the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第92部分

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determined　by　other　phenomenal　existences。　This　cause　and　its
causality　exist　therefore　out　of　and　apart　from　the　series　of
phenomena；　while　its　effects　do　exist　and　are　discoverable　in　the
series　of　empirical　conditions。　Such　an　effect　may　therefore　be
considered　to　be　free　in　relation　to　its　intelligible　cause；　and
necessary　in　relation　to　the　phenomena　from　which　it　is　a　necessary
consequence…　a　distinction　which；　stated　in　this　perfectly　general　and
abstract　manner；　must　appear　in　the　highest　degree　subtle　and　obscure。
The　sequel　will　explain。　It　is　sufficient；　at　present；　to　remark　that；
as　the　plete　and　unbroken　connection　of　phenomena　is　an　unalterable
law　of　nature；　freedom　is　impossible…　on　the　supposition　that
phenomena　are　absolutely　real。　Hence　those　philosophers　who　adhere
to　the　mon　opinion　on　this　subject　can　never　succeed　in　reconciling
the　ideas　of　nature　and　freedom。

　　　　　Possibility　of　Freedom　in　Harmony　with　the　Universal　Law
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Natural　Necessity。

　　That　element　in　a　sensuous　object　which　is　not　itself　sensuous；　I
may　be　allowed　to　term　intelligible。　If；　accordingly；　an　object
which　must　be　regarded　as　a　sensuous　phenomenon　possesses　a　faculty
which　is　not　an　object　of　sensuous　intuition；　but　by　means　of　which　it
is　capable　of　being　the　cause　of　phenomena；　the　causality　of　an　object
or　existence　of　this　kind　may　be　regarded　from　two　different　points　of
view。　It　may　be　considered　to　be　intelligible；　as　regards　its
action…　the　action　of　a　thing　which　is　a　thing　in　itself；　and
sensuous；　as　regards　its　effects…　the　effects　of　a　phenomenon
belonging　to　the　sensuous　world。　We　should　accordingly；　have　to　form
both　an　empirical　and　an　intellectual　conception　of　the　causality　of
such　a　faculty　or　power…　both；　however；　having　reference　to　the　same
effect。　This　twofold　manner　of　cogitating　a　power　residing　in　a
sensuous　object　does　not　run　counter　to　any　of　the　conceptions　which
we　ought　to　form　of　the　world　of　phenomena　or　of　a　possible
experience。　Phenomena…　not　being　things　in　themselves…　must　have　a
transcendental　object　as　a　foundation；　which　determines　them　as　mere
representations；　and　there　seems　to　be　no　reason　why　we　should　not
ascribe　to　this　transcendental　object；　in　addition　to　the　property
of　self…phenomenization；　a　causality　whose　effects　are　to　be　met
with　in　the　world　of　phenomena；　although　it　is　not　itself　a
phenomenon。　But　every　effective　cause　must　possess　a　character；　that
is　to　say；　a　law　of　its　causality；　without　which　it　would　cease　to
be　a　cause。　In　the　above　case；　then；　every　sensuous　object　would
possess　an　empirical　character；　which　guaranteed　that　its　actions；
as　phenomena；　stand　in　plete　and　harmonious　connection；　conformably
to　unvarying　natural　laws；　with　all　other　phenomena；　and　can　be
deduced　from　these；　as　conditions；　and　that　they　do　thus；　in
connection　with　these；　constitute　a　series　in　the　order　of　nature。
This　sensuous　object　must；　in　the　second　place；　possess　an
intelligible　character；　which　guarantees　it　to　be　the　cause　of　those
actions；　as　phenomena；　although　it　is　not　itself　a　phenomenon　nor
subordinate　to　the　conditions　of　the　world　of　sense。　The　former　may　be
termed　the　character　of　the　thing　as　a　phenomenon；　the　latter　the
character　of　the　thing　as　a　thing　in　itself。
　　Now　this　active　subject　would；　in　its　character　of　intelligible
subject；　be　subordinate　to　no　conditions　of　time；　for　time　is　only　a
condition　of　phenomena；　and　not　of　things　in　themselves。　No　action
would　begin　or　cease　to　be　in　this　subject；　it　would　consequently　be
free　from　the　law　of　all　determination　of　time…　the　law　of　change；
namely；　that　everything　which　happens　must　have　a　cause　in　the
phenomena　of　a　preceding　state。　In　one　word；　the　causality　of　the
subject；　in　so　far　as　it　is　intelligible；　would　not　form　part　of　the
series　of　empirical　conditions　which　determine　and　necessitate　an
event　in　the　world　of　sense。　Again；　this　intelligible　character　of　a
thing　cannot　be　immediately　cognized；　because　we　can　perceive
nothing　but　phenomena；　but　it　must　be　capable　of　being　cogitated　in
harmony　with　the　empirical　character；　for　we　always　find　ourselves
pelled　to　place；　in　thought；　a　transcendental　object　at　the　basis
of　phenomena　although　we　can　never　know　what　this　object　is　in　itself。
　　In　virtue　of　its　empirical　character；　this　subject　would　at　the　same
time　be　subordinate　to　all　the　empirical　laws　of　causality；　and；　as
a　phenomenon　and　member　of　the　sensuous　world；　its　effects　would
have　to　be　accounted　for　by　a　reference　to　preceding　phenomena。
Eternal　phenomena　must　be　capable　of　influencing　it；　and　its
actions；　in　accordance　with　natural　laws；　must　explain　to　us　how　its
empirical　character；　that　is；　the　law　of　its　causality；　is　to　be
cognized　in　and　by　means　of　experience。　In　a　word；　all　requisites
for　a　plete　and　necessary　determination　of　these　actions　must　be
presented　to　us　by　experience。
　　In　virtue　of　its　intelligible　character；　on　the　other　hand　（although
we　possess　only　a　general　conception　of　this　character）；　the　subject
must　be　regarded　as　free　from　all　sensuous　influences；　and　from　all
phenomenal　determination。　Moreover；　as　nothing　happens　in　this
subject…　for　it　is　a　noumenon；　and　there　does　not　consequently　exist
in　it　any　change；　demanding　the　dynamical　determination　of　time；　and
for　the　same　reason　no　connection　with　phenomena　as　causes…　this
active　existence　must　in　its　actions　be　free　from　and　independent　of
natural　necessity；　for　or　necessity　exists　only　in　the　world　of
phenomena。　It　would　be　quite　correct　to　say　that　it　originates　or
begins　its　effects　in　the　world　of　sense　from　itself；　although　the
action　productive　of　these　effects　does　not　begin　in　itself。　We　should
not　be　in　this　case　affirming　that　these　sensuous　effects　began　to
exist　of　themselves；　because　they　are　always　determined　by　prior
empirical　conditions…　by　virtue　of　the　empirical　character；　which　is
the　phenomenon　of　the　intelligible　character…　and　are　possible　only　as
constituting　a　continuation　of　the　series　of　natural　causes。　And
thus　nature　and　freedom；　each　in　the　plete　and　absolute
signification　of　these　terms；　can　exist；　without　contradiction　or
disagreement；　in　the　same　action　to

