the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第20部分

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origin）…　in　this　expectation；　I　say；　we　form　to　ourselves；　by
anticipation；　the　idea　of　a　science　of　pure　understanding　and　rational
cognition；　by　means　of　which　we　may　cogitate　objects　entirely　a
priori。　A　science　of　this　kind；　which　should　determine　the　origin；　the
extent；　and　the　objective　validity　of　such　cognitions；　must　be
called　transcendental　logic；　because　it　has　not；　like　general　logic；
to　do　with　the　laws　of　understanding　and　reason　in　relation　to
empirical　as　well　as　pure　rational　cognitions　without　distinction；　but
concerns　itself　with　these　only　in　an　a　priori　relation　to　objects。

　　III。　Of　the　Division　of　General　Logic　into　Analytic　and　Dialectic。

　　The　old　question　with　which　people　sought　to　push　logicians　into　a
corner；　so　that　they　must　either　have　recourse　to　pitiful　sophisms
or　confess　their　ignorance；　and　consequently　the　vanity　of　their　whole
art；　is　this：　〃What　is　truth？〃　The　definition　of　the　word　truth；　to
wit；　〃the　accordance　of　the　cognition　with　its　object；〃　is　presupposed
in　the　question；　but　we　desire　to　be　told；　in　the　answer　to　it；　what
is　the　universal　and　secure　criterion　of　the　truth　of　every　cognition。
　　To　know　what　questions　we　may　reasonably　propose　is　in　itself　a
strong　evidence　of　sagacity　and　intelligence。　For　if　a　question　be
in　itself　absurd　and　unsusceptible　of　a　rational　answer；　it　is
attended　with　the　danger…　not　to　mention　the　shame　that　falls　upon　the
person　who　proposes　it…　of　seducing　the　unguarded　listener　into　making
absurd　answers；　and　we　are　presented　with　the　ridiculous　spectacle
of　one　（as　the　ancients　said）　〃milking　the　he…goat；　and　the　other
holding　a　sieve。〃
　　If　truth　consists　in　the　accordance　of　a　cognition　with　its
object；　this　object　must　be；　ipso　facto；　distinguished　from　all
others；　for　a　cognition　is　false　if　it　does　not　accord　with　the　object
to　which　it　relates；　although　it　contains　something　which　may　be
affirmed　of　other　objects。　Now　an　universal　criterion　of　truth　would
be　that　which　is　valid　for　all　cognitions；　without　distinction　of
their　objects。　But　it　is　evident　that　since；　in　the　case　of　such　a
criterion；　we　make　abstraction　of　all　the　content　of　a　cognition　（that
is；　of　all　relation　to　its　object）；　and　truth　relates　precisely　to
this　content；　it　must　be　utterly　absurd　to　ask　for　a　mark　of　the　truth
of　this　content　of　cognition；　and　that；　accordingly；　a　sufficient；　and
at　the　same　time　universal；　test　of　truth　cannot　possibly　be　found。　As
we　have　already　termed　the　content　of　a　cognition　its　matter；　we　shall
say：　〃Of　the　truth　of　our　cognitions　in　respect　of　their　matter；　no
universal　test　can　be　demanded；　because　such　a　demand　is
self…contradictory。〃
　　On　the　other　hand；　with　regard　to　our　cognition　in　respect　of　its
mere　form　（excluding　all　content）；　it　is　equally　manifest　that
logic；　in　so　far　as　it　exhibits　the　universal　and　necessary　laws　of
the　understanding；　must　in　these　very　laws　present　us　with　criteria　of
truth。　Whatever　contradicts　these　rules　is　false；　because　thereby
the　understanding　is　made　to　contradict　its　own　universal　laws　of
thought；　that　is；　to　contradict　itself。　These　criteria；　however；　apply
solely　to　the　form　of　truth；　that　is；　of　thought　in　general；　and　in　so
far　they　are　perfectly　accurate；　yet　not　sufficient。　For　although　a
cognition　may　be　perfectly　accurate　as　to　logical　form；　that　is；　not
self…contradictory；　it　is　notwithstanding　quite　possible　that　it　may
not　stand　in　agreement　with　its　object。　Consequently；　the　merely
logical　criterion　of　truth；　namely；　the　accordance　of　a　cognition　with
the　universal　and　formal　laws　of　understanding　and　reason；　is
nothing　more　than　the　conditio　sine　qua　non；　or　negative　condition
of　all　truth。　Farther　than　this　logic　cannot　go；　and　the　error　which
depends　not　on　the　form；　but　on　the　content　of　the　cognition；　it　has
no　test　to　discover。
　　General　logic；　then；　resolves　the　whole　formal　business　of
understanding　and　reason　into　its　elements；　and　exhibits　them　as
principles　of　all　logical　judging　of　our　cognitions。　This　part　of
logic　may；　therefore；　be　called　analytic；　and　is　at　least　the　negative
test　of　truth；　because　all　cognitions　must　first　of　an　be　estimated
and　tried　according　to　these　laws　before　we　proceed　to　investigate
them　in　respect　of　their　content；　in　order　to　discover　whether　they
contain　positive　truth　in　regard　to　their　object。　Because；　however；
the　mere　form　of　a　cognition；　accurately　as　it　may　accord　with　logical
laws；　is　insufficient　to　supply　us　with　material　（objective）　truth；　no
one；　by　means　of　logic　alone；　can　venture　to　predicate　anything　of
or　decide　concerning　objects；　unless　he　has　obtained；　independently　of
logic；　well…grounded　information　about　them；　in　order　afterwards　to
examine；　according　to　logical　laws；　into　the　use　and　connection；　in
a　cohering　whole；　of　that　information；　or；　what　is　still　better；
merely　to　test　it　by　them。　Notwithstanding；　there　lies　so　seductive
a　charm　in　the　possession　of　a　specious　art　like　this…　an　art　which
gives　to　all　our　cognitions　the　form　of　the　understanding；　although
with　respect　to　the　content　thereof　we　may　be　sadly　deficient…　that
general　logic；　which　is　merely　a　canon　of　judgement；　has　been　employed
as　an　organon　for　the　actual　production；　or　rather　for　the　semblance
of　production；　of　objective　assertions；　and　has　thus　been　grossly
misapplied。　Now　general　logic；　in　its　assumed　character　of　organon；　is
called　dialectic。
　　Different　as　are　the　significations　in　which　the　ancients　used
this　term　for　a　science　or　an　art；　we　may　safely　infer；　from　their
actual　employment　of　it；　that　with　them　it　was　nothing　else　than　a
logic　of　illusion…　a　sophistical　art　for　giving　ignorance；　nay；　even
intentional　sophistries；　the　colouring　of　truth；　in　which　the
thoroughness　of　procedure　which　logic　requires　was　imitated；　and　their
topic　employed　to　cloak　the　empty　pretensions。　Now　it　may　be　taken
as　a　safe　and　useful　warning；　that　general　logic；　considered　as　an
organon；　must　always　be　a　logic　of　illusion；　that　is；　be
dialectical；　for；　as　it　teaches　us　nothing　whatever　respecting　the
content　of　our　cognitions；　but　merely　the　formal　conditions　of　their
accordance　with　the　understanding；　which　do　not　relate　to　and　are
quite　indifferent　in　respect　of　objects；　any　attempt　to　employ　it　as
an　instrument　（organon）　in　order　to　extend　and　enlarge　the　range　of
our　knowledge　must　end　in　mere　prating；　any　one　being　able　to　maintain
or　oppose；　with　some　appearance　of　truth；　any　single　assertion
whatever。
　　Such　instruction　is　quite　unbeing　the　dignity　of　philosophy。
For　these　reasons　we　have　chosen　to　denominate　this　part　of　logic
dialectic；　in　the　sense　of　a　critique　of　dialectical　illusion；　and
we　wish　the　term　to　be　so　understood　in　this　place。

