the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第136部分

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hold　it　fast；　though　I　may　not　be　in　a　position　to　give　a
speculative　account　of　it。
　　But　mere　doctrinal　belief　is；　to　some　extent；　wanting　in
stability。　We　often　quit　our　hold　of　it；　in　consequence　of　the
difficulties　which　occur　in　speculation；　though　in　the　end　we
inevitably　return　to　it　again。
　　It　is　quite　otherwise　with　moral　belief。　For　in　this　sphere　action
is　absolutely　necessary；　that　is；　I　must　act　in　obedience　to　the　moral
law　in　all　points。　The　end　is　here　incontrovertibly　established；　and
there　is　only　one　condition　possible；　according　to　the　best　of　my
perception；　under　which　this　end　can　harmonize　with　all　other　ends；
and　so　have　practical　validity…　namely；　the　existence　of　a　God　and
of　a　future　world。　I　know　also；　to　a　certainty；　that　no　one　can　be
acquainted　with　any　other　conditions　which　conduct　to　the　same　unity
of　ends　under　the　moral　law。　But　since　the　moral　precept　is；　at　the
same　time；　my　maxim　（as　reason　requires　that　it　should　be）；　I　am
irresistibly　constrained　to　believe　in　the　existence　of　God　and　in　a
future　life；　and　I　am　sure　that　nothing　can　make　me　waver　in　this
belief；　since　I　should　thereby　overthrow　my　moral　maxims；　the
renunciation　of　which　would　render　me　hateful　in　my　own　eyes。
　　Thus；　while　all　the　ambitious　attempts　of　reason　to　penetrate　beyond
the　limits　of　experience　end　in　disappointment；　there　is　still
enough　left　to　satisfy　us　in　a　practical　point　of　view。　No　one；　it
is　true；　will　be　able　to　boast　that　he　knows　that　there　is　a　God　and　a
future　life；　for；　if　he　knows　this；　be　is　just　the　man　whom　I　have
long　wished　to　find。　All　knowledge；　regarding　an　object　of　mere
reason；　can　be　municated；　and　I　should　thus　be　enabled　to　hope　that
my　own　knowledge　would　receive　this　wonderful　extension；　through　the
instrumentality　of　his　instruction。　No；　my　conviction　is　not
logical；　but　moral　certainty；　and　since　it　rests　on　subjective　grounds
（of　the　moral　sentiment）；　I　must　not　even　say：　It　is　morally　certain
that　there　is　a　God；　etc。；　but：　I　am　morally　certain；　that　is；　my
belief　in　God　and　in　another　world　is　so　interwoven　with　my　moral
nature　that　I　am　under　as　little　apprehension　of　having　the　former
torn　from　me　as　of　losing　the　latter。
　　The　only　point　in　this　argument　that　may　appear　open　to　suspicion　is
that　this　rational　belief　presupposes　the　existence　of　moral
sentiments。　If　we　give　up　this　assumption；　and　take　a　man　who　is
entirely　indifferent　with　regard　to　moral　laws；　the　question　which
reason　proposes；　bees　then　merely　a　problem　for　speculation　and
may；　indeed；　be　supported　by　strong　grounds　from　analogy；　but　not　by
such　as　will　pel　the　most　obstinate　scepticism　to　give　way。*　But　in
these　questions　no　man　is　free　from　all　interest。　For　though　the
want　of　good　sentiments　may　place　him　beyond　the　influence　of　moral
interests；　still　even　in　this　case　enough　may　be　left　to　make　him　fear
the　existence　of　God　and　a　future　life。　For　he　cannot　pretend　to　any
certainty　of　the　non…existence　of　God　and　of　a　future　life；　unless…
since　it　could　only　be　proved　by　mere　reason；　and　therefore
apodeictically…　he　is　prepared　to　establish　the　impossibility　of　both；
which　certainly　no　reasonable　man　would　undertake　to　do。　This　would　be
a　negative　belief；　which　could　not；　indeed；　produce　morality　and
good　sentiments；　but　still　could　produce　an　analogon　of　these；　by
operating　as　a　powerful　restraint　on　the　outbreak　of　evil
dispositions。

　　*The　human　mind　（as；　I　believe；　every　rational　being　must　of
necessity　do）　takes　a　natural　interest　in　morality；　although　this
interest　is　not　undivided；　and　may　not　be　practically　in
preponderance。　If　you　strengthen　and　increase　it；　you　will　find　the
reason　bee　docile；　more　enlightened；　and　more　capable　of　uniting
the　speculative　interest　with　the　practical。　But　if　you　do　not　take
care　at　the　outset；　or　at　least　midway；　to　make　men　good；　you　will
never　force　them　into　an　honest　belief。

