the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第70部分

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fact；　nothing　more　than　the　logical　qualitative　unity　of
self…consciousness　in　thought；　whilst　we　remain　perfectly　ignorant
whether　the　subject　is　posite　or　not。

　　　　　　　Refutation　of　the　Argument　of　Mendelssohn　for　the
　　　　　　　　　　Substantiality　or　Permanence　of　the　Soul。

　　This　acute　philosopher　easily　perceived　the　insufficiency　of　the
mon　argument　which　attempts　to　prove　that　the　soul…　it　being
granted　that　it　is　a　simple　being…　cannot　perish　by　dissolution　or
deposition；　he　saw　it　is　not　impossible　for　it　to　cease　to　be　by
extinction；　or　disappearance。　He　endeavoured　to　prove　in　his　Phaedo；
that　the　soul　cannot　be　annihilated；　by　showing　that　a　simple　being
cannot　cease　to　exist。　Inasmuch　as；　be　said；　a　simple　existence　cannot
diminish；　nor　gradually　lose　portions　of　its　being；　and　thus　be　by
degrees　reduced　to　nothing　（for　it　possesses　no　parts；　and　therefore
no　multiplicity）；　between　the　moment　in　which　it　is；　and　the　moment　in
which　it　is　not；　no　time　can　be　discovered…　which　is　impossible。　But
this　philosopher　did　not　consider　that；　granting　the　soul　to　possess
this　simple　nature；　which　contains　no　parts　external　to　each　other　and
consequently　no　extensive　quantity；　we　cannot　refuse　to　it　any　less
than　to　any　other　being；　intensive　quantity；　that　is；　a　degree　of
reality　in　regard　to　all　its　faculties；　nay；　to　all　that　constitutes
its　existence。　But　this　degree　of　reality　can　bee　less　and　less
through　an　infinite　series　of　smaller　degrees。　It　follows；
therefore；　that　this　supposed　substance…　this　thing；　the　permanence　of
which　is　not　assured　in　any　other　way；　may；　if　not　by　deposition；
by　gradual　loss　（remissio）　of　its　powers　（consequently　by
elanguescence；　if　I　may　employ　this　expression）；　be　changed　into
nothing。　For　consciousness　itself　has　always　a　degree；　which　may　be
lessened。*　Consequently　the　faculty　of　being　conscious　may　be
diminished；　and　so　with　all　other　faculties。　The　permanence　of　the
soul；　therefore；　as　an　object　of　the　internal　sense；　remains
undemonstrated；　nay；　even　indemonstrable。　Its　permanence　in　life　is
evident；　per　se；　inasmuch　as　the　thinking　being　（as　man）　is　to　itself；
at　the　same　time；　an　object　of　the　external　senses。　But　this　does
not　authorize　the　rational　psychologist　to　affirm；　from　mere
conceptions；　its　permanence　beyond　life。*＇2＇

　　*Clearness　is　not；　as　logicians　maintain；　the　consciousness　of　a
representation。　For　a　certain　degree　of　consciousness；　which　may
not；　however；　be　sufficient　for　recollection；　is　to　be　met　with　in
many　dim　representations。　For　without　any　consciousness　at　all；　we
should　not　be　able　to　recognize　any　difference　in　the　obscure
representations　we　connect；　as　we　really　can　do　with　many　conceptions；
such　as　those　of　right　and　justice；　and　those　of　the　musician；　who
strikes　at　once　several　notes　in　improvising　a　piece　of　music。　But　a
representation　is　clear；　in　which　our　consciousness　is　sufficient
for　the　consciousness　of　the　difference　of　this　representation　from
others。　If　we　are　only　conscious　that　there　is　a　difference；　but　are
not　conscious　of　the　difference…　that　is；　what　the　difference　is…
the　representation　must　be　termed　obscure。　There　is；　consequently；
an　infinite　series　of　degrees　of　consciousness　down　to　its　entire
disappearance。
　　*＇2＇　There　are　some　who　think　they　have　done　enough　to　establish　a
new　possibility　in　the　mode　of　the　existence　of　souls；　when　they
have　shown　that　there　is　no　contradiction　in　their　hypotheses　on
this　subject。　Such　are　those　who　affirm　the　possibility　of　thought…　of
which　they　have　no　other　knowledge　than　what　they　derive　from　its
use　in　connecting　empirical　intuitions　presented　in　this　our　human
life…　after　this　life　bas　ceased。　But　it　is　very　easy　to　embarrass
them　by　the　introduction　of　counter…possibilities；　which　rest　upon
quite　as　good　a　foundation。　Such；　for　example；　is　the　possibility　of
the　division　of　a　simple　substance　into　several　substances；　and
conversely；　of　the　coalition　of　several　into　one　simple　substance。
For；　although　divisibility　presupposes　position；　it　does　not
necessarily　require　a　position　of　substances；　but　only　of　the
degrees　（of　the　several　faculties）　of　one　and　the　same　substance。
Now　we　can　cogitate　all　the　powers　and　faculties　of　the　soul…　even
that　of　consciousness…　as　diminished　by　one　half；　the　substance
still　remaining。　In　the　same　way　we　can　represent　to　ourselves　without
contradiction；　this　obliterated　half　as　preserved；　not　in　the　soul；
but　without　it；　and　we　can　believe　that；　as　in　this　case　every。
thing　that　is　real　in　the　soul；　and　has　a　degree…　consequently　its
entire　existence…　has　been　halved；　a　particular　substance　would
arise　out　of　the　soul。　For　the　multiplicity；　which　has　been　divided；
formerly　existed；　but　not　as　a　multiplicity　of　substances；　but　of
every　reality　as　the　quantum　of　existence　in　it；　and　the　unity　of
substance　was　merely　a　mode　of　existence；　which　by　this　division　alone
has　been　transformed　into　a　plurality　of　subsistence。　In　the　same
manner　several　simple　substances　might　coalesce　into　one；　without
anything　being　lost　except　the　plurality　of　subsistence；　inasmuch　as
the　one　substance　would　contain　the　degree　of　reality　of　all　the
former　substances。　Perhaps；　indeed；　the　simple　substances；　which
appear　under　the　form　of　matter；　might　（not　indeed　by　a　mechanical
or　chemical　influence　upon　each　other；　but　by　an　unknown　influence；　of
which　the　former　would　be　but　the　phenomenal　appearance）；　by　means
of　such　a　dynamical　division　of　the　parent…souls；　as　intensive
quantities；　produce　other　souls；　while　the　former　repaired　the　loss
thus　sustained　with　new　matter　of　the　same　sort。　I　am　far　from
allowing　any　value　to　such　chimeras；　and　the　principles　of　our
analytic　have　clearly　proved　that　no　other　than　an　empirical　use　of
the　categories…　that　of　substance；　for　example…　is　possible。　But　if
the　rationalist　is　bold　enough　to　construct；　on　the　mere　authority
of　the　faculty　of　thought…　without　any　intuition；　whereby　an　object　is
given…　a　self…subsistent　being；　merely　because　the　unity　of
apperception　in　thought　cannot　allow　him　to　believe　it　a　posite
being；　instead　of　declaring；　as　he　ought　to　do；　that　he　is　unable　to
explain　the　possibility　of　a　thinking　nature；　what　ought　to　hinder　the
materialist；　with　as　plete　an　independence　of　experience；　to　employ
the　principle　of　the　rationalist　in　a　directly　opposite　manner…
still　preserving　the　formal　unity　required　by　his　opponent？

