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pretended　synthetical　propositions　which　critical　reason　cannot
acknowledge　and　which　are　based　solely　upon　a　transcendental
amphiboly；　that　is；　upon　a　substitution　of　an　object　of　pure
understanding　for　a　phenomenon。
　　For　want　of　this　doctrine　of　transcendental　topic；　and
consequently　deceived　by　the　amphiboly　of　the　conceptions　of
reflection；　the　celebrated　Leibnitz　constructed　an　intellectual　system
of　the　world；　or　rather；　believed　himself　petent　to　cognize　the
internal　nature　of　things；　by　paring　all　objects　merely　with　the
understanding　and　the　abstract　formal　conceptions　of　thought。　Our
table　of　the　conceptions　of　reflection　gives　us　the　unexpected
advantage　of　being　able　to　exhibit　the　distinctive　peculiarities　of
his　system　in　all　its　parts；　and　at　the　same　time　of　exposing　the
fundamental　principle　of　this　peculiar　mode　of　thought；　which　rested
upon　naught　but　a　misconception。　He　pared　all　things　with　each
other　merely　by　means　of　conceptions；　and　naturally　found　no　other
differences　than　those　by　which　the　understanding　distinguishes　its
pure　conceptions　one　from　another。　The　conditions　of　sensuous
intuition；　which　contain　in　themselves　their　own　means　of　distinction；
he　did　not　look　upon　as　primitive；　because　sensibility　was　to　him
but　a　confused　mode　of　representation　and　not　any　particular　source　of
representations。　A　phenomenon　was　for　him　the　representation　of　the
thing　in　itself；　although　distinguished　from　cognition　by　the
understanding　only　in　respect　of　the　logical　form…　the　former　with　its
usual　want　of　analysis　containing；　according　to　him；　a　certain　mixture
of　collateral　representations　in　its　conception　of　a　thing；　which　it
is　the　duty　of　the　understanding　to　separate　and　distinguish。　In　one
word；　Leibnitz　intellectualized　phenomena；　just　as　Locke；　in　his
system　of　noogony　（if　I　may　be　allowed　to　make　use　of　such
expressions）；　sensualized　the　conceptions　of　the　understanding；　that
is　to　say；　declared　them　to　be　nothing　more　than　empirical　or　abstract
conceptions　of　reflection。　Instead　of　seeking　in　the　understanding　and
sensibility　two　different　sources　of　representations；　which；
however；　can　present　us　with　objective　judgements　of　things　only　in
conjunction；　each　of　these　great　men　recognized　but　one　of　these
faculties；　which；　in　their　opinion；　applied　immediately　to　things　in
themselves；　the　other　having　no　duty　but　that　of　confusing　or
arranging　the　representations　of　the　former。
　　Accordingly；　the　objects　of　sense　were　pared　by　Leibnitz　as
things　in　general　merely　in　the　understanding。
　　1st。　He　pares　them　in　regard　to　their　identity　or　difference…
as　judged　by　the　understanding。　As；　therefore；　he　considered　merely
the　conceptions　of　objects；　and　not　their　position　in　intuition；　in
which　alone　objects　can　be　given；　and　left　quite　out　of　sight　the
transcendental　locale　of　these　conceptions…　whether；　that　is；　their
object　ought　to　be　classed　among　phenomena；　or　among　things　in
themselves；　it　was　to　be　expected　that　he　should　extend　the
application　of　the　principle　of　indiscernibles；　which　is　valid
solely　of　conceptions　of　things　in　general；　to　objects　of　sense
（mundus　phaenomenon）；　and　that　he　should　believe　that　he　had　thereby
contributed　in　no　small　degree　to　extend　our　knowledge　of　nature。　In
truth；　if　I　cognize　in　all　its　inner　determinations　a　drop　of　water　as
a　thing　in　itself；　I　cannot　look　upon　one　drop　as　different　from
another；　if　the　conception　of　the　one　is　pletely　identical　with
that　of　the　other。　But　if　it　is　a　phenomenon　in　space；　it　has　a
place　not　merely　in　the　understanding　（among　conceptions）；　but　also　in
sensuous　external　intuition　（in　space）；　and　in　this　case；　the　physical
locale　is　a　matter　of　indifference　in　regard　to　the　internal
determinations　of　things；　and　one　place；　B；　may　contain　a　thing
which　is　perfectly　similar　and　equal　to　another　in　a　place；　A；　just　as
well　as　if　the　two　things　were　in　every　respect　different　from　each
other。　Difference　of　place　without　any　other　conditions；　makes　the
plurality　and　distinction　of　objects　as　phenomena；　not　only　possible
in　itself；　but　even　necessary。　Consequently；　the　above　so…called　law
is　not　a　law　of　nature。　It　is　merely　an　analytical　rule　for　the
parison　of　things　by　means　of　mere　conceptions。
　　2nd。　The　principle：　〃Realities　（as　simple　affirmations）　never
logically　contradict　each　other；〃　is　a　proposition　perfectly　true
respecting　the　relation　of　conceptions；　but；　whether　as　regards
nature；　or　things　in　themselves　（of　which　we　have　not　the　slightest
