the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第22部分

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Problematical
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Assertorical
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Apodeictical

　　As　this　division　appears　to　differ　in　some；　though　not　essential
points；　from　the　usual　technique　of　logicians；　the　following
observations；　for　the　prevention　of　otherwise　possible
misunderstanding；　will　not　be　without　their　use。
　　1。　Logicians　say；　with　justice；　that　in　the　use　of　judgements　in
syllogisms；　singular　judgements　may　be　treated　like　universal　ones。
For；　precisely　because　a　singular　judgement　has　no　extent　at　all；
its　predicate　cannot　refer　to　a　part　of　that　which　is　contained　in　the
conception　of　the　subject　and　be　excluded　from　the　rest。　The　predicate
is　valid　for　the　whole　conception　just　as　if　it　were　a　general
conception；　and　had　extent；　to　the　whole　of　which　the　predicate
applied。　On　the　other　hand；　let　us　pare　a　singular　with　a　general
judgement；　merely　as　a　cognition；　in　regard　to　quantity。　The
singular　judgement　relates　to　the　general　one；　as　unity　to　infinity；
and　is　therefore　in　itself　essentially　different。　Thus；　if　we　estimate
a　singular　judgement　（judicium　singulare）　not　merely　according　to
its　intrinsic　validity　as　a　judgement；　but　also　as　a　cognition
generally；　according　to　its　quantity　in　parison　with　that　of
other　cognitions；　it　is　then　entirely　different　from　a　general
judgement　（judicium　mune）；　and　in　a　plete　table　of　the　momenta
of　thought　deserves　a　separate　place…　though；　indeed；　this　would　not
be　necessary　in　a　logic　limited　merely　to　the　consideration　of　the　use
of　judgements　in　reference　to　each　other。
　　2。　In　like　manner；　in　transcendental　logic；　infinite　must　be
distinguished　from　affirmative　judgements；　although　in　general　logic
they　are　rightly　enough　classed　under　affirmative。　General　logic
abstracts　all　content　of　the　predicate　（though　it　be　negative）；　and
only　considers　whether　the　said　predicate　be　affirmed　or　denied　of　the
subject。　But　transcendental　logic　considers　also　the　worth　or
content　of　this　logical　affirmation…　an　affirmation　by　means　of　a
merely　negative　predicate；　and　inquires　how　much　the　sum　total　of
our　cognition　gains　by　this　affirmation。　For　example；　if　I　say　of
the　soul；　〃It　is　not　mortal〃…　by　this　negative　judgement　I　should　at
least　ward　off　error。　Now；　by　the　proposition；　〃The　soul　is　not
mortal；〃　I　have；　in　respect　of　the　logical　form；　really　affirmed；
inasmuch　as　I　thereby　place　the　soul　in　the　unlimited　sphere　of
immortal　beings。　Now；　because　of　the　whole　sphere　of　possible
existences；　the　mortal　occupies　one　part；　and　the　immortal　the
other；　neither　more　nor　less　is　affirmed　by　the　proposition　than
that　the　soul　is　one　among　the　infinite　multitude　of　things　which
remain　over；　when　I　take　away　the　whole　mortal　part。　But　by　this
proceeding　we　acplish　only　this　much；　that　the　infinite　sphere　of
all　possible　existences　is　in　so　far　limited　that　the　mortal　is
excluded　from　it；　and　the　soul　is　placed　in　the　remaining　part　of
the　extent　of　this　sphere。　But　this　part　remains；　notwithstanding　this
exception；　infinite；　and　more　and　more　parts　may　be　taken　away　from
the　whole　sphere；　without　in　the　slightest　degree　thereby　augmenting
or　affirmatively　determining　our　conception　of　the　soul。　These
judgements；　therefore；　infinite　in　respect　of　their　logical　extent；
are；　in　respect　of　the　content　of　their　cognition；　merely
limitative；　and　are　consequently　entitled　to　a　place　in　our
transcendental　table　of　all　the　momenta　of　thought　in　judgements；
because　the　function　of　the　understanding　exercised　by　them　may
perhaps　be　of　importance　in　the　field　of　its　pure　a　priori　cognition。
　　3。　All　relations　of　thought　in　judgements　are　those　（a）　of　the
predicate　to　the　subject；　（b）　of　the　principle　to　its　consequence；　（c）
of　the　divided　cognition　and　all　the　members　of　the　division　to　each
other。　In　the　first　of　these　three　classes；　we　consider　only　two
conceptions；　in　the　second；　two　judgements；　in　the　third；　several
judgements　in　relation　to　each　other。　The　hypothetical　proposition；
〃If　perfect　justice　exists；　the　obstinately　wicked　are　punished；〃
contains　properly　the　relation　to　each　other　of　two　propositions；
namely；　〃Perfect　justice　exists；〃　and　〃The　obstinately　wicked　are
punished。〃　Whether　these　propositions　are　in　themselves　true　is　a
question　not　here　decided。　Nothing　is　cogitated　by　means　of　this
judgement　except　a　certain　consequence。　Finally；　the　disjunctive
judgement　contains　a　relation　of　two　or　more　propositions　to　each
other…　a　relation　not　of　consequence；　but　of　logical　opposition；　in　so