　　IV。　Of　the　Division　of　Transcendental　Logic　into　Transcendental
　　　　　　Analytic　and　Dialectic。

　　In　transcendental　logic　we　isolate　the　understanding　（as　in
transcendental　aesthetic　the　sensibility）　and　select　from　our
cognition　merely　that　part　of　thought　which　has　its　origin　in　the
understanding　alone。　The　exercise　of　this　pure　cognition；　however；
depends　upon　this　as　its　condition；　that　objects　to　which　it　may　be
applied　be　given　to　us　in　intuition；　for　without　intuition　the　whole
of　our　cognition　is　without　objects；　and　is　therefore　quite　void。　That
part　of　transcendental　logic；　then；　which　treats　of　the　elements　of
pure　cognition　of　the　understanding；　and　of　the　principles　without
which　no　object　at　all　can　be　thought；　is　transcendental　analytic；　and
at　the　same　time　a　logic　of　truth。　For　no　cognition　can　contradict　it；
without　losing　at　the　same　time　all　content；　that　is；　losing　all
reference　to　an　object；　and　therefore　all　truth。　But　because　we　are
very　easily　seduced　into　employing　these　pure　cognitions　and
principles　of　the　understanding　by　themselves；　and　that　even　beyond
the　boundaries　of　experience；　which　yet　is　the　only　source　whence　we
can　obtain　matter　（objects）　on　which　those　pure　conceptions　may　be
employed…　understanding　runs　the　risk　of　making；　by　means　of　empty
sophisms；　a　material　and　objective　use　of　the　mere　formal　principles
of　the　pure　understanding；　and　of　passing　judgements　on　objects
without　distinction…　objects　which　are　not　given　to　us；　nay；　perhaps
cannot　be　given　to　us　in　any　way。　Now；　as　it　ought　properly　to　be　only
a　canon　for　judging　of　the　empirical　use　of　the　understanding；　this
kind　of　logic　is　misused　when　we　seek　to　employ　it　as　an　organon　of
the　universal　and　unlimited　exercise　of　the　understanding；　and　attempt
with　the　pure　understanding　alone　to　judge　synthetically；　affirm；
and　determine　respecting　objects　in　general。　In　this　case　the　exercise
of　the　pure　understanding　bees　dialectical。　The　second　part　of
our　transcendental　logic　must　therefore　be　a　critique　of　dialectical
illusion；　and　this　critique　we　shall　term　transcendental　dialectic…
not　meaning　it　as　an　art　of　producing　dogmatically　such　illusion　（an
art　which　is　unfortunately　too　current　among　the　practitioners　of
metaphysical　juggling）；　but　as　a　critique　of　understanding　and
reason　in　regard　to　their　hyperphysical　use。　This　critique　will　expose
the　groundless　nature