the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第33部分

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conclusive　objection　to　it。　The　conception　of　cause；　for　example；
which　expresses　the　necessity　of　an　effect　under　a　presupposed
condition；　would　be　false；　if　it　rested　only　upon　such　an　arbitrary
subjective　necessity　of　uniting　certain　empirical　representations
according　to　such　a　rule　of　relation。　I　could　not　then　say…　〃The
effect　is　connected　with　its　cause　in　the　object　（that　is；
necessarily）；〃　but　only；　〃I　am　so　constituted　that　I　can　think　this
representation　as　so　connected；　and　not　otherwise。〃　Now　this　is　just
what　the　sceptic　wants。　For　in　this　case；　all　our　knowledge；　depending
on　the　supposed　objective　validity　of　our　judgement；　is　nothing　but
mere　illusion；　nor　would　there　be　wanting　people　who　would　deny　any
such　subjective　necessity　in　respect　to　themselves；　though　they　must
feel　it。　At　all　events；　we　could　not　dispute　with　any　one　on　that
which　merely　depends　on　the　manner　in　which　his　subject　is　organized。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　Short　view　of　the　above　Deduction。

　　The　foregoing　deduction　is　an　exposition　of　the　pure　conceptions
of　the　understanding　（and　with　them　of　all　theoretical　a　priori
cognition）；　as　principles　of　the　possibility　of　experience；　but　of
experience　as　the　determination　of　all　phenomena　in　space　and　time
in　general…　of　experience；　finally；　from　the　principle　of　the　original
synthetical　unity　of　apperception；　as　the　form　of　the　understanding　in
relation　to　time　and　space　as　original　forms　of　sensibility。

　　I　consider　the　division　by　paragraphs　to　be　necessary　only　up　to
this　point；　because　we　had　to　treat　of　the　elementary　conceptions。
As　we　now　proceed　to　the　exposition　of　the　employment　of　these；　I
shall　not　designate　the　chapters　in　this　manner　any　further。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　II。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Analytic　of　Principles。

　　General　logic　is　constructed　upon　a　plan　which　coincides　exactly
with　the　division　of　the　higher　faculties　of　cognition。　These　are；
understanding；　judgement；　and　reason。　This　science；　accordingly；
treats　in　its　analytic　of　conceptions；　judgements；　and　conclusions
in　exact　correspondence　with　the　functions　and　order　of　those　mental
powers　which　we　include　generally　under　the　generic　denomination　of
understanding。
　　As　this　merely　formal　logic　makes　abstraction　of　all　content　of
cognition；　whether　pure　or　empirical；　and　occupies　itself　with　the
mere　form　of　thought　（discursive　cognition）；　it　must　contain　in　its
analytic　a　canon　for　reason。　For　the　form　of　reason　has　its　law；
which；　without　taking　into　consideration　the　particular　nature　of
the　cognition　about　which　it　is　employed；　can　be　discovered　a
priori；　by　the　simple　analysis　of　the　action　of　reason　into　its
momenta。
　　Transcendental　logic；　limited　as　it　is　to　a　determinate　content；
that　of　pure　a　priori　cognitions；　to　wit；　cannot　imitate　general　logic
in　this　division。　For　it　is　evident　that　the　transcendental　employment
of　reason　is　not　objectively　valid；　and　therefore　does　not　belong　to
the　logic　of　truth　（that　is；　to　analytic）；　but　as　a　logic　of　illusion；
occupies　a　particular　department　in　the　scholastic　system　under　the
name　of　transcendental　dialectic。
　　Understanding　and　judgement　accordingly　possess　in　transcendental
logic　a　canon　of　objectively　valid；　and　therefore　true　exercise；　and
are　prehended　in　the　analytical　department　of　that　logic。　But
reason；　in　her　endeavours　to　arrive　by　a　priori　means　at　some　true
statement　concerning　objects　and　to　extend　cognition　beyond　the　bounds
of　possible　experience；　is　altogether　dialectic；　and　her　illusory
assertions　cannot　be　constructed　into　a　canon　such　as　an　analytic
ought　to　contain。
　　Accordingly；　the　analytic　of　principles　will　be　merely　a　canon　for
the　faculty　of　judgement；　for　the　instruction　of　this　faculty　in　its
application　to　phenomena　of　the　pure　conceptions　of　the　understanding；
which　contain　the　necessary　condition　for　the　establishment　of　a
priori　laws。　On　this　account；　although　the　subject　of　the　following
chapters　is　the　especial　principles　of　understanding；　I　shall　make　use
of　the　term　Doctrine　of　the　faculty　of　judgement；　in　order　to　define
more　particularly　my　present　purpose。

