the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第72部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


of　our　knowledge；　and　by　a　desire　mensurate　therewith…　remains　to
humanity；　even　after　the　theoretical　cognition　of　ourselves　bas　failed
to　establish　the　necessity　of　an　existence　after　death。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Conclusion　of　the　Solution　of　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Psychological　Paralogism。

　　The　dialectical　illusion　in　rational　psychology　arises　from　our
confounding　an　idea　of　reason　（of　a　pure　intelligence）　with　the
conception…　in　every　respect　undetermined…　of　a　thinking　being　in
general。　I　cogitate　myself　in　behalf　of　a　possible　experience；　at
the　same　time　making　abstraction　of　all　actual　experience；　and　infer
therefrom　that　I　can　be　conscious　of　myself　apart　from　experience
and　its　empirical　conditions。　I　consequently　confound　the　possible
abstraction　of　my　empirically　determined　existence　with　the　supposed
consciousness　of　a　possible　separate　existence　of　my　thinking　self；
and　I　believe　that　I　cognize　what　is　substantial　in　myself　as　a
transcendental　subject；　when　I　have　nothing　more　in　thought　than　the
unity　of　consciousness；　which　lies　at　the　basis　of　all　determination
of　cognition。
　　The　task　of　explaining　the　munity　of　the　soul　with　the　body
does　not　properly　belong　to　the　psychology　of　which　we　are　here
speaking；　because　it　proposes　to　prove　the　personality　of　the　soul
apart　from　this　munion　（after　death）；　and　is　therefore　transcendent
in　the　proper　sense　of　the　word；　although　occupying　itself　with　an
object　of　experience…　only　in　so　far；　however；　as　it　ceases　to　be　an
object　of　experience。　But　a　sufficient　answer　may　be　found　to　the
question　in　our　system。　The　difficulty　which　lies　in　the　execution
of　this　task　consists；　as　is　well　known；　in　the　presupposed
heterogeneity　of　the　object　of　the　internal　sense　（the　soul）　and　the
objects　of　the　external　senses；　inasmuch　as　the　formal　condition　of
the　intuition　of　the　one　is　time；　and　of　that　of　the　other　space　also。
But　if　we　consider　that　both　kinds　of　objects　do　not　differ
internally；　but　only　in　so　far　as　the　one　appears　externally　to　the
other…　consequently；　that　what　lies　at　the　basis　of　phenomena；　as　a
thing　in　itself；　may　not　be　heterogeneous；　this　difficulty　disappears。
There　then　remains　no　other　difficulty　than　is　to　be　found　in　the
question…　how　a　munity　of　substances　is　possible；　a　question
which　lies　out　of　the　region　of　psychology；　and　which　the　reader；
after　what　in　our　analytic　has　been　said　of　primitive　forces　and
faculties；　will　easily　judge　to　be　also　beyond　the　region　of　human
cognition。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　GENERAL　REMARK

