the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第2部分

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presented　and　the　aid　furnished　by　experience。
　　So　much　for　the　pleteness　and　thoroughness　necessary　in　the
execution　of　the　present　task。　The　aims　set　before　us　are　not
arbitrarily　proposed；　but　are　imposed　upon　us　by　the　nature　of
cognition　itself。
　　The　above　remarks　relate　to　the　matter　of　our　critical　inquiry。　As
regards　the　form；　there　are　two　indispensable　conditions；　which　any
one　who　undertakes　so　difficult　a　task　as　that　of　a　critique　of　pure
reason；　is　bound　to　fulfil。　These　conditions　are　certitude　and
clearness。
　　As　regards　certitude；　I　have　fully　convinced　myself　that；　in　this
sphere　of　thought；　opinion　is　perfectly　inadmissible；　and　that
everything　which　bears　the　least　semblance　of　an　hypothesis　must　be
excluded；　as　of　no　value　in　such　discussions。　For　it　is　a　necessary
condition　of　every　cognition　that　is　to　be　established　upon　a　priori
grounds　that　it　shall　be　held　to　be　absolutely　necessary；　much　more　is
this　the　case　with　an　attempt　to　determine　all　pure　a　priori
cognition；　and　to　furnish　the　standard…　and　consequently　an　example…
of　all　apodeictic　（philosophical）　certitude。　Whether　I　have
succeeded　in　what　I　professed　to　do；　it　is　for　the　reader　to
determine；　it　is　the　author's　business　merely　to　adduce　grounds　and
reasons；　without　determining　what　influence　these　ought　to　have　on　the
mind　of　his　judges。　But；　lest　anything　he　may　have　said　may　bee　the
innocent　cause　of　doubt　in　their　minds；　or　tend　to　weaken　the　effect
which　his　arguments　might　otherwise　produce…　he　may　be　allowed　to
point　out　those　passages　which　may　occasion　mistrust　or　difficulty；
although　these　do　not　concern　the　main　purpose　of　the　present　work。　He
does　this　solely　with　the　view　of　removing　from　the　mind　of　the　reader
any　doubts　which　might　affect　his　judgement　of　the　work　as　a　whole；
and　in　regard　to　its　ultimate　aim。
　　I　know　no　investigations　more　necessary　for　a　full　insight　into
the　nature　of　the　faculty　which　we　call　understanding；　and　at　the　same
time　for　the　determination　of　the　rules　and　limits　of　its　use；　than
those　undertaken　in　the　second　chapter　of　the　〃Transcendental
Analytic；〃　under　the　title　of　〃Deduction　of　the　Pure　Conceptions　of
the　Understanding〃；　and　they　have　also　cost　me　by　far　the　greatest
labour…　labour　which；　I　hope；　will　not　remain　unpensated。　The
view　there　taken；　which　goes　somewhat　deeply　into　the　subject；　has　two
sides；　The　one　relates　to　the　objects　of　the　pure　understanding；　and
is　intended　to　demonstrate　and　to　render　prehensible　the
objective　validity　of　its　a　priori　conceptions；　and　it　forms　for
this　reason　an　essential　part　of　the　Critique。　The　other　considers　the
pure　understanding　itself；　its　possibility　and　its　powers　of
cognition…　that　is；　from　a　subjective　point　of　view；　and；　although
this　exposition　is　of　great　importance；　it　does　not　belong　essentially
to　the　main　purpose　of　the　work；　because　the　grand　question　is　what
and　how　much　can　reason　and　understanding；　apart　from　experience；
cognize；　and　not；　how　is　the　faculty　of　thought　itself　possible？　As
the　latter　is　an；　inquiry　into　the　cause　of　a　given　effect；　and　has
thus　in　it　some　semblance　of　an　hypothesis　（although；　as　I　shall
show　on　another　occasion；　this　is　really　not　the　fact）；　it　would
seem　that；　in　the　present　instance；　I　had　allowed　myself　to　enounce
a　mere　opinion；　and　that　the　reader　must　therefore　be　at　liberty　to
hold　a　different　opinion。　But　I　beg　to　remind　him　that；　if　my
subjective　deduction　does　not　produce　in　his　mind　the　conviction　of
its　certitude　at　which　I　aimed；　the　objective　deduction；　with　which
alone　the　present　work　is　properly　concerned；　is　in　every　respect
satisfactory。
　　As　regards　clearness；　the　reader　has　a　right　to　demand；　in　the　first
place；　discursive　or　logical　clearness；　that　is；　on　the　basis　of
conceptions；　and；　secondly；　intuitive　or　aesthetic　clearness；　by　means
of　intuitions；　that　is；　by　examples　or　other　modes　of　illustration
in　concreto。　I　have　done　what　I　could　for　the　first　kind　of
intelligibility。　This　was　essential　to　my　purpose；　and　it　thus
became　the　accidental　cause　of　my　inability　to　do　plete　justice
to　the　second　requirement。　I　have　been　almost　always　at　a　loss；　during
the　progress　of　this　work；　how　to　settle　this　question。　Examples　and
illustrations　always　appeared　to　me　necessary；　and；　in　the　first
sketch　of　the　Critique；　naturally　fell　into　their　proper　places。　But　I
very　soon　became　aware　of　the　magnitude　of　my　task；　and　the　numerous
problems　with　which　I　should　be　engaged；　and；　as　I　perceived　that　this
critical　investigation　would；　even　if　delivered　in　the　driest
scholastic　manner；　be　far　from　being　brief；　I　found　it　unadvisable
to　enlarge　it　still　more　with　examples　and　explanations；　which　are
necessary　only　from　a　popular　point　of　view。　I　was　induced　to　take
this　course　from　the　consideration　also　that　the　present　work　is　not
intended　for　popular　use；　that　those　devoted　to　science　do　not　require
such　helps；　although　they　are　always　acceptable；　and　that　they　would
have　materially　interfered　with　my　present　purpose。　Abbe　Terrasson
remarks　with　great　justice　that；　if　we　estimate　the　size　of　a　work；
not　from　the　number　of　its　pages；　but　from　the　time　which　we　require
to　make　ourselves　master　of　it；　it　may　be　said　of　many　a　book　that
it　would　be　much　shorter；　if　it　were　not　so　short。　On　the　other
hand；　as　regards　the　prehensibility　of　a　system　of　speculative
cognition；　connected　under　a　single　principle；　we　may　say　with　equal
justice：　many　a　book　would　have　been　much　clearer；　if　it　had　not
been　intended　to　be　so　very　clear。　For　explanations　and　examples；
and　other　helps　to　intelligibility；　aid　us　in　the　prehension　of
parts；　but　they　distract　the　attention；　dissipate　the　mental　power
of　the　reader；　and　stand　in　the　way　of　his　forming　a　clear
conception　of　the　whole；　as　he　cannot　attain　soon　enough　to　a　survey
of　the　system；　and　the　colouring　and　embellishments　bestowed　upon　it
prevent　his　observing　its　articulation　or　organization…　which　is　the
most　important　consideration　with　him；　when　he　es　to　judge　of　its
unity　and　stability。
　　The　reader　must　naturally　have　a　strong　inducement　to　co…operate
with　the　present　author；　if　he　has　formed　the　intention　of　erecting
a　plete　and　solid　edifice　of　metaphysical　science；　according　to　the
plan　now　laid　before　him。　Metaphysics；　as　here　represented；　is　the
only　science　which　admits　of　pletion…　and　with　little　labour；　if　it
is　united；　in　a　short　time；　so　that　nothing　will　be　left　to　future
generations　except　the　task　of　illustrating　and　applying　it
didactically。　For　this　science　is　nothing　more　than　the　inventory　of
all　that　is　given　us　by　pure　reason；　systematically　arranged。
Nothing　can　escape　our　notice；　for　what　reason　produces　from　itself
cannot　lie　concealed；　but　must　be　brought　to　the　light　by　reason
itself；　so　soon　as　we　have　discovered　the　mon　principle　of　the
ideas　we　seek。　The　perfect　unity　of　this　kind　of　cognitions；　which　are
based　upon　pure　conceptions；　and　uninfluenced　by　any　empirical
element；　or　any　peculiar　intuition　leading　to　determinate
experience；　renders　this　pleteness　not　only　practicable；　but　also
necessary。

