the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第46部分

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subsequent　to　that　in　which　the　former　existed。　In　like　manner；　the
second　state；　as　reality　（in　the　phenomenon）；　differs　from　the
first；　in　which　the　reality　of　the　second　did　not　exist；　as　b　from
zero。　That　is　to　say；　if　the　state；　b；　differs　from　the　state；　a；　only
in　respect　to　quantity；　the　change　is　a　ing　into　existence　of　b　…
a；　which　in　the　former　state　did　not　exist；　and　in　relation　to　which
that　state　is　=　O。
　　Now　the　question　arises　how　a　thing　passes　from　one　state　=　a；
into　another　state　=　b。　Between　two　moments　there　is　always　a
certain　time；　and　between　two　states　existing　in　these　moments　there
is　always　a　difference　having　a　certain　quantity　（for　all　parts　of
phenomena　are　in　their　turn　quantities）。　Consequently；　every
transition　from　one　state　into　another　is　always　effected　in　a　time
contained　between　two　moments；　of　which　the　first　determines　the　state
which　leaves；　and　the　second　determines　the　state　into　the　thing
passes。　the　thing　leaves；　and　the　second　determines　the　state　into
which　the　thing　Both　moments；　then；　are　limitations　of　the　time　of　a
change；　consequently　of　the　intermediate　state　between　both；　and　as
such　they　belong　to　the　total　of　the　change。　Now　every　change　has　a
cause；　which　evidences　its　causality　in　the　whole　time　during　which
the　charge　takes　place。　The　cause；　therefore；　does　not　produce　the
change　all　at　once　or　in　one　moment；　but　in　a　time；　so　that；　as　the
time　gradually　increases　from　the　mencing　instant；　a；　to　its
pletion　at　b；　in　like　manner　also；　the　quantity　of　the　reality
（b　…　a）　is　generated　through　the　lesser　degrees　which　are　contained
between　the　first　and　last。　All　change　is　therefore　possible　only
through　a　continuous　action　of　the　causality；　which；　in　so　far　as　it
is　uniform；　we　call　a　momentum。　The　change　does　not　consist　of　these
momenta；　but　is　generated　or　produced　by　them　as　their　effect。
　　Such　is　the　law　of　the　continuity　of　all　change；　the　ground　of　which
is　that　neither　time　itself　nor　any　phenomenon　in　time　consists　of
parts　which　are　the　smallest　possible；　but　that；　notwithstanding；
the　state　of　a　thing　passes　in　the　process　of　a　change　through　all
these　parts；　as　elements；　to　its　second　state。　There　is　no　smallest
degree　of　reality　in　a　phenomenon；　just　as　there　is　no　smallest　degree
in　the　quantity　of　time；　and　so　the　new　state　of　reality　grows　up
out　of　the　former　state；　through　all　the　infinite　degrees　thereof；　the
differences　of　which　one　from　another；　taken　all　together；　are　less
than　the　difference　between　o　and　a。
　　It　is　not　our　business　to　inquire　here　into　the　utility　of　this
principle　in　the　investigation　of　nature。　But　how　such　a
proposition；　which　appears　so　greatly　to　extend　our　knowledge　of
nature；　is　possible　pletely　a　priori；　is　indeed　a　question　which
deserves　investigation；　although　the　first　view　seems　to　demonstrate
the　truth　and　reality　of　the　principle；　and　the　question；　how　it　is
possible；　may　be　considered　superfluous。　For　there　are　so　many
groundless　pretensions　to　the　enlargement　of　our　knowledge　by　pure
reason　that　we　must　take　it　as　a　general　rule　to　be　mistrustful　of　all
such；　and　without　a　thoroughgoing　and　radical　deduction；　to　believe
nothing　of　the　sort　even　on　the　clearest　dogmatical　evidence。
　　Every　addition　to　our　empirical　knowledge；　and　every　advance　made　in
the　exercise　of　our　perception；　is　nothing　more　than　an　extension　of
the　determination　of　the　internal　sense；　that　is　to　say；　a　progression
in　time；　be　objects　themselves　what　they　may；　phenomena；　or　pure
intuitions。　This　progression　in　time　determines　everything；　and　is
itself　determined　by　nothing　else。　That　is　to　say；　the　parts　of　the
progression　exist　only　in　time；　and　by　means　of　the　synthesis　thereof；
and　are　not　given　antecedently　to　it。　For　this　reason；　every
transition　in　perception　to　anything　which　follows　upon　another　in
time；　is　a　determination　of　time　by　means　of　the　production　of　this
perception。　And　as　this　determination　of　time　is；　always　and　in　all
its　parts；　a　quantity；　the　perception　produced　is　to　be　considered
as　a　quantity　which　proceeds　through　all　its　degrees…　no　one　of
which　is　the　smallest　possible…　from　zero　up　to　its　determined　degree。
From　this　we　perceive　the　possibility　of　cognizing　a　priori　a　law　of
changes…　a　law；　however；　which　concerns　their　form　merely。　We　merely
anticipate　our　own　apprehension；　the　formal　condition　of　which；
inasmuch　as　it　is　itself　to　be　found　in　the　mind　antecedently　to　all
given　phenomena；　must　certainly　be　capable　of　being　cognized　a　priori。
　　Thus；　as　time　contains　the　sensuous　condition　a　priori　of　the
possibility　of　a　continuous　progression　of　that　which　exists　to　that
which　follows　it；　the　understanding；　by　virtue　of　the　unity　of
apperception；　contains　the　condition　a　priori　of　the　possibility　of
a　continuous　determination　of　the　position　in　time　of　all　phenomena；
and　this　by　means　of　the　series　of　causes　and　effects；　the　former　of
which　necessitate　the　sequence　of　the　latter；　and　thereby　render
universally　and　for　all　time；　and　by　consequence；　objectively；　valid
the　empirical　cognition　of　the　relations　of　time。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　C。　THIRD　ANALOGY。