　　　　　On　the　Transition　from　Rational　Psychology　to　Cosmology。

　　The　proposition；　〃I　think；〃　or；　〃I　exist　thinking；〃　is　an
empirical　proposition。　But　such　a　proposition　must　be　based　on
empirical　intuition；　and　the　object　cogitated　as　a　phenomenon；　and
thus　our　theory　appears　to　maintain　that　the　soul；　even　in　thought；　is
merely　a　phenomenon；　and　in　this　way　our　consciousness　itself；　in
fact；　abuts　upon　nothing。
　　Thought；　per　se；　is　merely　the　purely　spontaneous　logical　function
which　operates　to　connect　the　manifold　of　a　possible　intuition；　and　it
does　not　represent　the　subject　of　consciousness　as　a　phenomenon…　for
this　reason　alone；　that　it　pays　no　attention　to　the　question　whether
the　mode　of　intuiting　it　is　sensuous　or　intellectual。　I　therefore　do
not　represent　myself　in　thought　either　as　I　am；　or　as　I　appear　to
myself；　I　merely　cogitate　myself　as　an　object　in　general；　of　the
mode　of　intuiting　which　I　make　abstraction。　When　I　represent　myself　as
the　subject　of　thought；　or　as　the　ground　of　thought；　these　modes　of
representation　are　not　related　to　the　categories　of　substance　or　of
cause；　for　these　are　functions　of　thought　applicable　only　to　our
sensuous　intuition。　The　application　of　these　categories　to　the　Ego
would；　however；　be　necessary；　if　I　wished　to　make　myself　an　object
of　knowledge。　But　I　wish　to　be　conscious　of　myself　only　as　thinking；
in　what　mode　my　Self　is　given　in　intuition；　I　do　not　consider；　and
it　may　be　that　I；　who　think；　am　a　phenomenon…　although　not　in　so　far
as　I　am　a　thinking　being；　but　in　the　consciousness　of　myself　in　mere
thought　I　am　a　being；　though　this　consciousness　does　not　present　to　me
any　property　of　this　being　as　material　for　thought。
　　But　the　proposition；　〃I　think；〃　in　so　far　as　it　declares；　〃I　exist
thinking；〃　is　not　the　mere　representation　of　a　logical　function。　It
determines　the　subject　（which　is　in　this　case　an　object　also）　in
relation　to　existence；　and　it　cannot　be　given　without　the　aid　of　the
internal　sense；　whose　intuition　presents　to　us　an　object；　not　as　a
thing　in　itself；　but　always　as　a　phenomenon。　In　this　proposition　there
is　therefore　something　more　to　be　found　than　the　mere　spontaneity　of
thought；　there　is　also　the　receptivity　of　intuition；　that　is；　my
thought　of　myself　applied　to　the　empirical　intuition　of　myself。　Now；
in　this　intuition　the　thinking　self　must　seek　the　conditions　of　the
employment　of　its　logical　functions　as　categories　of　substance；　cause；
and　so　forth；　not　merely　for　the　purpose　of　distinguishing　itself　as
an　object　in　itself　by　means　of　the　representation　〃I；〃　but　also　for
the　purpose　of　determining　the　mode　of　its　existence；　that　is；　of
cognizing　itself　as　noumenon。　But　this　is　impossible；　for　the　internal
empirical　intuition　is　sensuous；　and　presents　us　with　nothing　but
phenomenal　data；　which　do　not　assist　the　object　of　pure
consciousness　in　its　attempt　to　cognize　itself　as　a　separate
existence；　but　are　useful　only　as　contributions　to　experience。
　　But；　let　it　be　granted　that　we　could　discover；　not　in　experience；
but　in　certain　firmly…established　a　priori　laws　of　the　use　of　pure
reason…　laws　relating　to　our　existence；　authority　to　consider
ourselves　as　legislating　a　priori　in　relation　to　our　own　existence　and
as　determining　this　existence；　we　should；　on　this　supposition；　find
ourselves　possessed　of　a　spontaneity；　by　which　our　actual　existence
would　be　determinable；　without　the　aid　of　the　conditions　of
empirical　intuition。　We　should　also　bee　aware　that　in　the
consciousness　of　our　existence　there　was　an　a　priori　content；　which
would　serve　to　determine　our　own　existence…　an　existence　only
sensuously　determinable…　relatively；　however；　to　a　certain　internal
faculty　in　relation　to　an　intelligible　world。
　　But　this　would　not　give　the　least　help　to　the　attempts　of　rational
psychology。　For　this　wonderful　faculty；　which　the　consciousness　of　the
moral　law　in　me　reveals；　would　present　me　with　a　principle　of　the
determination　of　my　own　existence　which　is　purely　intellectual…　but　by
what　predicates？　By　none　other　than　those　which　are　given　in
sensuous　intuition。　Thus　I　should　find　myself　in　the　same　position
in　rational　psychology　which　I　formerly　occupied；　that　is　to　say；　I
should　find　myself　still　in　need　of　sensuous　intuitions；　in　order　to
give　significance　to　my　conceptions　of　substance　and　cause；　by　means
of　which　alone　I　can　possess　a　knowledge　of　myself：　but　these
intuitions　can　never　raise　me　above　the　sphere　of　experience。　I　should
be　justified；　however；　in　applying　these　conceptions；　in　regard　to
their　practical　use；　which　is　always　directed　to　objects　of
experience…　in　conformity　with　their　analogical　significance　when
employed　theoretically…　to　freedom　and　its　subject。　At　the　same
time；　I　should　understand　by　them　merely　the　logical　functions　of
subject　and　predicate；　of　principle　and　consequence；　in　conformity
with　which　all　actions　are　so　determined；　that　they　are　capable　of
being　explained　along　with　the　laws　of　nature；　conformably　to　the
categories　of　substance　and　cause；　although　they　originate　from　a　very
different　principle。　We　have　made　these　observations　for　the　purpose
of　guarding　against　misunderstanding；　to　which　the　doctrine　of　our
intuition　of　self　as　a　phenomenon　is　exposed。　We　shall　have　occasion
to　perceive　their　utility　in　the　sequel。
　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　II。　The　Antinomy　of　Pure　Reason。

　　We　showed　in　the　introduction　to　this　part　of　our　work；　that　all
transcendental　illusion　of　pure　reason　arose　from　dialectical
arguments；　the　schema　of　which　logic　gives　us　in　its　three　formal
species　of　syllogisms…　just　as　the　categories　find　their　logical
schema　in　the　four　functions　of　all　judgements。　The　first　kind　of
these　sophistical　arguments　related　to　the　unconditioned　unity　of
the　subjective　conditions　of　all　representations　in　general　（of　the
subject　or　soul）；　in　correspondence　with　the　categorical　syllogisms；
the　major　of　which；　as　the　principle；　enounces　the　relation　of　a
predicate　to　a　subject。　The　second　kind　of　dialectical　argument　will
therefore　be　concerned；　following　the　analogy　with　hypothetical
syllogisms；　with　the　unconditioned　unity　of　the　objective　conditions
in　the　phenomenon；　and；　in　this　way；　the　theme　of　the　third　kind　to　be
treated　of　in　the　following　chapter　will　be　the　unconditioned　unity　of
the　objective　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　objects　in　general。
　　But　it　is　worthy　of　remark　that　the　transcendental　paralogism
produced　in　the　mind　only　a　one…third　illusion；　in　regard　to　the
idea　of　the　subject　of　our　thought；　and　the　conceptions　of　reason　gave
no　ground　to　maintain　the　contrary　proposition。