the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第65部分

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it　the　cognition　of　the　object　thought；　and　say：　〃Caius　is　mortal。〃
　　Hence；　in　the　conclusion　of　a　syllogism　we　restrict　a　predicate　to　a
certain　object；　after　having　thought　it　in　the　major　in　its　whole
extent　under　a　certain　condition。　This　plete　quantity　of　the　extent
in　relation　to　such　a　condition　is　called　universality
（universalitas）。　To　this　corresponds　totality　（universitas）　of
conditions　in　the　synthesis　of　intuitions。　The　transcendental
conception　of　reason　is　therefore　nothing　else　than　the　conception
of　the　totality　of　the　conditions　of　a　given　conditioned。　Now　as　the
unconditioned　alone　renders　possible　totality　of　conditions；　and；
conversely；　the　totality　of　conditions　is　itself　always　unconditioned；
a　pure　rational　conception　in　general　can　be　defined　and　explained
by　means　of　the　conception　of　the　unconditioned；　in　so　far　as　it
contains　a　basis　for　the　synthesis　of　the　conditioned。
　　To　the　number　of　modes　of　relation　which　the　understanding　cogitates
by　means　of　the　categories；　the　number　of　pure　rational　conceptions
will　correspond。　We　must　therefore　seek　for；　first；　an　unconditioned
of　the　categorical　synthesis　in　a　subject；　secondly；　of　the
hypothetical　synthesis　of　the　members　of　a　series；　thirdly；　of　the
disjunctive　synthesis　of　parts　in　a　system。
　　There　are　exactly　the　same　number　of　modes　of　syllogisms；　each　of
which　proceeds　through　prosyllogisms　to　the　unconditioned…　one　to
the　subject　which　cannot　be　employed　as　predicate；　another　to　the
presupposition　which　supposes　nothing　higher　than　itself；　and　the
third　to　an　aggregate　of　the　members　of　the　plete　division　of　a
conception。　Hence　the　pure　rational　conceptions　of　totality　in　the
synthesis　of　conditions　have　a　necessary　foundation　in　the　nature　of
human　reason…　at　least　as　modes　of　elevating　the　unity　of　the
understanding　to　the　unconditioned。　They　may　have　no　valid
application；　corresponding　to　their　transcendental　employment；　in
concreto；　and　be　thus　of　no　greater　utility　than　to　direct　the
understanding　how；　while　extending　them　as　widely　as　possible；　to
maintain　its　exercise　and　application　in　perfect　consistence　and
harmony。
　　But；　while　speaking　here　of　the　totality　of　conditions　and　of　the
unconditioned　as　the　mon　title　of　all　conceptions　of　reason；　we
again　light　upon　an　expression　which　we　find　it　impossible　to　dispense
with；　and　which　nevertheless；　owing　to　the　ambiguity　attaching　to　it
from　long　abuse；　we　cannot　employ　with　safety。　The　word　absolute　is
one　of　the　few　words　which；　in　its　original　signification；　was
perfectly　adequate　to　the　conception　it　was　intended　to　convey…　a
conception　which　no　other　word　in　the　same　language　exactly　suits；　and
the　loss…　or；　which　is　the　same　thing；　the　incautious　and　loose
employment…　of　which　must　be　followed　by　the　loss　of　the　conception
itself。　And；　as　it　is　a　conception　which　occupies　much　of　the
attention　of　reason；　its　loss　would　be　greatly　to　the　detriment　of　all
transcendental　philosophy。　The　word　absolute　is　at　present
frequently　used　to　denote　that　something　can　be　predicated　of　a
thing　considered　in　itself　and　intrinsically。　In　this　sense　absolutely
possible　would　signify　that　which　is　possible　in　itself　（interne）…
which　is；　in　fact；　the　least　that　one　can　predicate　of　an　object。　On
the　other　hand；　it　is　sometimes　employed　to　indicate　that　a　thing　is
valid　in　all　respects…　for　example；　absolute　sovereignty。　Absolutely
possible　would　in　this　sense　signify　that　which　is　possible　in　all
relations　and　in　every　respect；　and　this　is　the　most　that　can　be
predicated　of　the　possibility　of　a　thing。　Now　these　significations
do　in　truth　frequently　coincide。　Thus；　for　example；　that　which　is
intrinsically　impossible；　is　also　impossible　in　all　relations；　that
is；　absolutely　impossible。　But　in　most　cases　they　differ　from　each
other　toto　caelo；　and　I　can　by　no　means　conclude　that；　because　a　thing
is　in　itself　possible；　it　is　also　possible　in　all　relations；　and
therefore　absolutely。　Nay；　more；　I　shall　in　the　sequel　show　that
absolute　necessity　does　not　by　any　means　depend　on　internal　necessity；
and　that；　therefore；　it　must　not　be　considered　as　synonymous　with
it。　Of　an　opposite　which　is　intrinsically　impossible；　we　may　affirm
that　it　is　in　all　respects　impossible；　and　that；　consequently；　the
thing　itself；　of　which　this　is　the　opposite；　is　absolutely
necessary；　but　I　cannot　reason　conversely　and　say；　the　opposite　of
that　which　is　absolutely　necessary　is　intrinsically　impossible；　that
is；　that　the　absolute　necessity　of　things　is　an　internal　necessity。