far　as　the　sphere　of　the　one　proposition　excludes　that　of　the　other。
But　it　contains　at　the　same　time　a　relation　of　munity；　in　so　far　as
all　the　propositions　taken　together　fill　up　the　sphere　of　the
cognition。　The　disjunctive　judgement　contains；　therefore；　the　relation
of　the　parts　of　the　whole　sphere　of　a　cognition；　since　the　sphere　of
each　part　is　a　plemental　part　of　the　sphere　of　the　other；　each
contributing　to　form　the　sum　total　of　the　divided　cognition。　Take；　for
example；　the　proposition；　〃The　world　exists　either　through　blind
chance；　or　through　internal　necessity；　or　through　an　external
cause。〃　Each　of　these　propositions　embraces　a　part　of　the　sphere　of
our　possible　cognition　as　to　the　existence　of　a　world；　all　of　them
taken　together；　the　whole　sphere。　To　take　the　cognition　out　of　one
of　these　spheres；　is　equivalent　to　placing　it　in　one　of　the　others；
and；　on　the　other　hand；　to　place　it　in　one　sphere　is　equivalent　to
taking　it　out　of　the　rest。　There　is；　therefore；　in　a　disjunctive
judgement　a　certain　munity　of　cognitions；　which　consists　in　this；
that　they　mutually　exclude　each　other；　yet　thereby　determine；　as　a
whole；　the　true　cognition；　inasmuch　as；　taken　together；　they　make　up
the　plete　content　of　a　particular　given　cognition。　And　this　is
all　that　I　find　necessary；　for　the　sake　of　what　follows；　to　remark
in　this　place。
　　4。　The　modality　of　judgements　is　a　quite　peculiar　function；　with
this　distinguishing　characteristic；　that　it　contributes　nothing　to　the
content　of　a　judgement　（for　besides　quantity；　quality；　and　relation；
there　is　nothing　more　that　constitutes　the　content　of　a　judgement）；
but　concerns　itself　only　with　the　value　of　the　copula　in　relation　to
thought　in　general。　Problematical　judgements　are　those　in　which　the
affirmation　or　negation　is　accepted　as　merely　possible　（ad　libitum）。
In　the　assertorical；　we　regard　the　proposition　as　real　（true）；　in
the　apodeictical；　we　look　on　it　as　necessary。*　Thus　the　two　judgements
（antecedens　et　consequens）；　the　relation　of　which　constitutes　a
hypothetical　judgement；　likewise　those　（the　members　of　the　division）
in　whose　reciprocity　the　disjunctive　consists；　are　only　problematical。
In　the　example　above　given　the　proposition；　〃There　exists　perfect
justice；〃　is　not　stated　assertorically；　but　as　an　ad　libitum
judgement；　which　someone　may　choose　to　adopt；　and　the　consequence
alone　is　assertorical。　Hence　such　judgements　may　be　obviously　false；
and　yet；　taken　problematically；　be　conditions　of　our　cognition　of
the　truth。　Thus　the　proposition；　〃The　world　exists　only　by　blind
chance；〃　is　in　the　disjunctive　judgement　of　problematical　import　only：
that　is　to　say；　one　may　accept　it　for　the　moment；　and　it　helps　us
（like　the　indication　of　the　wrong　road　among　all　the　roads　that　one
can　take）　to　find　out　the　true　proposition。　The　problematical
proposition　is；　therefore；　that　which　expresses　only　logical
possibility　（which　is　not　objective）；　that　is；　it　expresses　a　free
choice　to　admit　the　validity　of　such　a　proposition…　a　merely　arbitrary
reception　of　it　into　the　understanding。　The　assertorical　speaks　of
logical　reality　or　truth；　as；　for　example；　in　a　hypothetical
syllogism；　the　antecedens　presents　itself　in　a　problematical　form　in
the　major；　in　an　assertorical　form　in　the　minor；　and　it　shows　that　the
proposition　is　in　harmony　with　the　laws　of　the　understanding。　The
apodeictical　proposition　cogitates　the　assertorical　as　determined　by
these　very　laws　of　the　understanding；　consequently　as　affirming　a
priori；　and　in　this　manner　it　expresses　logical　necessity。　Now　because
all　is　here　gradually　incorporated　with　the　understanding…　inasmuch　as
in　the　first　place　we　judge　problematically；　then　accept
assertorically　our　judgement　as　true；　lastly；　affirm　it　as　inseparably
united　with　the　understanding；　that　is；　as　necessary　and　apodeictical…
we　may　safely　reckon　these　three　functions　of　modality　as　so　many
momenta　of　thought。

　　*Just　as　if　thought　were　in　the　first　instance　a　function　of　the
understanding；　in　the　second；　of　judgement；　in　the　third；　of　reason。　A
remark　which　will　be　explained　in　the　sequel。

　　SECTION　III。　Of　the　Pure　Conceptions　of　the　Understanding；　or
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Categories。　SS　6

　　General　logic；　as　has　been　repeatedly　said；　makes　abstraction　of　all
content　of　cognition；　and　expects　to　receive　representations　from　some
other　quarter；　in　order；　by　means　of　analysis；　to　convert　them　into
conceptions。　On　the　contrary；　transcendental　logic　has　lying　before　it
the　manifold　content　of　a　priori　sensibility；　which　transcendental
aesthetic　presents　to　it　in　order　to　give　mat