the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第63部分

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conditions　（in　the　synthesis　of　phenomena；　or　of　thought　in　general）
extends　to　the　unconditioned　is　objectively　true；　or　not；　what
consequences　result　therefrom　affecting　the　empirical　use　of　the
understanding；　or　rather　whether　there　exists　any　such　objectively
valid　proposition　of　reason；　and　whether　it　is　not；　on　the　contrary；　a
merely　logical　precept　which　directs　us　to　ascend　perpetually　to　still
higher　conditions；　to　approach　pleteness　in　the　series　of　them；　and
thus　to　introduce　into　our　cognition　the　highest　possible　unity　of
reason。　We　must　ascertain；　I　say；　whether　this　requirement　of　reason
has　not　been　regarded；　by　a　misunderstanding；　as　a　transcendental
principle　of　pure　reason；　which　postulates　a　thorough　pleteness
in　the　series　of　conditions　in　objects　themselves。　We　must　show；
moreover；　the　misconceptions　and　illusions　that　intrude　into
syllogisms；　the　major　proposition　of　which　pure　reason　has　supplied…　a
proposition　which　has　perhaps　more　of　the　character　of　a　petitio
than　of　a　postulatum…　and　that　proceed　from　experience　upwards　to
its　conditions。　The　solution　of　these　problems　is　our　task　in
transcendental　dialectic；　which　we　are　about　to　expose　even　at　its
source；　that　lies　deep　in　human　reason。　We　shall　divide　it　into　two
parts；　the　first　of　which　will　treat　of　the　transcendent　conceptions
of　pure　reason；　the　second　of　transcendent　and　dialectical　syllogisms。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　I。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　OF　THE　CONCEPTIONS　OF　PURE　REASON。

　　The　conceptions　of　pure　reason…　we　do　not　here　speak　of　the
possibility　of　them…　are　not　obtained　by　reflection；　but　by
inference　or　conclusion。　The　conceptions　of　understanding　are　also
cogitated　a　priori　antecedently　to　experience；　and　render　it　possible；
but　they　contain　nothing　but　the　unity　of　reflection　upon　phenomena；
in　so　far　as　these　must　necessarily　belong　to　a　possible　empirical
consciousness。　Through　them　alone　are　cognition　and　the
determination　of　an　object　possible。　It　is　from　them；　accordingly；
that　we　receive　material　for　reasoning；　and　antecedently　to　them　we
possess　no　a　priori　conceptions　of　objects　from　which　they　might　be
deduced；　On　the　other　hand；　the　sole　basis　of　their　objective
reality　consists　in　the　necessity　imposed　on　them；　as　containing　the
intellectual　form　of　all　experience；　of　restricting　their
application　and　influence　to　the　sphere　of　experience。
　　But　the　term；　conception　of　reason；　or　rational　conception；　itself
indicates　that　it　does　not　confine　itself　within　the　limits　of
experience；　because　its　object…matter　is　a　cognition；　of　which　every
empirical　cognition　is　but　a　part…　nay；　the　whole　of　possible
experience　may　be　itself　but　a　part　of　it…　a　cognition　to　which　no
actual　experience　ever　fully　attains；　although　it　does　always
pertain　to　it。　The　aim　of　rational　conceptions　is　the　prehension；
as　that　of　the　conceptions　of　understanding　is　the　understanding　of
perceptions。　If　they　contain　the　unconditioned；　they　relate　to　that　to
which　all　experience　is　subordinate；　but　which　is　never　itself　an
object　of　experience…　that　towards　which　reason　tends　in　all　its
conclusions　from　experience；　and　by　the　standard　of　which　it　estimates
the　degree　of　their　empirical　use；　but　which　is　never　itself　an
element　in　an　empirical　synthesis。　If；　notwithstanding；　such
conceptions　possess　objective　validity；　they　may　be　called　conceptus
ratiocinati　（conceptions　legitimately　concluded）；　in　cases　where
they　do　not；　they　have　been　admitted　on　account　of　having　the
appearance　of　being　correctly　concluded；　and　may　be　called　conceptus
ratiocinantes　（sophistical　conceptions）。　But　as　this　can　only　be
sufficiently　demonstrated　in　that　part　of　our　treatise　which　relates
to　the　dialectical　conclusions　of　reason；　we　shall　omit　any
consideration　of　it　in　this　place。　As　we　called　the　pure　conceptions
of　the　understanding　categories；　we　shall　also　distinguish　those　of
pure　reason　by　a　new　name　and　call　them　transcendental　ideas。　These
terms；　however；　we　must　in　the　first　place　explain　and　justify。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I　…　Of　Ideas　in　General。