　　　　　Tecum　habita；　et　noris　quam　sit　tibi　curta　supellex。*

　　*Persius。　＇Satirae　iv。　52。　〃Dwell　with　yourself；　and　you　will　know
how　short　your　household　stuff　is。〃

　　Such　a　system　of　pure　speculative　reason　I　hope　to　be　able　to
publish　under　the　title　of　Metaphysic　of　Nature。　The　content　of　this
work　（which　will　not　be　half　so　long）　will　be　very　much　richer　than
that　of　the　present　Critique；　which　has　to　discover　the　sources　of
this　cognition　and　expose　the　conditions　of　its　possibility；　and　at
the　same　time　to　clear　and　level　a　fit　foundation　for　the　scientific
edifice。　In　the　present　work；　I　look　for　the　patient　hearing　and　the
impartiality　of　a　judge；　in　the　other；　for　the　good…will　and
assistance　of　a　co…labourer。　For；　however　plete　the　list　of
principles　for　this　system　may　be　in　the　Critique；　the　correctness
of　the　system　requires　that　no　deduced　conceptions　should　be　absent。
These　cannot　be　presented　a　priori；　but　must　be　gradually
discovered；　and；　while　the　synthesis　of　conceptions　has　been　fully
exhausted　in　the　Critique；　it　is　necessary　that；　in　the　proposed　work；
the　same　should　be　the　case　with　their　analysis。　But　this　will　be
rather　an　amusement　than　a　labour。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　PREFACE　TO　THE　SECOND　EDITION；　1787

　　Whether　the　treatment　of　that　portion　of　our　knowledge　which　lies
within　the　province　of　pure　reason　advances　with　that　undeviating
certainty　which　characterizes　the　progress　of　science；　we　shall　be
at　no　loss　to　determine。　If　we　find　those　who　are　engaged　in
metaphysical　pursuits；　unable　to　e　to　an　understanding　as　to　the
method　which　they　ought　to　follow；　if　we　find　them；　after　the　most
elaborate　preparations；　invariably　brought　to　a　stand　before　the
goal　is　reached；　and　pelled　to　retrace　their　steps　and　strike
into　fresh　paths；　we　may　then　feel　quite　sure　that　they　are　far　from
having　attained　to　the　certainty　of　scientific　progress　and　may　rather
be　said　to　be　merely　groping　about　in　the　dark。　In　these　circumstances
we　shall　render　an　important　service　to　reaso