　　But；　it　will　be　said；　is　this　all　that　pure　reason　can　effect；　in
opening　up　prospects　beyond　the　limits　of　experience？　Nothing　more
than　two　articles　of　belief？　mon　sense　could　have　done　as　much　as
this；　without　taking　the　philosophers　to　counsel　in　the　matter！
　　I　shall　not　here　eulogize　philosophy　for　the　benefits　which　the
laborious　efforts　of　its　criticism　have　conferred　on　human　reason…
even　granting　that　its　merit　should　turn　out　in　the　end　to　be　only
negative…　for　on　this　point　something　more　will　be　said　in　the　next
section。　But；　I　ask；　do　you　require　that　that　knowledge　which　concerns
all　men；　should　transcend　the　mon　understanding；　and　should　only　be
revealed　to　you　by　philosophers？　The　very　circumstance　which　has
called　forth　your　censure；　is　the　best　confirmation　of　the　correctness
of　our　previous　assertions；　since　it　discloses；　what　could　not　have
been　foreseen；　that　Nature　is　not　chargeable　with　any　partial
distribution　of　her　gifts　in　those　matters　which　concern　all　men
without　distinction　and　that；　in　respect　to　the　essential　ends　of
human　nature；　we　cannot　advance　further　with　the　help　of　the　highest
philosophy；　than　under　the　guidance　which　nature　has　vouchsafed　to　the
meanest　understanding。
　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　III。　The　Architectonic　of　Pure　Reason。

　　By　the　term　architectonic　I　mean　the　art　of　constructing　a　system。
Without　systematic　unity；　our　knowledge　cannot　bee　science；　it　will
be　an　aggregate；　and　not　a　system。　Thus　architectonic　is　the
doctrine　of　the　scientific　in　cognition；　and　therefore　necessarily
forms　part　of　our　methodology。
　　Reason　cannot　permit　our　knowledge　to　remain　in　an　unconnected　and
rhapsodistic　state；　but　requires　that　the　sum　of　our　cognitions　should
constitute　a　system。　It　is　thus　alone　that　they　can　advance　the　ends
of　reason。　By　a　system　I　mean　the　unity　of　various　cognitions　under
one　idea。　This　idea　is　the　conception…　given　by　reason…　of　the　form　of
a　whole；　in　so　far　as　the　conception　determines　a　priori　not　only
the　limits　of　its　content；　but　the　place　which　each　of　its　parts　is　to
occupy。　The　scientific　idea　contains；　therefore；　the　end　and　the
form　of　the　whole　which　is　in　accordance　with　that　end。　The　unity　of
the　end；　to　which　all　the　parts　of　the　system　relate；　and　through
which　all　have　a　relation　to　each　other；　municates　unity　to　the
whole　system；　so　that　the　absence　of　any　part　can　be　immediately
detected　from　our　knowledge　of　the　rest；　and　it　determines　a　priori
the　limits　of　the　system；　thus　excluding　all　contingent　or　arbitrary
additions。　The　whole　is　thus　an　organism　（articulatio）；　and　not　an
aggregate　（coacervatio）；　it　may　grow　from　within　（per
intussusceptionem）；　but　it　cannot　increase　by　external　additions
（per　appositionem）。　It　is；　thus；　like　an　animal　body；　the　growth　of
which　does　not　add　any　limb；　but；　without　changing　their
proportions；　makes　each　in　its　sphere　stronger　and　more　active。
　　We　require；　for　the　execution　of　the　idea　of　a　system；　a　schema；
that　is；　a　content　and　an　arrangement　of　parts　determined　a　priori
by　the　principle　which　the　aim　of　the　system　prescribes。　A　schema
which　is　not　projected　in　accordance　with　an　idea；　that　is；　from　the
standpoint　of　the　highest　aim　of　reason；　but　merely　empirically；　in
accordance　with　accidental　aims　and　purposes　（the　number　of　which
cannot　be　predetermined）；　can　give　us　nothing　more　than　technical
unity。　But　the　schema　which　is　originated　from　an　idea　（in　which
case　reason　presents　us　with　aims　a　priori；　and　does　not　look　for　them
to　experience）；　forms　the　basis　of　architectonical　unity。　A　science；
in　the　proper　acceptation　of　that　term。　cannot　be　formed
technically；　that　is；　from　observation　of　the　similarity　existing
between　different　objects；　and　the　purely　contingent　use　we　make　of
our　knowledge　in　concreto　with　reference　to　all　kinds　of　arbitrary
external　aims；　its　constitution　must　be　framed　on　architectonical
principles；　that　is；　its　parts　must　be　shown　to　possess　an　essential
affinity；　and　be　capable　of　being　deduced　from　one　supreme　and
internal　aim　or　end；　which　forms　the　condition　of　the　possibility　of
the　scientific　whole。　The　schema　of　a　science　must　give　a　priori　the
plan　of　it　（monogramma）；　and　the　division　of　the　whole　into　parts；
in　conformity　with　the　idea　of　the　science；　and　it　must　also
distinguish　this　whole　from　all　others；　according　to　certain
understood　principles。
　　No　one　will　attempt　to　construct　a　science；　unless　he　have　some　idea
to　rest　on　as　a　proper　basis。　But；　in　the　elaboration　of　the
science；　he　finds　that　the　schema；　nay；　even　the　definition　which　he
at　first　gave　of　the　science；　rarely　corresponds　with　his　idea；　for
this　idea　lies；　like　a　germ；　in　our　reason；　its　parts　undeveloped
and　hid　even　from　microscopical　observation。　For　this　reason；　we　ought
to　explain　and　define　sciences；　not　according　to　the　description　which
the　originator　gives　of　them；　but　according　to　the　idea　which　we
find　based　in　reason　itself；　and　which　is　suggested　by　the　natural
unity　of　the　parts　of　the　science　already　accumulated。　For　it　will
of　ten　be　found　that　the　originator　of　a　science　and　even　his　latest
successors　remain　attached　to　an　erroneous　idea；　which　they　cannot
render　clear　to　themselves；　and　that　they　th