　　Despite　the　great　wealth　of　words　which　European　languages
possess；　the　thinker　finds　himself　often　at　a　loss　for　an　expression
exactly　suited　to　his　conception；　for　want　of　which　he　is　unable　to
make　himself　intelligible　either　to　others　or　to　himself。　To　coin
new　words　is　a　pretension　to　legislation　in　language　which　is　seldom
successful；　and；　before　recourse　is　taken　to　so　desperate　an
expedient；　it　is　advisable　to　examine　the　dead　and　learned
languages；　with　the　hope　and　the　probability　that　we　may　there　meet
with　some　adequate　expression　of　the　notion　we　have　in　our　minds。　In
this　case；　even　if　the　original　meaning　of　the　word　has　bee
somewhat　uncertain；　from　carelessness　or　want　of　caution　on　the　part
of　the　authors　of　it；　it　is　always　better　to　adhere　to　and　confirm　its
proper　meaning…　even　although　it　may　be　doubtful　whether　it　was
formerly　used　in　exactly　this　sense…　than　to　make　our　labour　vain　by
want　of　sufficient　care　to　render　ourselves　intelligible。
　　For　this　reason；　when　it　happens　that　there　exists　only　a　single
word　to　express　a　certain　conception；　and　this　word；　in　its　usual
acceptation；　is　thoroughly　adequate　to　the　conception；　the　accurate
distinction　of　which　from　related　conceptions　is　of　great
importance；　we　ought　not　to　employ　the　expression　improvidently；　or；
for　the　sake　of　variety　and　elegance　of　style；　use　it　as　a　synonym　for
other　cognate　words。　It　is　our　duty；　on　the　contrary；　carefully　to
preserve　its　peculiar　signification；　as　otherwise　it　easily　happens
that　when　the　attention　of　the　reader　is　no　longer　particularly
attracted　to　the　expression；　and　it　is　lost　amid　the　multitude　of
other　words　of　very　different　import；　the　thought　which　it　conveyed；
and　which　it　alone　conveyed；　is　lost　with　it。
　　Plato　employed　the　expression　idea　in　a　way　that　plainly　showed　he
meant　by　it　something　which　is　never　derived　from　the　senses；　but
which　far　transcends　even　the　conceptions　of　the　understanding　（with
which　Aristotle　occupied　himself）；　inasmuch　as　in　experience　nothing
perfectly　corresponding　to　them　could　be　found。　Ideas　are；　according
to　him；　archetypes　of　things　themselves；　and　not　merely　keys　to
possible　experiences；　like　the　categories。　In　his　view　they　flow
from　the　highest　reason；　by　which　they　have　been　imparted　to　human
reason；　which；　however；　exists　no　longer　in　its　original　state；　but　is
obliged　with　great　labour　to　recall　by　reminiscence…　which　is　called
philosophy…　the　old　but　now　sadly　obscured　ideas。　I　will　not　here
enter　upon　any　literary　investigation　of　the　sense　which　this
sublime　philosopher　attached　to　this　expression。　I　shall　content
myself　with　remarking　that　it　is　nothing　unusual；　in　mon
conversation　as　well　as　in　written　works；　by　paring　the　thoughts
which　an　author　has　delivered　upon　a　subject；　to　understand　him　better
than　he　understood　himself　inasmuch　as　he　may　not　have　sufficiently
determined　his　conception；　and　thus　have　sometimes　spoken；　nay　even
thought；　in　opposition　to　his　own　opinions。
　　Plato　perceived　very　clearly　that　our　faculty　of　cognition　has　the
feeling　of　a　much　higher　vocation　than　that　of　merely　spelling　out
phenomena　according　to　synthetical　unity；　for　the　purpose　of　being
able　to　read　them　as　experience；　and　that　our　reason　naturally
raises　itself　to　cognitions　far　too　elevated　to　admit　of　the
possibility　of　an　object　given　by　experience　corresponding　to　them…
cognitions　which　are　nevertheless　real；　and　are　not　mere　phantoms　of
the　brain。
　　This　philosopher　found　his　ideas　especially　in　all　that　is
practical；*　that　is；　which　rests　upon　freedom；　which　in　its　turn　ranks
under　cognitions　that　are　the　peculiar　product　of　reason。　He　who　would
derive　from　experience　the　conceptions　of　virtue；　who　would　make　（as
many　have　really　done）　that；　which　at　best　can　but　serve　as　an
imperfectly　illustrative　example；　a　model　for　or　the　formation　of　a
perfectly　adequate　idea　on　the　subject；　would　in　fact　transform　virtue
into　a　nonentity　changeable　according　to　time　and　circumstance　and
utterly　incapable　of　being　employed　as　a　rule。　On　the　contrary；
every　one　is　conscious　that；　when　any　one　is　held　up　to　him　as　a　model
of　virtue；　he　pares　this　so…called　model　with　the　true　original
which　he　possesses　in　his　own　mind　and　values　him　according　to　this
standard。　But　this　standard　is　the　idea　of　virtue；　in　relation　to
which　all　possible　objects　of　experience　are　indeed　serviceable　as
examples…　proofs　of　the　practicability　in　a　certain　degree　of　that
which　the　conception　of　virtue　demands…　but　certainly　not　as
archetypes。　That　the　actions　of　man　will　never　be　in　perfect
accordance　with　all　the　requirements　of　the　pure　ideas　of　reason；　does
not　prove　the　thought　to　be　chimerical。　For　only　through　this　idea　are
all　judgements　as　to　moral　merit　or　demerit　possible；　it
consequently　lies　at　the　foundation　of　every　approach　to　moral
perfection；　however　far　removed　from　it　the　obstacles　in　human　nature…
indeterminable　as　to　degree…　may　keep　us。

　　*He　certainly　extended　the　application　of　his　conception　to
speculative　cognitions　also；　pro