the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第45部分

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object；　or　to　speak　more　accurately；　there　is　therein　an　order　of
successive　synthesis　which　determines　an　object；　and　according　to
which　something　necessarily　precedes；　and　when　this　is　posited；
something　else　necessarily　follows。　If；　then；　my　perception　is　to
contain　the　cognition　of　an　event；　that　is；　of　something　which
really　happens；　it　must　be　an　empirical　judgement；　wherein　we　think
that　the　succession　is　determined；　that　is；　it　presupposes　another
phenomenon；　upon　which　this　event　follows　necessarily；　or　in
conformity　with　a　rule。　If；　on　the　contrary；　when　I　posited　the
antecedent；　the　event　did　not　necessarily　follow；　I　should　be
obliged　to　consider　it　merely　as　a　subjective　play　of　my
imagination；　and　if　in　this　I　represented　to　myself　anything　as
objective；　I　must　look　upon　it　as　a　mere　dream。　Thus；　the　relation
of　phenomena　（as　possible　perceptions）；　according　to　which　that
which　happens　is；　as　to　its　existence；　necessarily　determined　in
time　by　something　which　antecedes；　in　conformity　with　a　rule…　in　other
words；　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect…　is　the　condition　of　the
objective　validity　of　our　empirical　judgements　in　regard　to　the
sequence　of　perceptions；　consequently　of　their　empirical　truth；　and
therefore　of　experience。　The　principle　of　the　relation　of　causality　in
the　succession　of　phenomena　is　therefore　valid　for　all　objects　of
experience；　because　it　is　itself　the　ground　of　the　possibility　of
experience。
　　Here；　however；　a　difficulty　arises；　which　must　be　resolved。　The
principle　of　the　connection　of　causality　among　phenomena　is　limited　in
our　formula　to　the　succession　thereof；　although　in　practice　we　find
that　the　principle　applies　also　when　the　phenomena　exist　together　in
the　same　time；　and　that　cause　and　effect　may　be　simultaneous。　For
example；　there　is　heat　in　a　room；　which　does　not　exist　in　the　open
air。　I　look　about　for　the　cause；　and　find　it　to　be　the　fire；　Now　the
fire　as　the　cause　is　simultaneous　with　its　effect；　the　heat　of　the
room。　In　this　case；　then；　there　is　no　succession　as　regards　time；
between　cause　and　effect；　but　they　are　simultaneous；　and　still　the　law
holds　good。　The　greater　part　of　operating　causes　in　nature　are
simultaneous　with　their　effects；　and　the　succession　in　time　of　the
latter　is　produced　only　because　the　cause　cannot　achieve　the　total
of　its　effect　in　one　moment。　But　at　the　moment　when　the　effect　first
arises；　it　is　always　simultaneous　with　the　causality　of　its　cause；
because；　if　the　cause　had　but　a　moment　before　ceased　to　be；　the　effect
could　not　have　arisen。　Here　it　must　be　specially　remembered　that　we
must　consider　the　order　of　time　and　not　the　lapse　thereof。　The
relation　remains；　even　though　no　time　has　elapsed。　The　time　between
the　causality　of　the　cause　and　its　immediate　effect　may　entirely
vanish；　and　the　cause　and　effect　be　thus　simultaneous；　but　the
relation　of　the　one　to　the　other　remains　always　determinable　according
to　time。　If；　for　example；　I　consider　a　leaden　ball；　which　lies　upon
a　cushion　and　makes　a　hollow　in　it；　as　a　cause；　then　it　is
simultaneous　with　the　effect。　But　I　distinguish　the　two　through　the
relation　of　time　of　the　dynamical　connection　of　both。　For　if　I　lay　the
ball　upon　the　cushion；　then　the　hollow　follows　upon　the　before
smooth　surface；　but　supposing　the　cushion　has；　from　some　cause　or
another；　a　hollow；　there　does　not　thereupon　follow　a　leaden　ball。
　　Thus；　the　law　of　succession　of　time　is　in　all　instances　the　only
empirical　criterion　of　effect　in　relation　to　the　causality　of　the
antecedent　cause。　The　glass　is　the　cause　of　the　rising　of　the　water
above　its　horizontal　surface；　although　the　two　phenomena　are
contemporaneous。　For；　as　soon　as　I　draw　some　water　with　the　glass　from
a　larger　vessel；　an　effect　follows　thereupon；　namely；　the　change　of
the　horizontal　state　which　the　water　had　in　the　large　vessel　into　a
concave；　which　it　assumes　in　the　glass。
　　This　conception　of　causality　leads　us　to　the　conception　of　action；
that　of　action；　to　the　conception　of　force；　and　through　it；　to　the
conception　of　substance。　As　I　do　not　wish　this　critical　essay；　the
sole　purpose　of　which　is　to　treat　of　the　sources　of　our　synthetical
cognition　a　priori；　to　be　crowded　with　analyses　which　merely
explain；　but　do　not　enlarge　the　sphere　of　our　conceptions；　I　reserve
the　detailed　explanation　of　the　above　conceptions　for　a　future
system　of　pure　reason。　Such　an　analysis；　indeed；　executed　with　great
particularity；　may　already　be　found　in　well…known　works　on　this
