the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第54部分

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from　sensibility；　that　is；　they　cannot　be　applied　to　an　object。　They
are　merely　the　pure　form　of　the　employment　of　the　understanding　in
respect　of　objects　in　general　and　of　thought；　without　its　being　at　the
same　time　possible　to　think　or　to　determine　any　object　by　their　means。
　　But　there　lurks　at　the　foundation　of　this　subject　an　illusion
which　it　is　very　difficult　to　avoid。　The　categories　are　not　based；
as　regards　their　origin；　upon　sensibility；　like　the　forms　of
intuition；　space；　and　time；　they　seem；　therefore；　to　be　capable　of
an　application　beyond　the　sphere　of　sensuous　objects。　But　this　is
not　the　case。　They　are　nothing　but　mere　forms　of　thought；　which
contain　only　the　logical　faculty　of　uniting　a　priori　in
consciousness　the　manifold　given　in　intuition。　Apart；　then；　from　the
only　intuition　possible　for　us；　they　have　still　less　meaning　than
the　pure　sensuous　forms；　space　and　time；　for　through　them　an　object　is
at　least　given；　while　a　mode　of　connection　of　the　manifold；　when　the
intuition　which　alone　gives　the　manifold　is　wanting；　has　no　meaning　at
all。　At　the　same　time；　when　we　designate　certain　objects　as
phenomena　or　sensuous　existences；　thus　distinguishing　our　mode　of
intuiting　them　from　their　own　nature　as　things　in　themselves；　it　is
evident　that　by　this　very　distinction　we　as　it　were　place　the
latter；　considered　in　this　their　own　nature；　although　we　do　not　so
intuite　them；　in　opposition　to　the　former；　or；　on　the　other　hand；　we
do　so　place　other　possible　things；　which　are　not　objects　of　our
senses；　but　are　cogitated　by　the　understanding　alone；　and　call　them
intelligible　existences　（noumena）。　Now　the　question　arises　whether　the
pure　conceptions　of　our　understanding　do　possess　significance　in
respect　of　these　latter；　and　may　possibly　be　a　mode　of　cognizing　them。
　　But　we　are　met　at　the　very　mencement　with　an　ambiguity；　which　may
easily　occasion　great　misapprehension。　The　understanding；　when　it
terms　an　object　in　a　certain　relation　phenomenon；　at　the　same　time
forms　out　of　this　relation　a　representation　or　notion　of　an　object
in　itself；　and　hence　believes　that　it　can　form　also　conceptions　of
such　objects。　Now　as　the　understanding　possesses　no　other
fundamental　conceptions　besides　the　categories；　it　takes　for　granted
that　an　object　considered　as　a　thing　in　itself　must　be　capable　of
being　thought　by　means　of　these　pure　conceptions；　and　is　thereby　led
to　hold　the　perfectly　undetermined　conception　of　an　intelligible
existence；　a　something　out　of　the　sphere　of　our　sensibility；　for　a
determinate　conception　of　an　existence　which　we　can　cognize　in　some
way　or　other　by　means　of　the　understanding。
　　If；　by　the　term　noumenon；　we　understand　a　thing　so　far　as　it　is
not　an　object　of　our　sensuous　intuition；　thus　making　abstraction　of
our　mode　of　intuiting　it；　this　is　a　noumenon　in　the　negative　sense
of　the　word。　But　if　we　understand　by　it　an　object　of　a　non…sensuous
intuition；　we　in　this　case　assume　a　peculiar　mode　of　intuition；　an
intellectual　intuition；　to　wit；　which　does　not；　however；　belong　to　us；
of　the　very　possibility　of　which　we　have　no　notion…　and　this　is　a
noumenon　in　the　positive　sense。
　　The　doctrine　of　sensibility　is　also　the　doctrine　of　noumena　in　the
negative　sense；　that　is；　of　things　which　the　understanding　is
obliged　to　cogitate　apart　from　any　relation　to　our　mode　of
intuition；　consequently　not　as　mere　phenomena；　but　as　things　in
themselves。　But　the　understanding　at　the　same　time　prehends　that　it
cannot　employ　its　categories　for　the　consideration　of　things　in
themselves；　because　these　possess　significance　only　in　relation　to　the
unity　of　intuitions　in　space　and　time；　and　that　they　are　petent
to　determine　this　unity　by　means　of　general　a　priori　connecting
conceptions　only　on　account　of　the　pure　ideality　of　space　and　time。
Where　this　unity　of　time　is　not　to　be　met　with；　as　is　the　case　with
noumena；　the　whole　use；　indeed　the　whole　meaning　of　the　categories
is　entirely　lost；　for　even　the　possibility　of　things　to　correspond
to　the　categories　is　in　this　case　inprehensible。　On　this　point；　I
need　only　refer　the　reader　to　what　I　have　said　at　the　mencement
of　the　General　Remark　appended　to　the　foregoing　chapter。　Now；　the
possibility　of　a　thing　can　never　be　proved　from　the　fact　that　the
conception　of　it　is　not　self…contradictory；　but　only　by　means　of　an
intuition　corresponding　to　the　conception。　If；　therefore；　we　wish　to
apply　the　categories　to　objects　which　cannot　be　regarded　as　phenomena；
we　must　have　an　intuition　different　from　the　sensuous；　and　in　this
