the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第135部分

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only　subjective　means；　not；　indeed；　of　producing　conviction；　but　of
detecting　the　merely　private　validity　of　the　judgement；　in　other
words；　of　discovering　that　there　is　in　it　the　element　of　mere
persuasion。
　　If　we　can；　in　addition　to　this；　develop　the　subjective　causes　of　the
judgement；　which　we　have　taken　for　its　objective　grounds；　and　thus
explain　the　deceptive　judgement　as　a　phenomenon　in　our　mind；　apart
altogether　from　the　objective　character　of　the　object；　we　can　then
expose　the　illusion　and　need　be　no　longer　deceived　by　it；　although；　if
its　subjective　cause　lies　in　our　nature；　we　cannot　hope　altogether
to　escape　its　influence。
　　I　can　only　maintain；　that　is；　affirm　as　necessarily　valid　for
every　one；　that　which　produces　conviction。　Persuasion　I　may　keep　for
myself；　if　it　is　agreeable　to　me；　but　I　cannot；　and　ought　not；　to
attempt　to　impose　it　as　binding　upon　others。
　　Holding　for　true；　or　the　subjective　validity　of　a　judgement　in
relation　to　conviction　（which　is；　at　the　same　time；　objectively
valid）；　has　the　three　following　degrees：　opinion；　belief；　and
knowledge。　Opinion　is　a　consciously　insufficient　judgement；
subjectively　as　well　as　objectively。　Belief　is　subjectively
sufficient；　but　is　recognized　as　being　objectively　insufficient。
Knowledge　is　both　subjectively　and　objectively　sufficient。
Subjective　sufficiency　is　termed　conviction　（for　myself）；　objective
sufficiency　is　termed　certainty　（for　all）。　I　need　not　dwell　longer
on　the　explanation　of　such　simple　conceptions。
　　I　must　never　venture　to　be　of　opinion；　without　knowing　something；　at
least；　by　which　my　judgement；　in　itself　merely　problematical；　is
brought　into　connection　with　the　truth…　which　connection；　although　not
perfect；　is　still　something　more　than　an　arbitrary　fiction。
Moreover；　the　law　of　such　a　connection　must　be　certain。　For　if；　in
relation　to　this　law；　I　have　nothing　more　than　opinion；　my　judgement
is　but　a　play　of　the　imagination；　without　the　least　relation　to　truth。
In　the　judgements　of　pure　reason；　opinion　has　no　place。　For；　as　they
do　not　rest　on　empirical　grounds　and　as　the　sphere　of　pure　reason　is
that　of　necessary　truth　and　a　priori　cognition；　the　principle　of
connection　in　it　requires　universality　and　necessity；　and　consequently
perfect　certainty…　otherwise　we　should　have　no　guide　to　the　truth　at
all。　Hence　it　is　absurd　to　have　an　opinion　in　pure　mathematics；　we
must　know；　or　abstain　from　forming　a　judgement　altogether。　The　case　is
the　same　with　the　maxims　of　morality。　For　we　must　not　hazard　an　action
on　the　mere　opinion　that　it　is　allowed；　but　we　must　know　it　to　be　so。
　　In　the　transcendental　sphere　of　reason；　on　the　other　hand；　the
term　opinion　is　too　weak；　while　the　word　knowledge　is　too　strong。　From
the　merely　speculative　point　of　view；　therefore；　we　cannot　form　a
judgement　at　all。　For　the　subjective　grounds　of　a　judgement；　such　as
produce　belief；　cannot　be　admitted　in　speculative　inquiries；
inasmuch　as　they　cannot　stand　without　empirical　support　and　are
incapable　of　being　municated　to　others　in　equal　measure。
　　But　it　is　only　from　the　practical　point　of　view　that　a　theoretically
insufficient　judgement　can　be　termed　belief。　Now　the　practical
reference　is　either　to　skill　or　to　morality；　to　the　former；　when　the
end　proposed　is　arbitrary　and　accidental；　to　the　latter；　when　it　is
absolutely　necessary。
　　If　we　propose　to　ourselves　any　end　whatever；　the　conditions　of　its
attainment　are　hypothetically　necessary。　The　necessity　is
subjectively；　but　still　only　paratively；　sufficient；　if　I　am
acquainted　with　no　other　conditions　under　which　the　end　can　be
attained。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　sufficient；　absolutely　and　for
every　one；　if　I　know　for　certain　that　no　one　can　be　acquainted　with
any　other　conditions　under　which　the　attainment　of　the　proposed　end
would　be　possible。　In　the　former　case　my　supposition…　my　judgement
with　regard　to　certain　conditions…　is　a　merely　accidental　belief；　in
the　latter　it　is　a　necessary　belief。　The　physician　must　pursue　some
course　in　the　case　of　a　patient　who　is　in　danger；　but　is　ignorant　of
the　nature　of　the　disease。　He　observes　the　symptoms；　and　concludes；
according　to　the　best　of　his　judgement；　that　it　is　a　case　of　phthisis。
His　belief　is；　even　in　his　own　judgement；　only　contingent：　another　man
might；　perhaps　e　nearer　the　truth。　Such　a　belief；　contingent
indeed；　but　still　forming　the　ground　of　the　actual　use　of　means　for
the　attainment　of　certain　ends；　I　term　Pragmatical　belief。
　　The　usual　test；　whether　that　which　any　one　maintains　is　merely　his