subject。　But　I　cannot　at　present　refrain　from　making　a　few　remarks
on　the　empirical　criterion　of　a　substance；　in　so　far　as　it　seems　to　be
more　evident　and　more　easily　recognized　through　the　conception　of
action　than　through　that　of　the　permanence　of　a　phenomenon。
　　Where　action　（consequently　activity　and　force）　exists；　substance
also　must　exist；　and　in　it　alone　must　be　sought　the　seat　of　that
fruitful　source　of　phenomena。　Very　well。　But　if　we　are　called　upon
to　explain　what　we　mean　by　substance；　and　wish　to　avoid　the　vice　of
reasoning　in　a　circle；　the　answer　is　by　no　means　so　easy。　How　shall　we
conclude　immediately　from　the　action　to　the　permanence　of　that　which
acts；　this　being　nevertheless　an　essential　and　peculiar　criterion　of
substance　（phenomenon）？　But　after　what　has　been　said　above；　the
solution　of　this　question　bees　easy　enough；　although　by　the
mon　mode　of　procedure…　merely　analysing　our　conceptions…　it　would
be　quite　impossible。　The　conception　of　action　indicates　the　relation
of　the　subject　of　causality　to　the　effect。　Now　because　all　effect
consists　in　that　which　happens；　therefore　in　the　changeable；　the
last　subject　thereof　is　the　permanent；　as　the　substratum　of　all　that
changes；　that　is；　substance。　For　according　to　the　principle　of
causality；　actions　are　always　the　first　ground　of　all　change　in
phenomena　and；　consequently；　cannot　be　a　property　of　a　subject　which
itself　changes；　because　if　this　were　the　case；　other　actions　and
another　subject　would　be　necessary　to　determine　this　change。　From
all　this　it　results　that　action　alone；　as　an　empirical　criterion；　is　a
sufficient　proof　of　the　presence　of　substantiality；　without　any
necessity　on　my　part　of　endeavouring　to　discover　the　permanence　of
substance　by　a　parison。　Besides；　by　this　mode　of　induction　we　could
not　attain　to　the　pleteness　which　the　magnitude　and　strict
universality　of　the　conception　requires。　For　that　the　primary
subject　of　the　causality　of　all　arising　and　passing　away；　all　origin
and　extinction；　cannot　itself　（in　the　sphere　of　phenomena）　arise　and
pass　away；　is　a　sound　and　safe　conclusion；　a　conclusion　which　leads　us
to　the　conception　of　empirical　necessity　and　permanence　in
existence；　and　consequently　to　the　conception　of　a　substance　as
phenomenon。
　　When　something　happens；　the　mere　fact　of　the　occurrence；　without
regard　to　that　which　occurs；　is　an　object　requiring　investigation。　The
transition　from　the　non…being　of　a　state　into　the　existence　of　it；
supposing　that　this　state　contains　no　quality　which　previously　existed
in　the　phenomenon；　is　a　fact　of　itself　demanding　inquiry。　Such　an
event；　as　has　been　shown　in　No。　A；　does　not　concern　substance　（for
substance　does　not　thus　originate）；　but　its　condition　or　state。　It
is　therefore　only　change；　and　not　origin　from　nothing。　If　this
origin　be　regarded　as　the　effect　of　a　foreign　cause；　it　is　termed
creation；　which　cannot　be　admitted　as　an　event　among　phenomena；
because　the　very　possibility　of　it　would　annihilate　the　unity　of
experience。　If；　however；　I　regard　all　things　not　as　phenomena；　but
as　things　in　themselves　and　objects　of　understanding　alone；　they；
although　substances；　may　be　considered　as　dependent；　in　respect　of
their　existence；　on　a　foreign　cause。　But　this　would　require　a　very
different　meaning　in　the　words；　a　meaning　which　could　not　apply　to
phenomena　as　objects　of　possible　experience。
　　How　a　thing　can　be　changed；　how　it　is　possible　that　upon　one　state
existing　in　one　point　of　time；　an　opposite　state　should　follow　in
another　point　of　time…　of　this　we　have　not　the　smallest　conception　a
priori。　There　is　requisite　for　this　the　knowledge　of　real　powers；
which　can　only　be　given　empirically；　for　example；　knowledge　of
moving　forces；　or；　in　other　words；　of　certain　successive　phenomena　（as
movements）　which　indicate　the　presence　of　such　forces。　But　the　form　of
every　change；　the　condition　under　which　alone　it　can　take　place　as　the
ing　into　existence　of　another　state　（be　the　content　of　the
change；　that　is；　the　state　which　is　changed；　what　it　may）；　and
consequently　the　succession　of　the　states　themselves　can　very　well
be　considered　a　priori；　in　relation　to　the　law　of　causality　and　the
conditions　of　time。*

　　*It　must　be　remarked　that　I　do　not　speak　of　the　change　of　certain
relations；　but　of　the　change　of　the　state。　Thus；　when　a　body　moves
in　a　uniform　manner；　it　does　not　change　its　state　（of　motion）；　but
only　when　all　motion　increases　or　decreases。

　　When　a　substance　passes　from　one　state；　a；　into　another　state；　b；
the　point　of　time　in　which　the　latter　exists　is　different　from；　and
subsequent　to　that　in　which　the　former　existed。　In　like　manner；　the
second　state；　as　reality　（