the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第133部分

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　　I　call　the　world　a　moral　world；　in　so　far　as　it　may　be　in　accordance
with　all　the　ethical　laws…　which；　by　virtue　of　the　freedom　of
reasonable　beings；　it　can　be；　and　according　to　the　necessary　laws　of
morality　it　ought　to　be。　But　this　world　must　be　conceived　only　as　an
intelligible　world；　inasmuch　as　abstraction　is　therein　made　of　all
conditions　（ends）；　and　even　of　all　impediments　to　morality　（the
weakness　or　pravity　of　human　nature）。　So　far；　then；　it　is　a　mere　idea…
though　still　a　practical　idea…　which　may　have；　and　ought　to　have；　an
influence　on　the　world　of　sense；　so　as　to　bring　it　as　far　as
possible　into　conformity　with　itself。　The　idea　of　a　moral　world　has；
therefore；　objective　reality；　not　as　referring　to　an　object　of
intelligible　intuition…　for　of　such　an　object　we　can　form　no
conception　whatever…　but　to　the　world　of　sense…　conceived；　however；　as
an　object　of　pure　reason　in　its　practical　use…　and　to　a　corpus
mysticum　of　rational　beings　in　it；　in　so　far　as　the　liberum
arbitrium　of　the　individual　is　placed；　under　and　by　virtue　of　moral
laws；　in　plete　systematic　unity　both　with　itself　and　with　the
freedom　of　all　others。
　　That　is　the　answer　to　the　first　of　the　two　questions　of　pure
reason　which　relate　to　its　practical　interest：　Do　that　which　will
render　thee　worthy　of　happiness。　The　second　question　is　this：　If　I
conduct　myself　so　as　not　to　be　unworthy　of　happiness；　may　I　hope
thereby　to　obtain　happiness？　In　order　to　arrive　at　the　solution　of
this　question；　we　must　inquire　whether　the　principles　of　pure
reason；　which　prescribe　a　priori　the　law；　necessarily　also　connect
this　hope　with　it。
　　I　say；　then；　that　just　as　the　moral　principles　are　necessary
according　to　reason　in　its　practical　use；　so　it　is　equally　necessary
according　to　reason　in　its　theoretical　use　to　assume　that　every　one
has　ground　to　hope　for　happiness　in　the　measure　in　which　he　has　made
himself　worthy　of　it　in　his　conduct；　and　that　therefore　the　system
of　morality　is　inseparably　（though　only　in　the　idea　of　pure　reason）
connected　with　that　of　happiness。
　　Now　in　an　intelligible；　that　is；　in　the　moral　world；　in　the
conception　of　which　we　make　abstraction　of　all　the　impediments　to
morality　（sensuous　desires）；　such　a　system　of　happiness；　connected
with　and　proportioned　to　morality；　may　be　conceived　as　necessary；
because　freedom　of　volition…　partly　incited；　and　partly　restrained
by　moral　laws…　would　be　itself　the　cause　of　general　happiness；　and
thus　rational　beings；　under　the　guidance　of　such　principles；　would
be　themselves　the　authors　both　of　their　own　enduring　welfare　and
that　of　others。　But　such　a　system　of　self…rewarding　morality　is　only
an　idea；　the　carrying　out　of　which　depends　upon　the　condition　that
every　one　acts　as　he　ought；　in　other　words；　that　all　actions　of
reasonable　beings　be　such　as　they　would　be　if　they　sprung　from　a
Supreme　Will；　prehending　in；　or　under；　itself　all　particular　wills。
But　since　the　moral　law　is　binding　on　each　individual　in　the　use　of
his　freedom　of　volition；　even　if　others　should　not　act　in　conformity
with　this　law；　neither　the　nature　of　things；　nor　the　causality　of
actions　and　their　relation　to　morality；　determine　how　the　consequences
of　these　actions　will　be　related　to　happiness；　and　the　necessary
connection　of　the　hope　of　happiness　with　the　unceasing　endeavour　to
bee　worthy　of　happiness；　cannot　be　cognized　by　reason；　if　we　take
nature　alone　for　our　guide。　This　connection　can　be　hoped　for　only　on
the　assumption　that　the　cause　of　nature　is　a　supreme　reason；　which
governs　according　to　moral　laws。
　　I　term　the　idea　of　an　intelligence　in　which　the　morally　most　perfect
will；　united　with　supreme　blessedness；　is　the　cause　of　all　happiness
in　the　world；　so　far　as　happiness　stands　in　strict　｝　relation　to
morality　（as　the　worthiness　of　being　happy）；　the　ideal　of　the
supreme　Good。　supreme　original　good；　that　pure　reason　can　find　the
ground　of　the　practically　necessary　connection　of　both　elements　of　the
highest　derivative　good；　and　accordingly　of　an　intelligible；　that
is；　moral　world。　Now　since　we　are　necessitated　by　reason　to　conceive
ourselves　as　belonging　to　such　a　world；　while　the　senses　present　to　us
nothing　but　a　world　of　phenomena；　we　must　assume　the　former　as　a
consequence　of　our　conduct　in　the　world　of　sense　（since　the　world　of
sense　gives　us　no　hint　of　it）；　and　therefore　as　future　in　relation
to　us。　Thus　God　and　a　future　life　are　two　hypotheses　which；
according　to　the　principles　of　pure　reason；　are　inseparable　from　the
obligation　which　this　reason　imposes　upon　us。
