the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第9部分

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occupied　still　remains；　and　this　it　is　utterly　impossible　to
annihilate　in　thought。　Again；　if　we　take　away；　in　like　manner；　from
our　empirical　conception　of　any　object；　corporeal　or　incorporeal；
all　properties　which　mere　experience　has　taught　us　to　connect　with　it；
still　we　cannot　think　away　those　through　which　we　cogitate　it　as
substance；　or　adhering　to　substance；　although　our　conception　of
substance　is　more　determined　than　that　of　an　object。　pelled；
therefore；　by　that　necessity　with　which　the　conception　of　substance
forces　itself　upon　us；　we　must　confess　that　it　has　its　seat　in　our
faculty　of　cognition　a　priori。

　　III。　Philosophy　stands　in　need　of　a　Science　which　shall
　　　　　　　Determine　the　Possibility；　Principles；　and　Extent　of
　　　　　　　Human　Knowledge　〃a　priori〃

　　Of　far　more　importance　than　all　that　has　been　above　said；　is　the
consideration　that　certain　of　our　cognitions　rise　pletely　above　the
sphere　of　all　possible　experience；　and　by　means　of　conceptions；　to
which　there　exists　in　the　whole　extent　of　experience　no
corresponding　object；　seem　to　extend　the　range　of　our　judgements
beyond　its　bounds。　And　just　in　this　transcendental　or　supersensible
sphere；　where　experience　affords　us　neither　instruction　nor
guidance；　lie　the　investigations　of　reason；　which；　on　account　of　their
importance；　we　consider　far　preferable　to；　and　as　having　a　far　more
elevated　aim　than；　all　that　the　understanding　can　achieve　within　the
sphere　of　sensuous　phenomena。　So　high　a　value　do　we　set　upon　these
investigations；　that　even　at　the　risk　of　error；　we　persist　in
following　them　out；　and　permit　neither　doubt　nor　disregard　nor
indifference　to　restrain　us　from　the　pursuit。　These　unavoidable
problems　of　mere　pure　reason　are　God；　freedom　（of　will）；　and
immortality。　The　science　which；　with　all　its　preliminaries；　has　for
its　especial　object　the　solution　of　these　problems　is　named
metaphysics…　a　science　which　is　at　the　very　outset　dogmatical；　that
is；　it　confidently　takes　upon　itself　the　execution　of　this　task
without　any　previous　investigation　of　the　ability　or　inability　of
reason　for　such　an　undertaking。
　　Now　the　safe　ground　of　experience　being　thus　abandoned；　it　seems
nevertheless　natural　that　we　should　hesitate　to　erect　a　building
with　the　cognitions　we　possess；　without　knowing　whence　they　e；
and　on　the　strength　of　principles；　the　origin　of　which　is
undiscovered。　Instead　of　thus　trying　to　build　without　a　foundation；　it
is　rather　to　be　expected　that　we　should　long　ago　have　put　the
question；　how　the　understanding　can　arrive　at　these　a　priori
cognitions；　and　what　is　the　extent；　validity；　and　worth　which　they　may
possess？　We　say；　〃This　is　natural　enough；〃　meaning　by　the　word
natural；　that　which　is　consistent　with　a　just　and　reasonable　way　of
thinking；　but　if　we　understand　by　the　term；　that。　which　usually
happens；　nothing　indeed　could　be　more　natural　and　more
prehensible　than　that　this　investigation　should　be　left　long
unattempted。　For　one　part　of　our　pure　knowledge；　the　science　of
mathematics；　has　been　long　firmly　established；　and　thus　leads　us　to
form　flattering　expectations　with　regard　to　others；　though　these　may
be　of　quite　a　different　nature。　Besides；　when　we　get　beyond　the　bounds
of　experience；　we　are　of　course　safe　from　opposition　in　that
quarter；　and　the　charm　of　widening　the　range　of　our　knowledge　is　so
great　that；　unless　we　are　brought　to　a　standstill　by　some　evident
contradiction；　we　hurry　on　undoubtingly　in　our　course。　This；
however；　may　be　avoided；　if　we　are　sufficiently　cautious　in　the
construction　of　our　fictions；　which　are　not　the　less　fictions　on
that　account。
　　Mathematical　science　affords　us　a　brilliant　example；　how　far；
independently　of　all　experience；　we　may　carry　our　a　priori
knowledge。　It　is　true　that　the　mathematician　occupies　himself　with
objects　and　cognitions　only　in　so　far　as　they　can　be　represented　by
means　of　intuition。　But　this　circumstance　is　easily　overlooked；
because　the　said　intuition　can　itself　be　given　a　priori；　and　therefore
is　hardly　to　be　distinguished　from　a　mere　pure　conception。　Deceived　by
such　a　proof　of　the　power　of　reason；　we　can　perceive　no　limits　to
the　extension　of　our　knowledge。　The　light　dove　cleaving　in　free　flight
the　thin　air；　whose　resistance　it　feels；　might　imagine　that　her
movements　would　be　far　more　free　and　rapid　in　airless　space。　just　in
the　same　way　did　Plato；　abandoning　the　world　of　sense　because　of　the
narrow　limits　it　sets　to　the　understanding；　venture　upon　the　wings
of　ideas　beyond　it；　into　the　void　space　of　pure　intellect。　He　did
not　reflect　that　he　made　no　real　progress　by　all　his　efforts；　for　he
met　with　no　resistance　which　might　serve　him　for　a　support；　as　it
were；　whereon　to　rest；　and　on　which　he　might　apply　his　powers；　in
order　to　let　the　intellect　acquire　momentum　for　its　progress。　It　is；
indeed；　the　mon　fate　of　human　reason　in　speculation；　to　finish
the　imposing　edifice　of　thought　as　rapidly　as　possible；　and　then　for
the　first　time　to　begin　to　examine　whether　the　foundation　is　a　solid
one　or　no。　Arrived　at　this　point；　all　sorts　of　excuses　are　sought
after；　in　order　to　console　us　for　its　want　of　stability；　or　rather；
indeed；　to　enable　Us　to　dispense　altogether　with　so　late　and　dangerous
an　investigation。　But　what　frees　us　during　the　process　of　building
from　all　apprehension　or　suspicion；　and　flatters　us　into　the　belief　of
its　solidity；　is　this。　A　great　part；　perhaps　the　greatest　part；　of　the
business　of　our　reason　consists　in　the　analysation　of　the
conceptions　which　we　already　possess　of　objects。　By　this　means　we　gain
a　multitude　of　cognitions；　which　although　really　nothing　more　than
elucidations　or　explanations　of　that　which　（though　in　a　confused
manner）　was　already　thought　in　our　conceptions；　are；　at　least　in
respect　of　their　form；　prized　as　new　introspections；　whilst；　so　far　as
regards　their　matter　or　content；　we　have　really　made　no　addition　to
our　conceptions；　but　only　disinvolved　them。　But　as　this　process　does
furnish　a　real　priori　knowledge；　which　has　a　sure　progress　and
useful　results；　reason；　deceived　by　this；　slips　in；　without　being
itself　aware　of　it；　assertions　of　a　quite　different　kind；　in　which；　to
given　conceptions　it　adds　others；　a　priori　indeed；　but　entirely
foreign　to　them；　without　our　knowing　how　it　arrives　at　these；　and；
indeed；　without　such　a　question　ever　suggesting　itself。　I　shall
therefore　at　once　proceed　to　examine　the　difference　between　these
two　modes　of　knowledge。

