the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第50部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


necessary　condition　of　the　possibility　of　a　determined　consciousness
of　ourselves；　it　does　not　follow　that　every　intuitive　representation
of　external　things　involves　the　existence　of　these　things；　for　their
representations　may　very　well　be　the　mere　products　of　the
imagination　（in　dreams　as　well　as　in　madness）；　though；　indeed；　these
are　themselves　created　by　the　reproduction　of　previous　external
perceptions；　which；　as　has　been　shown；　are　possible　only　through　the
reality　of　external　objects。　The　sole　aim　of　our　remarks　has；　however；
been　to　prove　that　internal　experience　in　general　is　possible　only
through　external　experience　in　general。　Whether　this　or　that
supposed　experience　be　purely　imaginary　must　be　discovered　from　its
particular　determinations　and　by　paring　these　with　the　criteria
of　all　real　experience。

　　Finally；　as　regards　the　third　postulate；　it　applies　to　material
necessity　in　existence；　and　not　to　merely　formal　and　logical　necessity
in　the　connection　of　conceptions。　Now　as　we　cannot　cognize
pletely　a　priori　the　existence　of　any　object　of　sense；　though　we
can　do　so　paratively　a　priori；　that　is；　relatively　to　some　other
previously　given　existence…　a　cognition；　however；　which　can　only　be　of
such　an　existence　as　must　be　contained　in　the　plex　of　experience；
of　which　the　previously　given　perception　is　a　part…　the　necessity　of
existence　can　never　be　cognized　from　conceptions；　but　always；　on　the
contrary；　from　its　connection　with　that　which　is　an　object　of
perception。　But　the　only　existence　cognized；　under　the　condition　of
other　given　phenomena；　as　necessary；　is　the　existence　of　effects
from　given　causes　in　conformity　with　the　laws　of　causality。　It　is
consequently　not　the　necessity　of　the　existence　of　things　（as
substances）；　but　the　necessity　of　the　state　of　things　that　we　cognize；
and　that　not　immediately；　but　by　means　of　the　existence　of　other
states　given　in　perception；　according　to　empirical　laws　of
causality。　Hence　it　follows　that　the　criterion　of　necessity　is　to　be
found　only　in　the　law　of　possible　experience…　that　everything　which
happens　is　determined　a　priori　in　the　phenomenon　by　its　cause。　Thus　we
cognize　only　the　necessity　of　effects　in　nature；　the　causes　of　which
are　given　us。　Moreover；　the　criterion　of　necessity　in　existence
possesses　no　application　beyond　the　field　of　possible　experience；
and　even　in　this　it　is　not　valid　of　the　existence　of　things　as
substances；　because　these　can　never　be　considered　as　empirical
effects；　or　as　something　that　happens　and　has　a　beginning。
Necessity；　therefore；　regards　only　the　relations　of　phenomena
according　to　the　dynamical　law　of　causality；　and　the　possibility
grounded　thereon；　of　reasoning　from　some　given　existence　（of　a
cause）　a　priori　to　another　existence　（of　an　effect）。　〃Everything
that　happens　is　hypothetically　necessary；〃　is　a　principle　which
subjects　the　changes　that　take　place　in　the　world　to　a　law；　that　is；
to　a　rule　of　necessary　existence；　without　which　nature　herself　could
not　possibly　exist。　Hence　the　proposition；　〃Nothing　happens　by　blind
chance　（in　mundo　non　datur　casus）；〃　is　an　a　priori　law　of　nature。
The　case　is　the　same　with　the　proposition；　〃Necessity　in　nature　is　not
blind；〃　that　is；　it　is　conditioned；　consequently　intelligible
necessity　（non　datur　fatum）。　Both　laws　subject　the　play　of　change　to
〃a　nature　of　things　（as　phenomena）；〃　or；　which　is　the　same　thing；　to
the　unity　of　the　understanding；　and　through　the　understanding　alone
can　changes　belong　to　an　experience；　as　the　synthetical　unity　of
phenomena。　Both　belong　to　the　class　of　dynamical　principles。　The
former　is　properly　a　consequence　of　the　principle　of　causality…　one　of
the　analogies　of　experience。　The　latter　belongs　to　the　principles　of
modality；　which　to　the　determination　of　causality　adds　the
conception　of　necessity；　which　is　itself；　however；　subject　to　a　rule
of　the　understanding。　The　principle　of　continuity　forbids　any　leap
in　the　series　of　phenomena　regarded　as　changes　（in　mundo　non　datur
saltus）；　and　likewise；　in　the　plex　of　all　empirical　intuitions　in
space；　any　break　or　hiatus　between　two　phenomena　（non　datur　hiatus）…
for　we　can　so　express　the　principle；　that　experience　can　admit　nothing
which　proves　the　existence　of　a　vacuum；　or　which　even　admits　it　as　a
part　of　an　empirical　synthesis。　For；　as　regards　a　vacuum　or　void；
which　we　may　cogitate　as　out　and　beyond　the　field　of　possible
experience　（the　world）；　such　a　question　cannot　e　before　the
tribunal　of　mere　understanding；　which　decides　only　upon　questions　that
