the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第27部分

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conceptions　belongs　the　function　Of　subject　and　to　which　that　of
predicate。　For　we　could　also　say：　〃Some　divisible　is　a　body。〃　But
the　category　of　substance；　when　the　conception　of　a　body　is　brought
under　it；　determines　that；　and　its　empirical　intuition　in　experience
must　be　contemplated　always　as　subject　and　never　as　mere　predicate。
And　so　with　all　the　other　categories。

　　SECTION　II　Transcendental　Deduction　of　the　pure　Conceptions　of
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　the　Understanding。　SS　11

　　Of　the　Possibility　of　a　Conjunction　of　the　manifold　representations
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　given　by　Sense。

　　The　manifold　content　in　our　representations　can　be　given　in　an
intuition　which　is　merely　sensuous…　in　other　words；　is　nothing　but
susceptibility；　and　the　form　of　this　intuition　can　exist　a　priori　in
our　faculty　of　representation；　without　being　anything　else　but　the
mode　in　which　the　subject　is　affected。　But　the　conjunction
（conjunctio）　of　a　manifold　in　intuition　never　can　be　given　us　by　the
senses；　it　cannot　therefore　be　contained　in　the　pure　form　of
sensuous　intuition；　for　it　is　a　spontaneous　act　of　the　faculty　of
representation。　And　as　we　must；　to　distinguish　it　from　sensibility；
entitle　this　faculty　understanding；　so　all　conjunction　whether
conscious　or　unconscious；　be　it　of　the　manifold　in　intuition；　sensuous
or　non…sensuous；　or　of　several　conceptions…　is　an　act　of　the
understanding。　To　this　act　we　shall　give　the　general　appellation　of
synthesis；　thereby　to　indicate；　at　the　same　time；　that　we　cannot
represent　anything　as　conjoined　in　the　object　without　having
previously　conjoined　it　ourselves。　Of　all　mental　notions；　that　of
conjunction　is　the　only　one　which　cannot　be　given　through　objects；　but
can　be　originated　only　by　the　subject　itself；　because　it　is　an　act
of　its　purely　spontaneous　activity。　The　reader　will　easily　enough
perceive　that　the　possibility　of　conjunction　must　be　grounded　in　the
very　nature　of　this　act；　and　that　it　must　be　equally　valid　for　all
conjunction；　and　that　analysis；　which　appears　to　be　its　contrary；
must；　nevertheless；　always　presuppose　it；　for　where　the
understanding　has　not　previously　conjoined；　it　cannot　dissect　or
analyse；　because　only　as　conjoined　by　it；　must　that　which　is　to　be
analysed　have　been　given　to　our　faculty　of　representation。
　　But　the　conception　of　conjunction　includes；　besides　the　conception
of　the　manifold　and　of　the　synthesis　of　it；　that　of　the　unity　of　it
also。　Conjunction　is　the　representation　of　the　synthetical　unity　of
the　manifold。*　This　idea　of　unity；　therefore；　cannot　arise　out　of　that
of　conjunction；　much　rather　does　that　idea；　by　bining　itself　with
the　representation　of　the　manifold；　render　the　conception　of
conjunction　possible。　This　unity；　which　a　priori　precedes　all
conceptions　of　conjunction；　is　not　the　category　of　unity　（SS　6）；　for
all　the　categories　are　based　upon　logical　functions　of　judgement；
and　in　these　functions　we　already　have　conjunction；　and　consequently
unity　of　given　conceptions。　It　is　therefore　evident　that　the
category　of　unity　presupposes　conjunction。　We　must　therefore　look
still　higher　for　this　unity　（as　qualitative；　SS　8）；　in　that；　namely；
which　contains　the　ground　of　the　unity　of　diverse　conceptions　in
judgements；　the　ground；　consequently；　of　the　possibility　of　the
existence　of　the　understanding；　even　in　regard　to　its　logical　use。

　　*Whether　the　representations　are　in　themselves　identical；　and
consequently　whether　one　can　be　thought　analytically　by　means　of　and
through　the　other；　is　a　question　which　we　need　not　at　present
consider。　Our　Consciousness　of　the　one；　when　we　speak　of　the　manifold；
is　always　distinguishable　from　our　consciousness　of　the　other；　and
it　is　only　respecting　the　synthesis　of　this　（possible）　consciousness
that　we　here　treat。