　　Morality　per　se　constitutes　a　system。　But　we　can　form　no　system　of
happiness；　except　in　so　far　as　it　is　dispensed　in　strict　proportion　to
morality。　But　this　is　only　possible　in　the　intelligible　world；　under　a
wise　author　and　ruler。　Such　a　ruler；　together　with　life　in　such　a
world；　which　we　must　look　upon　as　future；　reason　finds　itself
pelled　to　assume；　or　it　must　regard　the　moral　laws　as　idle
dreams；　since　the　necessary　consequence　which　this　same　reason
connects　with　them　must；　without　this　hypothesis；　fall　to　the
ground。　Hence　also　the　moral　laws　are　universally　regarded　as
mands；　which　they　could　not　be　did　they　not　connect　a　priori
adequate　consequences　with　their　dictates；　and　thus　carry　with　them
promises　and　threats。　But　this；　again；　they　could　not　do；　did　they　not
reside　in　a　necessary　being；　as　the　Supreme　Good；　which　alone　can
render　such　a　teleological　unity　possible。
　　Leibnitz　termed　the　world；　when　viewed　in　relation　to　the　rational
beings　which　it　contains；　and　the　moral　relations　in　which　they
stand　to　each　other；　under　the　government　of　the　Supreme　Good；　the
kingdom　of　Grace；　and　distinguished　it　from　the　kingdom　of　Nature；
in　which　these　rational　beings　live；　under　moral　laws；　indeed；　but
expect　no　other　consequences　from　their　actions　than　such　as　follow
according　to　the　course　of　nature　in　the　world　of　sense。　To　view
ourselves；　therefore；　as　in　the　kingdom　of　grace；　in　which　all
happiness　awaits　us；　except　in　so　far　as　we　ourselves　limit　our
participation　in　it　by　actions　which　render　us　unworthy　of
happiness；　is　a　practically　necessary　idea　of　reason。
　　Practical　laws；　in　so　far　as　they　are　subjective　grounds　of　actions；
that　is；　subjective　principles；　are　termed　maxims。　The　judgements　of
moral　according　to　in　its　purity　and　ultimate　results　are　framed
according　ideas；　the　observance　of　its　laws；　according　to　according　to
maxims。
　　The　whole　course　of　our　life　must　be　subject　to　moral　maxims；　but
this　is　impossible；　unless　with　the　moral　law；　which　is　a　mere　idea；
reason　connects　an　efficient　cause　which　ordains　to　all　conduct
which　is　in　conformity　with　the　moral　law　an　issue　either　in　this　or
in　another　life；　which　is　in　exact　conformity　with　our　highest　aims。
Thus；　without　a　God　and　without　a　world；　invisible　to　us　now；　but
hoped　for；　the　glorious　ideas　of　morality　are；　indeed；　objects　of
approbation　and　of　admiration；　but　cannot　be　the　springs　of　purpose
and　action。　For　they　do　not　satisfy　all　the　aims　which　are　natural
to　every　rational　being；　and　which　are　determined　a　priori　by　pure
reason　itself；　and　necessary。
　　Happiness　alone　is；　in　the　view　of　reason；　far　from　being　the
plete　good。　Reason　does　not　approve　of　it　（however　much　inclination
may　desire　it）；　except　as　united　with　desert。　On　the　other　hand；
morality　alone；　and　with　it；　mere　desert；　is　likewise　far　from　being
the　plete　good。　To　make　it　plete；　he　who　conducts　himself　in　a
manner　not　unworthy　of　happiness；　must　be　able　to　hope　for　the
possession　of　happiness。　Even　reason；　unbiased　by　private　ends；　or
interested　considerations；　cannot　judge　otherwise；　if　it　puts　itself
in　the　place　of　a　being　whose　business　it　is　to　dispense　all　happiness
to　others。　For　in　the　practical　idea　both　points　are　essentially
bined；　though　in　such　a　way　that　participation　in　happiness　is
rendered　possible　by　the　moral　disposition；　as　its　condition；　and
not　conversely；　the　moral　disposition　by　the　prospect　of　happiness。
For　a　disposition　which　should　require　the　prospect　of　happiness　as
its　necessary　condition　would　not　be　moral；　and　hence　also　would　not
be　worthy　of　plete　happiness…　a　happiness　which；　in　the　view　of
reason；　recognizes　no　limitation　but　such　as　arises　from　our　own
immoral　conduct。
　　Happiness；　therefore；　in　exact　proportion　with　the　morality　of
rational　beings　（whereby　they　are　made　worthy　of　happiness）；
constitutes　alone　the　supreme　good　of　a　world　into　which　we　absolutely
must　transport　ourselves　according　to　the　mands　of　pure　but
practical　reason。　This　world　is；　it　is　true；　only　an　intelligible
world；　for　of　such　a　systematic　unity　of　ends　as　it　requires；　the
world　of　sense　gives　us　no　hint。　Its　reality　can　be　based　on　nothing
else　but　the　hypothesis　of　a　supreme　original　good。　In　it
independent　reason；　equipped　with　all　the　sufficiency　of　a　supreme
cause；　founds；　maintains；　and　fulfils　the　universal　order　of　things；
with　the　most　perfect　teleological　harmony；　however　much　this　order
may　be　hidden　from　us　in　the　world　of　sense。
　　This　moral　theology　has　the　peculiar　advantage；　in　contrast　with
speculative　theology；　of　leading　inevitably　to　the　conception　o