nothing　more　than　the　causality　of　his　reason；　in　so　far　as　its
effects　in　the　phenomenal　world　manifest　the　presence　of　a　rule；
according　to　which　we　are　enabled　to　examine；　in　their　several　kinds
and　degrees；　the　actions　of　this　causality　and　the　rational　grounds
for　these　actions；　and　in　this　way　to　decide　upon　the　subjective
principles　of　the　volition。　Now　we　learn　what　this　empirical　character
is　only　from　phenomenal　effects；　and　from　the　rule　of　these　which　is
presented　by　experience；　and　for　this　reason　all　the　actions　of　man　in
the　world　of　phenomena　are　determined　by　his　empirical　character；
and　the　co…operative　causes　of　nature。　If；　then；　we　could
investigate　all　the　phenomena　of　human　volition　to　their　lowest
foundation　in　the　mind；　there　would　be　no　action　which　we　could　not
anticipate　with　certainty；　and　recognize　to　be　absolutely　necessary
from　its　preceding　conditions。　So　far　as　relates　to　this　empirical
character；　therefore；　there　can　be　no　freedom；　and　it　is　only　in　the
light　of　this　character　that　we　can　consider　the　human　will；　when　we
confine　ourselves　to　simple　observation　and；　as　is　the　case　in
anthropology；　institute　a　physiological　investigation　of　the　motive
causes　of　human　actions。
　　But　when　we　consider　the　same　actions　in　relation　to　reason…　not　for
the　purpose　of　explaining　their　origin；　that　is；　in　relation　to
speculative　reason；　but　to　practical　reason；　as　the　producing　cause　of
these　actions…　we　shall　discover　a　rule　and　an　order　very　different
from　those　of　nature　and　experience。　For　the　declaration　of　this
mental　faculty