　　　　Of　the　Originally　Synthetical　Unity　of　Apperception。　SS　12

　　The　〃I　think〃　must　acpany　all　my　representations；　for　otherwise
something　would　be　represented　in　me　which　could　not　be　thought；　in
other　words；　the　representation　would　either　be　impossible；　or　at
least　be；　in　relation　to　me；　nothing。　That　representation　which　can　be
given　previously　to　all　thought　is　called　intuition。　All　the　diversity
or　manifold　content　of　intuition；　has；　therefore；　a　necessary　relation
to　the　'I　think；〃　in　the　subject　in　which　this　diversity　is　found。　But
this　representation；　〃I　think；〃　is　an　act　of　spontaneity；　that　is　to
say；　it　cannot　be　regarded　as　belonging　to　mere　sensibility。　I　call　it
pure　apperception；　in　order　to　distinguish　it　from　empirical；　or
primitive　apperception；　because　it　is　self…consciousness　which；　whilst
it　gives　birth　to　the　representation〃　I　think；〃　must　necessarily　be
capable　of　acpanying　all　our　representations。　It　is　in　all　acts
of　consciousness　one　and　the　same；　and　unacpanied　by　it；　no
representation　can　exist　for　me。　The　unity　of　this　apperception　I　call
the　transcendental　unity　of　self…consciousness；　in　order　to　indicate
the　possibility　of　a　priori　cognition　arising　from　it。　For　the
manifold　representations　which　are　given　in　an　intuition　would　not　all
of　them　be　my　representations；　if　they　did　not　all　belong　to　one
self…consciousness；　that　is；　as　my　representations　（even　although　I　am
not　conscious　of　them　as　such）；　they　must　conform　to　the　condition
under　which　alone　they　can　exist　together　in　a　mon
self…consciousness；　because　otherwise　they　would　not　all　without
exception　belong　to　me。　From　this　primitive　conjunction　follow　many
important　results。
　　For　example；　this　universal　identity　of　the　apperception　of　the
manifold　given　in　intuition　contains　a　synthesis　of　representations
and　is　possible　only　by　means　of　the　consciousness　of　this
synthesis。　For　the　empirical　consciousness　which　acpanies　different
representations　is　in　itself　fragmentary　and　disunited；　and　without
relation　to　the　identity　of　the　subject。　This　relation；　then；　does　not
exist　because　I　acpany　every　representation　with　consciousness；　but
because　I　join　one　representation　to　another；　and　am　conscious　of
the　synthesis　of　them。　Consequently；　only　because　I　can　connect　a
variety　of　given　representations　in　one　consciousness；　is　it
possible　that　I　can　represent　to　myself　the　identity　of
consciousness　in　these　representations；　in　other　words；　the　analytical
unity　of　apperception　is　possible　only　under　the　presupposition　of　a
synthetical　unity。*　The　thought；　〃These　representations　given　in
intuition　belong　all　of　them　to　me；〃　is　accordingly　just　the　same
as；　〃I　unite　them　in　one　self…consciousness；　or　can　at　least　so
unite　them〃；　and　although　this　thought　is　not　itself　the　consciousness
of　the　synthesis　of　representations；　it　presupposes　the　possibility　of
it；　that　is　to　say；　for　the　reason　alone　that　I　can　prehend　the
variety　of　my　representations　in　one　consciousness；　do　I　call　them
my　representations；　for　otherwise　I　must　have　as　many…coloured　and
various　a　self　as　are　the　representations　of　which　I　am　conscious。
Synthetical　unity　of　the　manifold　in　intuitions；　as　given　a　priori；　is
therefore　the　foundation　of　the　identity　of　apperception　itself；　which
antecedes　a　priori　all　determinate　thought。　But　the　conjunction　of
representations　into　a　conception　is　not　to　be　found　in　objects
themselves；　nor　can　it　be；　as　it　were；　borrowed　from　them　and　taken　up
into　the　understanding　by　perception；　but　it　is　on　the　contrary　an
operation　of　the　understanding　itself；　which　is　nothing　more　than
the　faculty　of　conjoining　a　priori　and　of　bringing　the　variety　of
given　representations　under　the　unity　of　apperception。　This
principle　is　the　highest　in　all　human　cognition。

　　*All　general　conceptions…　as　such…　depend；　for　their　existence；　on
the　analytical　unity　of　consciousness。　For　example；　when　I　think　of
red　in　general；　I　thereby　think　to　myself　a　property　which　（as　a
characteristic　mark）　can　be　discovered　somewhere；　or　can　be　united
with　other　representations；　consequently；　it　is　only　by　means　of　a
forethought　possible　synthetical　unity　that　I　can　think　to　myself
the　analytical。　A　representation　which　is　cogitated　as　mon　to
different　representations；　is　regarded　as　belonging　to　such　as；
besides　this　mon　representation；　contain　something　different；
consequently　it　must　be　previously　thought　in　synthetical　unity　with
other　although　only　possible　representations；　before　I　can　think　in　it
the　analytical　unity　of　consciousness　which　makes　it　a　conceptas
munis。　And　thus　the　synthetical　unity　of　apperception　is　the
highest　point　with　which　we　must　connect　every　operation　of　the
understanding；　even　the　whole　of　logic；　and　after　it　our
transcendental　philosophy；　indeed；　this　faculty　is　the　understanding
itself。

　　This　fundamental　principle　of　the　necessary　unity　of　apperception　is
indeed　an　identical；　and　therefore　analytical；　proposition；　but　it
nevertheless　explains　the　necessity　for　a　synthesis　of　the　manifold
given　in　an　intuition；　without　which　the　identity　of
self…consciousness　would　be　incogitable。　For　the　ego；　as　a　simple
representation；　presents　us　with　no　manifold　content；　only　in
intuition；　which　is　quite　different　from　the　representation　ego；　can
it　be　given　us；　and　by　means　of　conjunction　it　is　cogitated　in　one
s