　　　　Exposition　of　the　Cosmological　Idea　of　Freedom　in　Harmony
　　　　　　　　with　the　Universal　Law　of　Natural　Necessity。

　　I　have　thought　it　advisable　to　lay　before　the　reader　at　first　merely
a　sketch　of　the　solution　of　this　transcendental　problem；　in　order　to
enable　him　to　form　with　greater　ease　a　clear　conception　of　the
course　which　reason　must　adopt　in　the　solution。　I　shall　now　proceed　to
exhibit　the　several　momenta　of　this　solution；　and　to　consider　them
in　their　order。
　　The　natural　law　that　everything　which　happens　must　have　a　cause；
that　the　causality　of　this　cause；　that　is；　the　action　of　the　cause
（which　cannot　always　have　existed；　but　must　be　itself　an　event；　for　it
precedes　in　time　some　effect　which　it　has　originated）；　must　have
itself　a　phenomenal　cause；　by　which　it　is　determined　and；　and；
consequently；　all　events　are　empirically　determined　in　an　order　of
nature…　this　law；　I　say；　which　lies　at　the　foundation　of　the
possibility　of　experience；　and　of　a　connected　system　of　phenomena　or
nature　is　a　law　of　the　understanding；　from　which　no　departure；　and
to　which　no　exception；　can　be　admitted。　For　to　except　even　a　single
phenomenon　from　its　operation　is　to　exclude　it　from　the　sphere　of
possible　experience　and　thus　to　admit　it　to　be　a　mere　fiction　of
thought　or　phantom　of　the　brain。
　　Thus　we　are　obliged　to　acknowledge　the　existence　of　a　chain　of
causes；　in　which；　however；　absolute　totality　cannot　be　found。　But　we
need　not　detain　ourselves　with　this　question；　for　it　has　already
been　sufficiently　answered　in　our　discussion　of　the　antinomies　into
which　reason　falls；　when　it　attempts　to　reach　the　unconditioned　in　the
series　of　phenomena。　If　we　permit　ourselves　to　be　deceived　by　the
illusion　of　transcendental　idealism；　we　shall　find　that　neither　nature
nor　freedom　exists。　Now　the　question　is：　〃Whether；　admitting　the
existence　of　natural　necessity　in　the　world　of　phenomena；　it　is
possible　to　consider　an　effect　as　at　the　same　time　an　effect　of　nature
and　an　effect　of　freedom…　or；　whether　these　two　modes　of　causality　are
contradictory　and　inpatible？〃
　　No　phenomenal　cause　can　absolutely　and　of　itself　begin　a　series。
Every　action；　in　so　far　as　it　is　productive　of　an　event；　is　itself
an　event　or　occurrence；　and　presupposes　another　preceding　state；　in
which　its　cause　existed。　Thus　everything　that　happens　is　but　a
continuation　of　a　series；　and　an　absolute　beginning　is　impossible　in
the　sensuous　world。　The　actions　of　natural　causes　are；　accordingly；
themselves　effects；　and　presuppose　causes　preceding　them　in　time。　A
primal　action　which　forms　an　absolute　beginning；　is　beyond　the
causal　power　of　phenomena。
　　Now；　is　it　absolutely　necessary　that；　granting　that　all　effects
are　phenomena；　the　causality　of　the　cause　of　these　effects　must　also
be　a　phenomenon　and　belong　to　the　empirical　world？　Is　it　not　rather
possible　that；　although　every　effect　in　the　phenomenal　world　must　be
connected　with　an　em