　　　　　　Principle　of　Coexistence；　According　to　the　Law
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Reciprocity　or　munity。

　　　All　substances；　in　so　far　as　they　can　be　perceived　in　space
　　　　at　the　same　time；　exist　in　a　state　of　plete　reciprocity
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　action。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROOF。

　　Things　are　coexistent；　when　in　empirical　intuition　the　perception　of
the　one　can　follow　upon　the　perception　of　the　other；　and　vice　versa…
which　cannot　occur　in　the　succession　of　phenomena；　as　we　have　shown　in
the　explanation　of　the　second　principle。　Thus　I　can　perceive　the
moon　and　then　the　earth；　or　conversely；　first　the　earth　and　then　the
moon；　and　for　the　reason　that　my　perceptions　of　these　objects　can
reciprocally　follow　each　other；　I　say；　they　exist　contemporaneously。
Now　coexistence　is　the　existence　of　the　manifold　in　the　same　time。　But
time　itself　is　not　an　object　of　perception；　and　therefore　we　cannot
conclude　from　the　fact　that　things　are　placed　in　the　same　time；　the
other　fact；　that　the　perception　of　these　things　can　follow　each
other　reciprocally。　The　synthesis　of　the　imagination　in　apprehension
would　only　present　to　us　each　of　these　perceptions　as　present　in　the
subject　when　the　other　is　not　present；　and　contrariwise；　but　would　not
show　that　the　objects　are　coexistent；　that　is　to　say；　that；　if　the　one
exists；　the　other　also　exists　in　the　same　time；　and　that　this　is
necessarily　so；　in　order　that　the　perceptions　may　be　capable　of
following　each　other　reciprocally。　It　follows　that　a　conception　of　the
understanding　or　category　of　the　reciprocal　sequence　of　the
determinations　of　phenomena　（existing；　as　they　do；　apart　from　each
other；　and　yet　contemporaneously）；　is　requisite　to　justify　us　in
saying　that　the　reciprocal　succession　of　perceptions　has　its
foundation　in　the　object；　and　to　enable　us　to　represent　coexistence　as
objective。　But　that　relation　of　substances　in　which　the　one　contains
determinations　the　ground　of　which　is　in　the　other　substance；　is　the
relation　of　influence。　And；　when　this　influence　is　reciprocal；　it　is
the　relation　of　munity　or　reciprocity。　Consequently　the　coexistence
of　substances　in　space　cannot　be　cognized　in　experience　otherwise　than
under　the　precondition　of　their　reciprocal　action。　This　is　therefore
the　condition　of　the　possibility　of　things　themselves　as　objects　of
experience。
　　Things　are　coexistent；　in　so　far　as　they　exist　in　one　and　the　same
time。　But　how　can　we　know　that　they　exist　in　one　and　the　same　time？
Only　by　observing　that　the　order　in　the　synthesis　of　apprehension　of
the　manifold　is　arbitrary　and　a　matter　of　indifference；　that　is　to
say；　that　it　can　proceed　from　A；　through　B；　C；　D；　to　E；　or
contrariwise　from　E　to　A。　For　if　they　were　successive　in　time　（and
in　the　order；　let　us　suppose；　which　begins　with　A）；　it　is　quite
impossible　for　the　apprehension　in　perception　to　begin　with　E　and　go
backwards　to　A；　inasmuch　as　A　belongs　to　past　time　and；　therefore；
cannot　be　an　object　of　apprehension。
　　Let　us　assume　that　in　a　number　of　substances　considered　as　phenomena
each　is　pletely　isolated；　that　is；　that　no　one　acts　upon　another。
Then　I　say　that　the　coexistence　of　these　cannot　be　an　object　of
possible　perception　and　that　the　existence　of　one　cannot；　by　any
mode　of　empirical　synthesis；　lead　us　to　the　existence　of　another。
For　we　imagine　them　in　this　case　to　be　separated　by　a　pletely
void　space；　and　thus　perception；　which　proceeds　from　the　one　to　the
other　in　time；　would　indeed　determine　their　existence　by　means　of　a
following　perception；　but　would　be　quite　unable　to　distinguish　whether
the　one　phenomenon　follows　objectively　upon　the　first；　or　is
coexistent　with　it。
　　Besides　the　mere　fact　of　existence；　then；　there　must　be　something　by
means　of　which　A　determines　the　position　of　B　in　time　and；　conversely；
B　the　position　of　A；　because　only　under　this　condition　can
substances　be　empirically　represented　as　existing　contemporaneously。
Now　that　alone　determines　the　position　of　another　thing　in　time
which　is　th