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can　be　nothing　else　than　the　mode　in　which　the　mind　is　affected　by　its
own　activity；　to　wit…　its　presenting　to　itself　representations；
consequently　the　mode　in　which　the　mind　is　affected　by　itself；　that
is；　it　can　be　nothing　but　an　internal　sense　in　respect　to　its　form。
Everything　that　is　represented　through　the　medium　of　sense　is　so　far
phenomenal；　consequently；　we　must　either　refuse　altogether　to　admit　an
internal　sense；　or　the　subject；　which　is　the　object　of　that　sense；
could　only　be　represented　by　it　as　phenomenon；　and　not　as　it　would
judge　of　itself；　if　its　intuition　were　pure　spontaneous　activity；　that
is；　were　intellectual。　The　difficulty　here　lies　wholly　in　the
question：　How　can　the　subject　have　an　internal　intuition　of　itself？
But　this　difficulty　is　mon　to　every　theory。　The　consciousness　of
self　（apperception）　is　the　simple　representation　of　the　〃ego〃；　and
if　by　means　of　that　representation　alone；　all　the　manifold
representations　in　the　subject　were　spontaneously　given；　then　our
internal　intuition　would　be　intellectual。　This　consciousness　in　man
requires　an　internal　perception　of　the　manifold　representations
which　are　previously　given　in　the　subject；　and　the　manner　in　which
these　representations　are　given　in　the　mind　without　spontaneity；　must；
on　account　of　this　difference　（the　want　of　spontaneity）；　be　called
sensibility。　If　the　faculty　of　self…consciousness　is　to　apprehend　what
lies　in　the　mind；　it　must　all　act　that　and　can　in　this　way　alone
produce　an　intuition　of　self。　But　the　form　of　this　intuition；　which
lies　in　the　original　constitution　of　the　mind；　determines；　in　the
representation　of　time；　the　manner　in　which　the　manifold
representations　are　to　bine　themselves　in　the　mind；　since　the
subject　intuites　itself；　not　as　it　would　represent　itself
immediately　and　spontaneously；　but　according　to　the　manner　in　which
the　mind　is　internally　affected；　consequently；　as　it　appears；　and
not　as　it　is。
　　III。　When　we　say　that　the　intuition　of　external　objects；　and　also
the　self…intuition　of　the　subject；　represent　both；　objects　and
subject；　in　space　and　time；　as　they　affect　our　senses；　that　is；　as
they　appear…　this　is　by　no　means　equivalent　to　asserting　that　these
objects　are　mere　illusory　appearances。　For　when　we　speak　of　things
as　phenomena；　the　objects；　nay；　even　the　properties　which　we　ascribe
to　them；　are　looked　upon　as　really　given；　only　that；　in　so　far　as　this
or　that　property　depends　upon　the　mode　of　intuition　of　the　subject；　in
the　relation　of　the　given　object　to　the　subject；　the　object　as
phenomenon　is　to　be　distinguished　from　the　object　as　a　thing　in
itself。　Thus　I　do　not　say　that　bodies　seem　or　appear　to　be　external　to
me；　or　that　my　soul　seems　merely　to　be　given　in　my　self…consciousness；
although　I　maintain　that　the　properties　of　space　and　time；　in
conformity　to　which　I　set　both；　as　the　condition　of　their　existence；
abide　in　my　mode　of　intuition；　and　not　in　the　objects　in　themselves。
It　would　be　my　own　fault；　if　out　of　that　which　I　should　reckon　as
phenomenon；　I　made　mere　illusory　appearance。*　But　this　will　not
happen；　because　of　our　principle　of　the　ideality　of　all　sensuous
intuitions。　On　the　contrary；　if　we　ascribe　objective　reality　to
these　forms　of　representation；　it　bees　impossible　to　avoid　changing
everything　into　mere　appearance。　For　if　we　regard　space　and　time　as
properties；　which　must　be　found　in　objects　as　things　in　themselves；　as
sine　quibus　non　of　the　possibility　of　their　existence；　and　reflect
on　the　absurdities　in　which　we　then　find　ourselves　involved；
inasmuch　as　we　are　pelled　to　admit　the　existence　of　two　infinite
things；　which　are　nevertheless　not　substances；　nor　anything　really
inhering　in　substances；　nay；　to　admit　that　they　are　the　necessary
conditions　of　the　existence　of　all　things；　and　moreover；　that　they
must　continue　to　exist；　although　all　existing　things　were　annihilated…
we　cannot　blame　the　good　Berkeley　for　degrading　bodies　to　mere
illusory　appearances。　Nay；　even　our　own　existence；　which　would　in　this
case　depend　upon　the　self…existent　reality　of　such　a　mere　nonentity　as
time；　would　necessarily　be　changed　with　it　into　mere　appearance…　an
absurdity　which　no　one　has　as　yet　been　guilty　of。