For　this　internal　necessity　is　in　certain　cases　a　mere　empty　word　with
which　the　least　conception　cannot　be　connected；　while　the　conception
of　the　necessity　of　a　thing　in　all　relations　possesses　very　peculiar
determinations。　Now　as　the　loss　of　a　conception　of　great　utility　in
speculative　science　cannot　be　a　matter　of　indifference　to　the
philosopher；　I　trust　that　the　proper　determination　and　careful
preservation　of　the　expression　on　which　the　conception　depends　will
likewise　be　not　indifferent　to　him。
　　In　this　enlarged　signification；　then；　shall　I　employ　the　word
absolute；　in　opposition　to　that　which　is　valid　only　in　some　particular
respect；　for　the　latter　is　restricted　by　conditions；　the　former　is
valid　without　any　restriction　whatever。
　　Now　the　transcendental　conception　of　reason　has　for　its　object
nothing　else　than　absolute　totality　in　the　synthesis　of　conditions　and
does　not　rest　satisfied　till　it　has　attained　to　the　absolutely；　that
is；　in　all　respects　and　relations；　unconditioned。　For　pure　reason
leaves　to　the　understanding　everything　that　immediately　relates　to　the
object　of　intuition　or　rather　to　their　synthesis　in　imagination。　The
former　restricts　itself　to　the　absolute　totality　in　the　employment
of　the　conceptions　of　the　understanding　and　aims　at　carrying　out　the
synthetical　unity　which　is　cogitated　in　the　category；　even　to　the
unconditioned。　This　unity　may　hence　be　called　the　rational　unity　of
phenomena；　as　the　other；　which　the　category　expresses；　may　be　termed
the　unity　of　the　understanding。　Reason；　therefore；　has　an　immediate
relation　to　the　use　of　the　understanding；　not　indeed　in　so　far　as
the　latter　contains　the　ground　of　possible　experience　（for　the
conception　of　the　absolute　totality　of　conditions　is　not　a
conception　that　can　be　employed　in　experience；　because　no　experience
is　unconditioned）；　but　solely　for　the　purpose　of　directing　it　to　a
certain　unity；　of　which　the　understanding　has　no　conception；　and　the
aim　of　which　is　to　collect　into　an　absolute　whole　all　acts　of　the
understanding。　Hence　the　objective　employment　of　the　pure
conceptions　of　reason　is　always　transcendent；　while　that　of　the　pure
conceptions　of　the　understanding　must；　according　to　their　nature；　be
always　immanent；　inasmuch　as　they　are　limited　to　possible　experience。
　　I　understand　by　idea　a　necessary　conception　of　reason；　to　which　no
corresponding　object　can　be　discovered　in　the　world　of　sense。
Accordingly；　the　pure　conceptions　of　reason　at　present　under
consideration　are　transcendental　ideas。　They　are　conceptions　of　pure
reason；　for　they　regard　all　empirical　cognition　as　determined　by　means
of　an　absolute　totality　of　conditions。　They　are　not　mere　fictions；　but
natural　and　necessary　products　of　reason；　and　have　hence　a　necessary
relation　to　the　whole　sphere　of　the　exercise　of　the　understanding。
And；　finally；　they　are　transcendent；　and　overstep　the　limits　of　all
experiences；　in　which；　consequently；　no　object　can　ever　be　presented
that　would　be　perfectly　adequate　to　a　transcendental　idea。　When　we　use
the　word　idea；　we　say；　as　regards　its　object　（an　object　of　the　pure
understanding）；　a　great　deal；　but　as　regards　its　subject　（that　is；
in　respect　of　its　reality　under　conditions　of　experience）；　exceedingly
little；　because　the　idea；　as　the　conception　of　a　maximum；　can　never　be
pletely　and　adequately　presented　in　concreto。　Now；　as　in　the　merely
speculative　employment　of　reason　the　latter　is　properly　the　sole
aim；　and　as　in　this　case　the　approximation　to　a　conception；　which　is
never　attained　in　practice；　is　the　same　thing　as　if　the　conception
were　non…existent…　it　is　monly　said　of　the　conception　of　this　kind；
〃it　is　only　an　idea。〃　So　we　might　very　well　say；　〃the　absolute
totality　of　all　phenomena　is　only　an　idea；〃　for；　as　we　never　can
present　an　adequate　representation　of　it；　it　remains　for　us　a
problem　incapable　of　solution。　On　the　other　hand；　as　in　the
practical　use　of　the　understanding　we　have　only　to　do　with　action
and　practice　according　to　rules；　an　idea　of　pure　reason　can　always
be　given　really　in　concreto；　although　only　partially；　nay；　it　is　the
indispensable　condition　of　all　practical　employment　of　reason。　The
practice　or　execution　of　the　idea　is　always　limited　and　defective；　but
nevertheless　within　indeterminable　boundaries；　consequently　always
under　the　influence　of　the　conception　of　an　absolute　perfection。　And
thus　the　practical　idea　is　always　in　the　highest　degree　fruitful；
and　in　relation　to　real　actions　indispensably　necessary。　In　the
idea；　pure　reason　possesses　even　causality　and　the　power　of
producing　that　which　its　conception　contains。　Hence