the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第19部分

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to　them；　nor　intuition　without　conceptions；　can　afford　us　a　cognition。
Both　are　either　pure　or　empirical。　They　are。　empirical；　when　sensation
（which　presupposes　the　actual　presence　of　the　object）　is　contained
in　them；　and　pure；　when　no　sensation　is　mixed　with　the　representation。
Sensations　we　may　call　the　matter　of　sensuous　cognition。　Pure
intuition　consequently　contains　merely　the　form　under　which
something　is　intuited；　and　pure　conception　only　the　form　of　the
thought　of　an　object。　Only　pure　intuitions　and　pure　conceptions　are
possible　a　priori；　the　empirical　only　a　posteriori。
　　We　apply　the　term　sensibility　to　the　receptivity　of　the　mind　for
impressions；　in　so　far　as　it　is　in　some　way　affected；　and；　on　the
other　hand；　we　call　the　faculty　of　spontaneously　producing
representations；　or　the　spontaneity　of　cognition；　understanding。　Our
nature　is　so　constituted　that　intuition　with　us　never　can　be　other
than　sensuous；　that　is；　it　contains　only　the　mode　in　which　we　are
affected　by　objects。　On　the　other　hand；　the　faculty　of　thinking　the
object　of　sensuous　intuition　is　the　understanding。　Neither　of　these
faculties　has　a　preference　over　the　other。　Without　the　sensuous
faculty　no　object　would　be　given　to　us；　and　without　the
understanding　no　object　would　be　thought。　Thoughts　without　content　are
void；　intuitions　without　conceptions；　blind。　Hence　it　is　as
necessary　for　the　mind　to　make　its　conceptions　sensuous　（that　is；　to
join　to　them　the　object　in　intuition）；　as　to　make　its　intuitions
intelligible　（that　is；　to　bring　them　under　conceptions）。　Neither　of
these　faculties　can　exchange　its　proper　function。　Understanding　cannot
intuite；　and　the　sensuous　faculty　cannot　think。　in　no　other　way　than
from　the　united　operation　of　both；　can　knowledge　arise。　But　no　one
ought；　on　this　account；　to　overlook　the　difference　of　the　elements
contributed　by　each；　we　have　rather　great　reason　carefully　to　separate
and　distinguish　them。　We　therefore　distinguish　the　science　of　the　laws
of　sensibility；　that　is；　aesthetic；　from　the　science　of　the　laws　of
the　understanding；　that　is；　logic。
　　Now；　logic　in　its　turn　may　be　considered　as　twofold…　namely；　as
logic　of　the　general；　or　of　the　particular　use　of　the　understanding。
The　first　contains　the　absolutely　necessary　laws　of　thought；　without
which　no　use　whatsoever　of　the　understanding　is　possible；　and　gives
laws　therefore　to　the　understanding；　without　regard　to　the
difference　of　objects　on　which　it　may　be　employed。　The　logic　of　the
particular　use　of　the　understanding　contains　the　laws　of　correct
thinking　upon　a　particular　class　of　objects。　The　former　may　be
called　elemental　logic…　the　latter；　the　organon　of　this　or　that
particular　science。　The　latter　is　for　the　most　part　employed　in　the
schools；　as　a　propaedeutic　to　the　sciences；　although；　indeed；
according　to　the　course　of　human　reason；　it　is　the　last　thing　we
arrive　at；　when　the　science　has　been　already　matured；　and　needs　only
the　finishing　touches　towards　its　correction　and　pletion；　for　our
knowledge　of　the　objects　of　our　attempted　science　must　be　tolerably
extensive　and　plete　before　we　can　indicate　the　laws　by　which　a
science　of　these　objects　can　be　established。
　　General　logic　is　again　either　pure　or　applied。　In　the　former；　we
abstract　all　the　empirical　conditions　under　which　the　understanding　is
exercised；　for　example；　the　influence　of　the　senses；　the　play　of　the
fantasy　or　imagination；　the　laws　of　the　memory；　the　force　of　habit；　of
inclination；　etc。；　consequently　also；　the　sources　of　prejudice…　in　a
word；　we　abstract　all　causes　from　which　particular　cognitions　arise；
because　these　causes　regard　the　understanding　under　certain
circumstances　of　its　application；　and；　to　the　knowledge　of　them
experience　is　required。　Pure　general　logic　has　to　do；　therefore；
merely　with　pure　a　priori　principles；　and　is　a　canon　of
understanding　and　reason；　but　only　in　respect　of　the　formal　part　of
their　use；　be　the　content　what　it　may；　empirical　or　transcendental。
General　logic　is　called　applied；　when　it　is　directed　to　the　laws　of
the　use　of　the　understanding；　under　the　subjective　empirical
conditions　which　psychology　teaches　us。　It　has　therefore　empirical
principles；　although；　at　the　same　time；　it　is　in　so　far　general；
that　it　applies　to　the　exercise　of　the　understanding；　without　regard
to　the　difference　of　objects。　On　this　account；　moreover；　it　is　neither
a　canon　of　the　understanding　in　general；　nor　an　organon　of　a
particular　science；　but　merely　a　cathartic　of　the　human　understanding。