persuasion；　or　his　subjective　conviction　at　least；　that　is；　his　firm
belief；　is　a　bet。　It　frequently　happens　that　a　man　delivers　his
opinions　with　so　much　boldness　and　assurance；　that　he　appears　to　be
under　no　apprehension　as　to　the　possibility　of　his　being　in　error。　The
offer　of　a　bet　startles　him；　and　makes　him　pause。　Sometimes　it　turns
out　that　his　persuasion　may　be　valued　at　a　ducat；　but　not　at　ten。
For　he　does　not　hesitate；　perhaps；　to　venture　a　ducat；　but　if　it　is
proposed　to　stake　ten；　he　immediately　bees　aware　of　the　possibility
of　his　being　mistaken…　a　possibility　which　has　hitherto　escaped　his
observation。　If　we　imagine　to　ourselves　that　we　have　to　stake　the
happiness　of　our　whole　life　on　the　truth　of　any　proposition；　our
judgement　drops　its　air　of　triumph；　we　take　the　alarm；　and　discover
the　actual　strength　of　our　belief。　Thus　pragmatical　belief　has
degrees；　varying　in　proportion　to　the　interests　at　stake。
　　Now；　in　cases　where　we　cannot　enter　upon　any　course　of　action　in
reference　to　some　object；　and　where；　accordingly；　our　judgement　is
purely　theoretical；　we　can　still　represent　to　ourselves；　in　thought；
the　possibility　of　a　course　of　action；　for　which　we　suppose　that　we
have　sufficient　grounds；　if　any　means　existed　of　ascertaining　the
truth　of　the　matter。　Thus　we　find　in　purely　theoretical　judgements
an　analogon　of　practical　judgements；　to　which　the　word　belief　may
properly　be　applied；　and　which　we　may　term　doctrinal　belief。　I
should　not　hesitate　to　stake　my　all　on　the　truth　of　the　proposition…
if　there　were　any　possibility　of　bringing　it　to　the　test　of
experience…　that；　at　least；　some　one　of　the　planets；　which　we　see；
is　inhabited。　Hence　I　say　that　I　have　not　merely　the　opinion；　but
the　strong　belief；　on　the　correctness　of　which　I　would　stake　even　many
of　the　advantages　of　life；　that　there　are　inhabitants　in　other　worlds。
　　Now　we　must　admit　that　the　doctrine　of　the　existence　of　God
belongs　to　doctrinal　belief。　For；　although　in　respect　to　the
theoretical　cognition　of　the　universe　I　do　not　require　to　form　any
theory　which　necessarily　involves　this　idea；　as　the　condition　of　my
explanation　of　the　phenomena　which　the　universe　presents；　but；　on
the　contrary；　am　rather　bound　so　to　use　my　reason　as　if　everything
were　mere　nature；　still　teleological　unity　is　so　important　a　condition
of　the　application　of　my　reason　to　nature；　that　it　is　impossible　for
me　to　ignore　it…　especially　since；　in　addition　to　these
considerations；　abundant　examples　of　it　are　supplied　by　experience。
But　the　sole　condition；　so　far　as　my　knowledge　extends；　under　which
this　unity　can　be　my　guide　in　the　investigation　of　nature；　is　the
assumption　that　a　supreme　intelligence　has　ordered　all　things
according　to　the　wisest　ends。　Consequently；　the　hypothesis　of　a　wise
author　of　the　universe　is　necessary　for　my　guidance　in　the
investigation　of　nature…　is　the　condition　under　which　alone　I　can
fulfil　an　end　which　is　contingent　indeed；　but　by　no　means　unimportant。
Moreover；　since　the　result　of　my　attempts　so　frequently　confirms　the
utility　of　this　assumption；　and　since　nothing　decisive　can　be
adduced　against　it；　it　follows　that　it　would　be　saying　far　too
little　to　term　my　judgement；　in　this　case；　a　mere　opinion；　and　that；
even　in　this　theoretical　connection；　I　may　assert　that　I　firmly
believe　in　God。　Still；　if　we　use　words　strictly；　this　must　not　be
called　a　practical；　but　a　doctrinal　belief；　which　the　theology　of
nature　（physico…theology）　must　also　produce　in　my　mind。　In　the
wisdom　of　a　Supreme　Being；　and　in　the　shortness　of　life；　so　inadequate
to　the　development　of　the　glorious　powers　of　human　nature；　we　may　find
equally　sufficient　grounds　for　a　doctrinal　belief　in　the　future　life
of　the　human　soul。
　　The　expression　of　belief　is；　in　such　cases；　an　expression　of　modesty
from　the　objective　point　of　view；　but；　at　the　same　time；　of　firm
confidence；　from　the　subjective。　If　I　should　venture　to　term　this
merely　theoretical　judgement　even　so　much　as　a　hypothesis　which　I　am
entitled　to　assume；　a　more　plete　conception；　with　regard　to　another
world　and　to　the　cause　of　the　world；　might　then　be　justly　required
of　me　than　I　am；　in　reality；　able　to　give。　For；　if　I　assume
anything；　even　as　a　mere　hypothesis；　I　must；　at　least；　know　so　much　of
the　properties　of　such　a　being　as　will　enable　me；　not　to　form　the
conception；　but　to　imagine　the　existence　of　it。　But　the　word　belief
refers　only　to　the　guidance　which　an　idea　gives　me；　and　to　its
subjective　influence　on　the　conduct　of　my　reason；　which　forces　me　to
hold　it　fast；　though　I　may　not　be　in　a　position　to　give　a
speculative　account　of　it。
　　But　mere　d