　　*The　predicates　of　the　phenomenon　can　be　affixed　to　the　object
itself　in　relation　to　our　sensuous　faculty；　for　example；　the　red
colour　or　the　perfume　to　the　rose。　But　（illusory）　appearance　never　can
be　attributed　as　a　predicate　to　an　object；　for　this　very　reason；
that　it　attributes　to　this　object　in　itself　that　which　belongs　to　it
only　in　relation　to　our　sensuous　faculty；　or　to　the　subject　in
general；　e。g。；　the　two　handles　which　were　formerly　ascribed　to　Saturn。
That　which　is　never　to　be　found　in　the　object　itself；　but　always　in
the　relation　of　the　object　to　the　subject；　and　which　moreover　is
inseparable　from　our　representation　of　the　object；　we　denominate
phenomenon。　Thus　the　predicates　of　space　and　time　are　rightly
attributed　to　objects　of　the　senses　as　such；　and　in　this　there　is　no
illusion。　On　the　contrary；　if　I　ascribe　redness　of　the　rose　as　a　thing
in　itself；　or　to　Saturn　his　handles；　or　extension　to　all　external
objects；　considered　as　things　in　themselves；　without　regarding　the
determinate　relation　of　these　objects　to　the　subject；　and　without
limiting　my　judgement　to　that　relation…　then；　and　then　only；　arises
illusion。

　　IV。　In　natural　theology；　where　we　think　of　an　object…　God…　which
never　can　be　an　object　of　intuition　to　us；　and　even　to　himself　can
never　be　an　object　of　sensuous　intuition；　we　carefully　avoid
attributing　to　his　intuition　the　conditions　of　space　and　time…　and
intuition　all　his　cognition　must　be；　and　not　thought；　which　always
includes　limitation。　But　with　what　right　can　we　do　this　if　we　make
them　forms　of　objects　as　things　in　themselves；　and　such；　moreover；
as　would　continue　to　exist　as　a　priori　conditions　of　the　existence
of　things；　even　though　the　things　themselves　were　annihilated？　For
as　conditions　of　all　existence　in　general；　space　and　time　must　be
conditions　of　the　existence　of　the　Supreme　Being　also。　But　if　we　do
not　thus　make　them　objective　forms　of　all　things；　there　is　no　other
way　left　than　to　make　them　subjective　forms　of　our　mode　of
intuition…　external　and　internal；　which　is　called　sensuous；　because　it
is　not　primitive；　that　is；　is　not　such　as　gives　in　itself　the
existence　of　the　object　of　the　intuition　（a　mode　of　intuition　which；
so　far　as　we　can　judge；　can　belong　only　to　the　Creator）；　but　is
dependent　on　the　existence　of　the　object；　is　possible；　therefore；　only
on　condition　that　the　representative　faculty　of　the　subject　is
affected　by　the　object。
　　It　is；　moreover；　not　necessary　that　we　should　limit　the　mode　of
intuition　in　space　and　time　to　the　sensuous　faculty　of　man。　It　may
well　be　that　all　finite　thinking　beings　must　necessarily　in　this
respect　agree　with　man　（though　as　to　this　we　cannot　decide）；　but
sensibility　does　not　on　account　of　this　universality　cease　to　be
sensibility；　for　this　very　reason；　that　it　is　a　deduced　（intuitus
derivativus）；　and　not　an　original　（intuitus　originarius）；　consequently
not　an　intellectual　intuition；　and　this　intuition；　as　such；　for
reasons　above　mentioned；　seems　to　belong　solely　to　the　Supreme
Being；　but　never　to　a　being　dependent；　quoad　its　existence；　as　well　as
its　intuition　（which　its　existence　determines　and　limits　relatively　to
given　objects）。　This　latter　remark；　however；　must　be　taken　only　as
an　illustration；　and　not　as　any　proof　of　the　truth　of　our
aesthetical　theory。

　　　　SS　10　Conclusion　of　the　Transcendental　Aesthetic。

　　We　have　now　pletely　before　us　one　part　of　the　solution　of　the
grand　general　problem　of　transcendental　philosophy；　namely；　the
question：　〃How　are　synthetical　propositions　a　priori　possible？〃　That
is　to　say；　we　have　shown　that　we　are　in　possession　of　pure　a　priori
intuitions；　namely；　space　and　time；　in　which　we　find；　when　in　a
judgement　a　priori　we　pass　out　beyond　the　given　conception；
something　which　is　not　discoverable　in　that　conception；　but　is
certainly　found　a　priori　in　the　intuition　which　corresponds　to　the
conception；　and　can　be　united　synthetically　with　it。　But　the
judgements　which　these　pure　intuitions　enable　us　to　make；　never
reach　farther　than　to　objects　of　the　senses；　and　are　valid　only　for
objects　of　possible　experience。
INTRO
　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　PART。　TRANSCENDENTAL　LOGIC。

　　　　　　　INTRODUCTION。　Idea　of　a　Transcendental　Logic。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　Of　Logic　in　General。

　　Our　knowledge　springs　from　two　main　sources　in　the　mind；　first　of
which　is　the　faculty　or　power　of　receiving　representations
（receptivity　for　impressions）；　the　second　is　the　power　of　cognizing　by
means　of　these　representations　（spontaneity　in　the　production　of
conceptions）。　Through　the　first　an　object　is　given　to　us；　through
the　second；　it　is；　in　relation　to　the　representation　（which　is　a
mere　determination　of　the　mind）；　thought。　Intuition　and　conceptions
constitute；　therefore；　the　elements　of　all　our　knowledge；　so　that
neither　conceptions　without　an　intuition　in　some　way　corresponding
to　them；　nor　intuition　without　conceptions；　can　afford　us　a　cognition。
Both　are　either　pure　or　empirical。　They