　　In　general　logic；　therefore；　that　part　which　constitutes　pure
logic　must　be　carefully　distinguished　from　that　which　constitutes
applied　（though　still　general）　logic。　The　former　alone　is　properly
science；　although　short　and　dry；　as　the　methodical　exposition　of　an
elemental　doctrine　of　the　understanding　ought　to　be。　In　this；
therefore；　logicians　must　always　bear　in　mind　two　rules：
　　1。　As　general　logic；　it　makes　abstraction　of　all　content　of　the
cognition　of　the　understanding；　and　of　the　difference　of　objects；
and　has　to　do　with　nothing　but　the　mere　form　of　thought。
　　2。　As　pure　logic；　it　has　no　empirical　principles；　and　consequently
draws　nothing　（contrary　to　the　mon　persuasion）　from　psychology；
which　therefore　has　no　influence　on　the　canon　of　the　understanding。　It
is　a　demonstrated　doctrine；　and　everything　in　it　must　be　certain
pletely　a　priori。
　　What　I　called　applied　logic　（contrary　to　the　mon　acceptation　of
this　term；　according　to　which　it　should　contain　certain　exercises
for　the　scholar；　for　which　pure　logic　gives　the　rules）；　is　a
representation　of　the　understanding；　and　of　the　rules　of　its　necessary
employment　in　concreto；　that　is　to　say；　under　the　accidental
conditions　of　the　subject；　which　may　either　hinder　or　promote　this
employment；　and　which　are　all　given　only　empirically。　Thus　applied
logic　treats　of　attention；　its　impediments　and　consequences；　of　the
origin　of　error；　of　the　state　of　doubt；　hesitation；　conviction；
etc。；　and　to　it　is　related　pure　general　logic　in　the　same　way　that
pure　morality；　which　contains　only　the　necessary　moral　laws　of　a
free　will；　is　related　to　practical　ethics；　which　considers　these
laws　under　all　the　impediments　of　feelings；　inclinations；　and　passions
to　which　men　are　more　or　less　subjected；　and　which　never　can　furnish
us　with　a　true　and　demonstrated　science；　because　it；　as　well　as
applied　logic；　requires　empirical　and　psychological　principles。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　Of　Transcendental　Logic。

　　General　logic；　as　we　have　seen；　makes　abstraction　of　all　content
of　cognition；　that　is；　of　all　relation　of　cognition　to　its　object；　and
regards　only　the　logical　form　in　the　relation　of　cognitions　to　each
other；　that　is；　the　form　of　thought　in　general。　But　as　we　have　both
pure　and　empirical　intuitions　（as　transcendental　aesthetic　proves）；　in
like　manner　a　distinction　might　be　drawn　between　pure　and　empirical
thought　（of　objects）。　In　this　case；　there　would　exist　a　kind　of　logic；
in　which　we　should　not　make　abstraction　of　all　content　of　cognition；
for　or　logic　which　should　prise　merely　the　laws　of　pure　thought　（of
an　object）；　would　of　course　exclude　all　those　cognitions　which　were　of
empirical　content。　This　kind　of　logic　would　also　examine　the　origin　of
our　cognitions　of　objects；　so　far　as　that　origin　cannot　be　ascribed　to
the　objects　themselves；　while；　on　the　contrary；　general　logic　has
nothing　to　do　with　the　origin　of　our　cognitions；　but　contemplates
our　representations；　be　they　given　primitively　a　priori　in
ourselves；　or　be　they　only　of　empirical　origin；　solely　according　to
the　laws　which　the　understanding　observes　in　employing　them　in　the
process　of　thought；　in　relation　to　each　other。　Consequently；　general
logic　treats　of　the　form　of　the　understanding　only；　which　can　be
applied　to　representations；　from　whatever　source　they　may　have　arisen。
　　And　here　I　shall　make　a　remark；　which　the　reader　must　bear　well　in
mind　in　the　course　of　the　following　considerations；　to　wit；　that　not
every　cognition　a　priori；　but　only　those　through　which　we　cognize　that
and　how　certain　representations　（intuitions　or　conceptions）　are
applied　or　are　possible　only　a　priori；　that　is　to　say；　the　a　priori
possibility　of　cognition　and　the　a　priori　use　of　it　are
transcendental。　Therefore　neither　is　space；　nor　any　a　priori
geometrical　determination　of　space；　a　transcendental　Representation；
but　only　the　knowledge　that　such　a　representation　is　not　of
empirical　origin；　and　the　possibility　of　its　relating　to　objects　of
experience；　although　itself　a　priori；　can　be　called　transcendental。　So
also；　the　application　of　space　to　objects　in　general　would　be
transcendental；　but　if　it　be　limited　to　objects　of　sense　it　is
empirical。　Thus；　the　distinction　of　the　transcendental　and　empirical
belongs　only　to　the　critique　of　cognitions；　and　does　not　concern　the
relation　of　these　to　their　object。
　　Accordingly；　in　the　expectation　that　there　may　perhaps　be
conceptions　which　relate　a　priori　to　objects；　not　as　pure　or
sensuous　intuitions；　but　merely　as　acts　of　pure　thought　（which　are
therefore　conceptions；　but　neither　of　empirical　nor　aesthetical
origin）…　in　this　expectation；　I　say；　we　form　to　ourselve