　　If；　now；　we　take　the　above　propositions…　as　they　must　be　accepted　as
valid　for　all　thinking　beings　in　the　system　of　rational　psychology…　in
synthetical　connection；　and　proceed；　from　the　category　of　relation；
with　the　proposition：　〃All　thinking　beings　are；　as　such；
substances；〃　backwards　through　the　series；　till　the　circle　is
pleted；　we　e　at　last　to　their　existence；　of　which；　in　this
system　of　rational　psychology；　substances　are　held　to　be　conscious；
independently　of　external　things；　nay；　it　is　asserted　that；　in
relation　to　the　permanence　which　is　a　necessary　characteristic　of
substance；　they　can　of　themselves　determine　external　things。　It
follows　that　idealism…　at　least　problematical　idealism；　is　perfectly
unavoidable　in　this　rationalistic　system。　And；　if　the　existence　of
outward　things　is　not　held　to　be　requisite　to　the　determination　of　the
existence　of　a　substance　in　time；　the　existence　of　these　outward
things　at　all；　is　a　gratuitous　assumption　which　remains　without　the
possibility　of　a　proof。
　　But　if　we　proceed　analytically…　the　〃I　think〃　as　a　proposition
containing　in　itself　an　existence　as　given；　consequently　modality
being　the　principle…　and　dissect　this　proposition；　in　order　to
ascertain　its　content；　and　discover　whether　and　how　this　Ego
determines　its　existence　in　time　and　space　without　the　aid　of　anything
external；　the　propositions　of　rationalistic　psychology　would　not　begin
with　the　conception　of　a　thinking　being；　but　with　a　reality；　and　the
properties　of　a　thinking　being　in　general　would　be　deduced　from　the
mode　in　which　this　reality　is　cogitated；　after　everything　empirical
had　been　abstracted；　as　is　shown　in　the　following　table：

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I　think；

　　　　　　　　　　　　2　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3
　　　　　　　　as　Subject；　　　　　　　　　　　　　　as　simple　Subject；

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　4
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　as　identical　Subject；
　　　　　　　　　　　in　every　state　of　my　thought。

　　Now；　inasmuch　as　it　is　not　determined　in　this　second　proposition；
whether　I　can　exist　and　be　cogitated　only　as　subject；　and　not　also
as　a　predicate　of　another　being；　the　conception　of　a　subject　is　here
taken　in　a　merely　logical　sense；　and　it　remains　undetermined；
whether　substance　is　to　be　cogitated　under　the　conception　or　not。
But　in　the　third　proposition；　the　absolute　unity　of　apperception…
the　simple　Ego　in　the　representation　to　which　all　connection　and
separation；　which　constitute　thought；　relate；　is　of　itself
important；　even　although　it　presents　us　with　no　information　about
the　constitution　or　subsistence　of　the　subject。　Apperception　is
something　real；　and　the　simplicity　of　its　nature　is　given　in　the
very　fact　of　its　possibility。　Now　in　space　there　is　nothing　rea