conception）；　is　without　any　the　least　meaning。　For　real　opposition；　in
which　A　…　B　is　=　0；　exists　everywhere；　an　opposition；　that　is；　in
which　one　reality　united　with　another　in　the　same　subject
annihilates　the　effects　of　the　other…　a　fact　which　is　constantly
brought　before　our　eyes　by　the　different　antagonistic　actions　and
operations　in　nature；　which；　nevertheless；　as　depending　on　real
forces；　must　be　called　realitates　phaenomena。　General　mechanics　can
even　present　us　with　the　empirical　condition　of　this　opposition　in
an　a　priori　rule；　as　it　directs　its　attention　to　the　opposition　in　the
direction　of　forces…　a　condition　of　which　the　transcendental
conception　of　reality　can　tell　us　nothing。　Although　M。　Leibnitz　did
not　announce　this　proposition　with　precisely　the　pomp　of　a　new
principle；　he　yet　employed　it　for　the　establishment　of　new
propositions；　and　his　followers　introduced　it　into　their
Leibnitzio…Wolfian　system　of　philosophy。　According　to　this
principle；　for　example；　all　evils　are　but　consequences　of　the
limited　nature　of　created　beings；　that　is；　negations；　because　these
are　the　only　opposite　of　reality。　（In　the　mere　conception　of　a　thing
in　general　this　is　really　the　case；　but　not　in　things　as　phenomena。）
In　like　manner；　the　upholders　of　this　system　deem　it　not　only
possible；　but　natural　also；　to　connect　and　unite　all　reality　in　one
being；　because　they　acknowledge　no　other　sort　of　opposition　than
that　of　contradiction　（by　which　the　conception　itself　of　a　thing　is
annihilated）；　and　find　themselves　unable　to　conceive　an　opposition
of　reciprocal　destruction；　so　to　speak；　in　which　one　real　cause
destroys　the　effect　of　another；　and　the　conditions　of　whose
representation　we　meet　with　only　in　sensibility。
　　3rd。　The　Leibnitzian　monadology　has　really　no　better　foundation　than
on　this　philosopher's　mode　of　falsely　representing　the　difference　of
the　internal　and　external　solely　in　relation　to　the　understanding。
Substances；　in　general；　must　have　something　inward；　which　is　therefore
free　from　external　relations；　consequently　from　that　of　position
also。　The　simple…　that　which　can　be　represented　by　a　unit…　is
therefore　the　foundation　of　that　which　is　internal　in　things　in
themselves。　The　internal　state　of　substances　cannot　therefore
consist　in　place；　shape；　contact；　or　motion；　determinations　which
are　all　external　relations；　and　we　can　ascribe　to　them　no　other　than
that　whereby　we　internally　determine　our　faculty　of　sense　itself；　that
is　to　say；　the　state　of　representation。　Thus；　then；　were　constructed
the　monads；　which　were　to　form　the　elements　of　the　universe；　the
active　force　of　which　consists　in　representation；　the　effects　of
this　force　being　thus　entirely　confined　to　themselves。
　　For　the　same　reason；　his　view　of　the　possible　munity　of
substances　could　not　represent　it　but　as　a　predetermined　harmony；
and　by　no　means　as　a　physical　influence。　For　inasmuch　as　everything　is
occupied　only　internally；　that　is；　with　its　own　representations；　the
state　of　the　representations　of　one　substance　could　not　stand　in
active　and　living　connection　with　that　of　another；　but　some　third
cause　operating　on　all　without　exception　was　necessary　to　make　the
different　states　correspond　with　one　another。　And　this　did　not
happen　by　means　of　assistance　applied　in　each　particular　case　（systema
assistentiae）；　but　through　the　unity　of　the　idea　of　a　cause　occupied
and　connected　with　all　substances；　in　which　they　necessarily
receive；　according　to　the　Leibnitzian　school；　their　existence　and
permanence；　consequently　also　reciprocal　correspondence；　according
to　universal　laws。
　　4th。　This　philosopher's　celebrated　doctrine　of　space　and　time；　in
which　he　intellectualized　these　forms　of　sensibility；　originated　in
the　same　delusion　of　transcendental　reflection。　If　I　attempt　to
represent　by　the　mere　understanding；　the　external　relations　of　things；
I　can　do　so　only　by　employing　the　conception　of　their　reciprocal
action；　and　if　I　wish　to　connect　one　state　of　the　same　thing　with
another　state；　I　must　avail　myself　of　the　notion　of　the　order　of　cause
and　effect。　And　thus　Leibnitz　regarded　space　as　a　certain　order　in　the
munity　of　substances；　and　time　as　the　dynamical　sequence　of　their
states。　That　which　space　and　time　possess　proper　to　themselves　and
independent　of　things；　he　ascribed　to　a　necessary　confusion　in　our
conceptions　of　them；　whereby　that　which　is　a　mere　form　of　dynamical
relations　is　held　to　be　a　self…existent　intuition；　antecedent　even
to　things　themselves。　Thus　space　and　time　were　the　intelligible　form
of　the　connection　of　things　（substances　and　their　states）　in
themselves。　But　things　were　inte