　　INTRODUCTION。　Of　the　Transcendental　Faculty　of　judgement　in　General。

　　If　understanding　in　general　be　defined　as　the　faculty　of　laws　or
rules；　the　faculty　of　judgement　may　be　termed　the　faculty　of
subsumption　under　these　rules；　that　is；　of　distinguishing　whether　this
or　that　does　or　does　not　stand　under　a　given　rule　（casus　datae　legis）。
General　logic　contains　no　directions　or　precepts　for　the　faculty　of
judgement；　nor　can　it　contain　any　such。　For　as　it　makes　abstraction　of
all　content　of　cognition；　no　duty　is　left　for　it；　except　that　of
exposing　analytically　the　mere　form　of　cognition　in　conceptions；
judgements；　and　conclusions；　and　of　thereby　establishing　formal
rules　for　all　exercise　of　the　understanding。　Now　if　this　logic
wished　to　give　some　general　direction　how　we　should　subsume　under
these　rules；　that　is；　how　we　should　distinguish　whether　this　or　that
did　or　did　not　stand　under　them；　this　again　could　not　be　done
otherwise　than　by　means　of　a　rule。　But　this　rule；　precisely　because　it
is　a　rule；　requires　for　itself　direction　from　the　faculty　of
judgement。　Thus；　it　is　evident　that　the　understanding　is　capable　of
being　instructed　by　rules；　but　that　the　judgement　is　a　peculiar
talent；　which　does　not；　and　cannot　require　tuition；　but　only　exercise。
This　faculty　is　therefore　the　specific　quality　of　the　so…called　mother
wit；　the　want　of　which　no　scholastic　discipline　can　pensate。
　　For　although　education　may　furnish；　and；　as　it　were；　engraft　upon
a　limited　understanding　rules　borrowed　from　other　minds；　yet　the　power
of　employing　these　rules　correctly　must　belong　to　the　pupil　himself；
and　no　rule　which　we　can　prescribe　to　him　with　this　purpose　is；　in　the
absence　or　deficiency　of　this　gift　of　nature；　secure　from　misuse。*　A
physician　therefore；　a　judge　or　a　statesman；　may　have　in　his　head　many
admirable　pathological；　juridical；　or　political　rules；　in　a　degree
that　may　enable　him　to　be　a　profound　teacher　in　his　particular
science；　and　yet　in　the　application　of　these　rules　he　may　very
possibly　blunder…　either　because　he　is　wanting　in　natural　judgement
（though　not　in　understanding）　and；　whilst　he　can　prehend　the
general　in　abstracto；　cannot　distinguish　whether　a　particular　case
in　concreto　ought　to　rank　under　the　former；　or　because　his　faculty
of　judgement　bas　not　been　sufficiently　exercised　by　examples　and
real　practice。　Indeed；　the　grand　and　only　use　of　examples；　is　to
sharpen　the　judgement。　For　as　regards　the　correctness　and　precision　of
the　insight　of　the　understanding；　examples　are　monly　injurious
rather　than　otherwise；　because；　as　casus　in　terminis　they　seldom
adequately　fulfil　the　conditions　of　the　rule。　Besides；　they　often
weaken　the　power　of　our　understanding　to　apprehend　rules　or　laws　in
their　universality；　independently　of　particular　circumstances　of
experience；　and　hence；　accustom　us　to　employ　them　more　as　formulae
than　as　principles。　Examples　are　thus　the　go…cart　of　the　judgement；
which　he　who　is　naturally　deficient　in　that　faculty　cannot　afford　to
dispense　with。

　　*Deficiency　in　judgement　is　properly　that　which　is　called　stupidity；
and　for　such　a　failing　we　know　no　remedy。　A　dull　or　narrow…minded
person；　to　whom　nothing　is　wanting　but　a　proper　degree　of
understanding；　may　be　improved　by　tuition；　even　so　far　as　to　deserve
the　epithet　of　learned。　But　as　such　persons　frequently　labour　under
a　deficiency　in　the　faculty　of　judgement；　it　is　not　unmon　to　find
men　extremely　learned　who　in　the　application　of　their　science　betray　a
lamentable　degree　this　irremediable　want。

　　But　although　general　logic　cannot　give　directions　to　the　faculty
of　judgement；　the　case　is　very　different　as　regards　transcendental
logic；　insomuch　that　it　appears　to　be　the　especial　duty　of　the
latter　to　secure　and　direct；　by　means　of　determinate　rules；　the
faculty　of　judgement　in　the　employment　of　the　pure　understanding。　For；
as　a　doctrine；　that　is；　as　an　endeavour　to　enlarge　the　sphere　of　the
understanding　in　regard　to　pure　a　priori　cognitions；　philosophy　is
worse　than　useless；　since　from　all　the　attempts　hitherto　made；
little　or　no　ground　has　been　gained。　But；　as　a　critique；　in　order　to
guard　against　the　mistakes　of　the　faculty　of　judgement　（lapsus
judicii）　in　the　employment　of　the　few　pure　conceptions　of　the
understanding　which　we　possess；　although　its　use　is　in　this　case
purely　negative；　philosophy　is　called　upon　to　apply　all　its
acuteness　and　penetration。
　　But　transcendental　philosophy　has　this　peculiarity；　that　besides
indicating　the　rule；　or　rather　the　general　condition　for　rules；
which　is　given　in　the　pure　conception　of　the　understanding；　it　can；　at
the　same　time；　indicate　a　priori　the　case　to　which　the　rule　must　be
applied。　The　cause　of　the　superiority　which；　in　this　respect；
transcendental　philosophy　possesses　above　all　other　sciences　except
mathematics；　lies　in　this：　it　treats　of　conceptions　which　must
relate　a　priori　to　their　objects；　whose　objective　validity
consequently　cannot　be　demonstrated　a　posteriori；　and　is；　at　the
same　time；　under　the　oblig