case　the　objects　would　be　a　noumena　in　the　positive　sense　of　the　word。
Now；　as　such　an　intuition；　that　is；　an　intellectual　intuition；　is　no
part　of　our　faculty　of　cognition；　it　is　absolutely　impossible　for
the　categories　to　possess　any　application　beyond　the　limits　of
experience。　It　may　be　true　that　there　are　intelligible　existences　to
which　our　faculty　of　sensuous　intuition　has　no　relation；　and　cannot　be
applied；　but　our　conceptions　of　the　understanding；　as　mere　forms　of
thought　for　our　sensuous　intuition；　do　not　extend　to　these。　What；
therefore；　we　call　noumenon　must　be　understood　by　us　as　such　in　a
negative　sense。
　　If　I　take　away　from　an　empirial　intuition　all　thought　（by　means　of
the　categories）；　there　remains　no　cognition　of　any　object；　for　by
means　of　mere　intuition　nothing　is　cogitated；　and；　from　the
existence　of　such　or　such　an　affection　of　sensibility　in　me；　it　does
not　follow　that　this　affection　or　representation　has　any　relation　to
an　object　without　me。　But　if　I　take　away　all　intuition；　there　still
remains　the　form　of　thought；　that　is；　the　mode　of　determining　an
object　for　the　manifold　of　a　possible　intuition。　Thus　the　categories
do　in　some　measure　really　extend　further　than　sensuous　intuition；
inasmuch　as　they　think　objects　in　general；　without　regard　to　the
mode　（of　sensibility）　in　which　these　objects　are　given。　But　they　do
not　for　this　reason　apply　to　and　determine　a　wider　sphere　of
objects；　because　we　cannot　assume　that　such　can　be　given；　without
presupposing　the　possibility　of　another　than　the　sensuous　mode　of
intuition；　a　supposition　we　are　not　justified　in　making。
　　I　call　a　conception　problematical　which　contains　in　itself　no
contradiction；　and　which　is　connected　with　other　cognitions　as　a
limitation　of　given　conceptions；　but　whose　objective　reality　cannot　be
cognized　in　any　manner。　The　conception　of　a　noumenon；　that　is；　of　a
thing　which　must　be　cogitated　not　as　an　object　of　sense；　but　as　a
thing　in　itself　（solely　through　the　pure　understanding）；　is　not
self…contradictory；　for　we　are　not　entitled　to　maintain　that
sensibility　is　the　only　possible　mode　of　intuition。　Nay；　further；　this
conception　is　necessary　to　restrain　sensuous　intuition　within　the
bounds　of　phenomena；　and　thus　to　limit　the　objective　validity　of
sensuous　cognition；　for　things　in　themselves；　which　lie　beyond　its
province；　are　called　noumena　for　the　very　purpose　of　indicating　that
this　cognition　does　not　extend　its　application　to　all　that　the
understanding　thinks。　But；　after　all；　the　possibility　of　such
noumena　is　quite　inprehensible；　and　beyond　the　sphere　of　phenomena；
all　is　for　us　a　mere　void；　that　is　to　say；　we　possess　an　understanding
whose　province　does　problematically　extend　beyond　this　sphere；　but
we　do　not　possess　an　intuition；　indeed；　not　even　the　conception　of　a
possible　intuition；　by　means　of　which　objects　beyond　the　region　of
sensibility　could　be　given　us；　and　in　reference　to　which　the
understanding　might　be　employed　assertorically。　The　conception　of　a
noumenon　is　therefore　merely　a　limitative　conception　and　therefore
only　of　negative　use。　But　it　is　not　an　arbitrary　or　fictitious　notion；
but　is　connected　with　the　limitation　of　sensibility；　without；　however；
being　capable　of　presenting　us　with　any　positive　datum　beyond　this
sphere。
　　The　division　of　objects　into　phenomena　and　noumena；　and　of　the　world
into　a　mundus　sensibilis　and　intelligibilis　is　therefore　quite
inadmissible　in　a　positive　sense；　although　conceptions　do　certainly
admit　of　such　a　division；　for　the　class　of　noumena　have　no　determinate
object　corresponding　to　them；　and　cannot　therefore　possess　objective
validity。　If　we　abandon　the　senses；　how　can　it　be　made　conceivable
that　the　categories　（which　are　the　only　conceptions　that　could　serve
as　conceptions　for　noumena）　have　any　sense　or　meaning　at　all；　inasmuch
as　something　more　than　the　mere　unity　of　thought；　namely；　a　possible
intuition；　is　requisite　for　their　application　to　an　object？　The
conception　of　a　noumenon；　considered　as　merely　problematical；　is；
however；　not　only　admissible；　but；　as　a　limitative　conception　of
sensibility；　absolutely　necessary。　But；　in　this　case；　a　noumenon　is
not　a　particular　intelligible　object　for　our　understanding；　on　the
contrary；　the　kind　of　understanding　to　which　it　could　belong　is　itself
a　problem；　for　we　cannot　form　the　most　distant　conception　of　the
possibility　of　an　understanding　which　should　cognize　an　object；　not
discursively　by　means　of　categories；　but　intuitively　in　a　non…sensuous
intuition。　Our　understanding　attains　in　this　way　a　sort　of　negative
extension。　That　is　to　say；　it　is　not　limited　by；　but　rather　li