concern　the　employment　of　given　phenomena　for　the　construction　of
empirical　cognition。　It　is　rather　a　problem　for　ideal　reason；　which
passes　beyond　the　sphere　of　a　possible　experience　and　aims　at
forming　a　judgement　of　that　which　surrounds　and　circumscribes　it；
and　the　proper　place　for　the　consideration　of　it　is　the　transcendental
dialectic。　These　four　propositions；　〃In　mundo　non　datur　hiatus；　non
datur　saltus；　non　datur　casus；　non　datur　fatum；〃　as　well　as　all
principles　of　transcendental　origin；　we　could　very　easily　exhibit　in
their　proper　order；　that　is；　in　conformity　with　the　order　of　the
categories；　and　assign　to　each　its　proper　place。　But　the　already
practised　reader　will　do　this　for　himself；　or　discover　the　clue　to
such　an　arrangement。　But　the　bined　result　of　all　is　simply　this；　to
admit　into　the　empirical　synthesis　nothing　which　might　cause　a　break
in　or　be　foreign　to　the　understanding　and　the　continuous　connection　of
all　phenomena；　that　is；　the　unity　of　the　conceptions　of　the
understanding。　For　in　the　understanding　alone　is　the　unity　of
experience；　in　which　all　perceptions　must　have　their　assigned　place；
possible。
　　Whether　the　field　of　possibility　be　greater　than　that　of　reality；
and　whether　the　field　of　the　latter　be　itself　greater　than　that　of
necessity；　are　interesting　enough　questions；　and　quite　capable　of
synthetic　solution；　questions；　however；　which　e　under　the
jurisdiction　of　reason　alone。　For　they　are　tantamount　to　asking
whether　all　things　as　phenomena　do　without　exception　belong　to　the
plex　and　connected　whole　of　a　single　experience；　of　which　every
given　perception　is　a　part　which　therefore　cannot　be　conjoined　with
any　other　phenomena…　or；　whether　my　perceptions　can　belong　to　more
than　one　possible　experience？　The　understanding　gives　to　experience；
according　to　the　subjective　and　formal　conditions；　of　sensibility　as
well　as　of　apperception；　the　rules　which　alone　make　this　experience
possible。　Other　forms　of　intuition　besides　those　of　space　and　time；
other　forms　of　understanding　besides　the　discursive　forms　of
thought；　or　of　cognition　by　means　of　conceptions；　we　can　neither
imagine　nor　make　intelligible　to　ourselves；　and　even　if　we　could；　they
would　still　not　belong　to　experience；　which　is　the　only　mode　of
cognition　by　which　objects　are　presented　to　us。　Whether　other
perceptions　besides　those　which　belong　to　the　total　of　our　possible
experience；　and　consequently　whether　some　other　sphere　of　matter
exists；　the　understanding　has　no　power　to　decide；　its　proper
occupation　being　with　the　synthesis　of　that　which　is　given。
Moreover；　the　poverty　of　the　usual　arguments　which　go　to　prove　the
existence　of　a　vast　sphere　of　possibility；　of　which　all　that　is　real
（every　object　of　experience）　is　but　a　small　part；　is　very
remarkable。　〃All　real　is　possible〃；　from　this　follows　naturally；
according　to　the　logical　laws　of　conversion；　the　particular
proposition：　〃Some　possible　is　real。〃　Now　this　seems　to　be
equivalent　to：　〃Much　is　possible　that　is　not　real。〃　No　doubt　it　does
seem　as　if　we　ought　to　consider　the　sum　of　the　possible　to　be
greater　than　that　of　the　real；　from　the　fact　that　something　must　be
added　to　the　former　to　constitute　the　latter。　But　this　notion　of
adding　to　the　possible　is　absurd。　For　that　which　is　not　in　the　sum
of　the　possible；　and　consequently　requires　to　be　added　to　it；　is
manifestly　impossible。　In　addition　to　accordance　with　the　formal
conditions　of　experience；　the　understanding　requires　a　connection　with
some　perception；　but　that　which　is　connected　with　this　perception　is
real；　even　although　it　is　not　immediately　perceived。　But　that
another　series　of　phenomena；　in　plete　coherence　with　that　which
is　given　in　perception；　consequently　more　than　one　all…embracing
experience　is　possible；　is　an　inference　which　cannot　be　concluded　from
the　data　given　us　by　experience；　and　still　less　without　any　data　at
all。　That　which　is　possible　only　under　conditions　which　are　themselves
merely　possible；　is　not　possible　in　any　respect。　And　yet　we　can　find
no　more　certain　ground　on　which　to　base　the　discussion　of　the　question
whether　the　sphere　of　possibility　is　wider　than　that　of　experience。
　　I　have　merely　mentioned　these　questions；　that　in　treating　of　the
conception　of　the　understanding；　there　might　be　no　omission　of
anything　that；　in　the　mon　opinion；　belongs　to　them。　In　reality；
however；　the　notion　of　absolute　possibility　（possibility　which　is
valid　in　every　respect）　is　not　a　mere　conception　of　the　understanding；
which　can　be　employed　empirically；　but　belongs　to　reason　alone；
which　passes　the　bounds　of　all　empirical　use　of　the　understanding。
We　have；　there