　　IV。　Of　the　Difference　Between　Analytical　and　Synthetical　Judgements。

　　In　all　judgements　wherein　the　relation　of　a　subject　to　the　predicate
is　cogitated　（I　mention　affirmative　judgements　only　here；　the
application　to　negative　will　be　very　easy）；　this　relation　is
possible　in　two　different　ways。　Either　the　predicate　B　belongs　to
the　subject　A；　as　somewhat　which　is　contained　（though　covertly）　in　the
conception　A；　or　the　predicate　B　lies　pletely　out　of　the　conception
A；　although　it　stands　in　connection　with　it。　In　the　first　instance；
I　term　the　judgement　analytical；　in　the　second；　synthetical。
Analytical　judgements　（affirmative）　are　therefore　those　in　which　the
connection　of　the　predicate　with　the　subject　is　cogitated　through
identity；　those　in　which　this　connection　is　cogitated　without
identity；　are　called　synthetical　judgements。　The　former　may　be
called　explicative；　the　latter　augmentative　judgements；　because　the
former　add　in　the　predicate　nothing　to　the　conception　of　the
subject；　but　only　analyse　it　into　its　constituent　conceptions；　which
were　thought　already　in　the　subject；　although　in　a　confused　manner；
the　latter　add　to　our　conceptions　of　the　subject　a　predicate　which　was
not　contained　in　it；　and　which　no　analysis　could　ever　have
discovered　therein。　For　example；　when　I　say；　〃All　bodies　are
extended；〃　this　is　an　analytical　judgement。　For　I　need　not　go　beyond
the　conception　of　body　in　order　to　find　extension　connected　with　it；
but　merely　analyse　the　conception；　that　is；　bee　conscious　of　the
manifold　properties　which　I　think　in　that　conception；　in　order　to
discover　this　predicate　in　it：　it　is　therefore　an　analytical
judgement。　On　the　other　hand；　when　I　say；　〃All　bodies　are　heavy；〃
the　predicate　is　something　totally　different　from　that　which　I　think
in　the　mere　conception　of　a　body。　By　the　addition　of　such　a　predicate；
therefore；　it　bees　a　synthetical　judgement。
　　Judgements　of　experience；　as　such；　are　always　synthetical。　For　it
would　be　absurd　to　think　of　grounding　an　analytical　judgement　on
experience；　because　in　forming　such　a　judgement　I　need　not　go　out　of
the　sphere　of　my　conceptions；　and　therefore　recourse　to　the
testimony　of　experience　is　quite　unnecessary。　That　〃bodies　are
extended〃　is　not　an　empirical　judgement；　but　a　proposition　which
stands　firm　a　priori。　For　before　addressing　myself　to　experience；　I
already　have　in　my　conception　all　the　requisite　conditions　for　the
judgement；　and　I　have　only　to　extract　the　predicate　from　the
conception；　according　to　the　principle　of　contradiction；　and　thereby
at　the　same　time　bee　conscious　of　the　necessity　of　the　judgement；　a
necessity　which　I　could　never　learn　from　experience。　On　the　other
hand；　though　at　first　I　do　not　at