the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第126部分

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to　all　possible　questions　of　a　certain　class。　Thus　scepticism　is　a
resting　place　for　reason；　in　which　it　may　reflect　on　its　dogmatical
wanderings　and　gain　some　knowledge　of　the　region　in　which　it　happens
to　be；　that　it　may　pursue　its　way　with　greater　certainty；　but　it
cannot　be　its　permanent　dwelling…place。　It　must　take　up　its　abode　only
in　the　region　of　plete　certitude；　whether　this　relates　to　the
cognition　of　objects　themselves；　or　to　the　limits　which　bound　all
our　cognition。
　　Reason　is　not　to　be　considered　as　an　indefinitely　extended　plane；　of
the　bounds　of　which　we　have　only　a　general　knowledge；　it　ought
rather　to　be　pared　to　a　sphere；　the　radius　of　which　may　be　found
from　the　curvature　of　its　surface…　that　is；　the　nature　of　a　priori
synthetical　propositions…　and；　consequently；　its　circumference　and
extent。　Beyond　the　sphere　of　experience　there　are　no　objects　which
it　can　cognize；　nay；　even　questions　regarding　such　supposititious
objects　relate　only　to　the　subjective　principles　of　a　plete
determination　of　the　relations　which　exist　between　the
understanding…conceptions　which　lie　within　this　sphere。
　　We　are　actually　in　possession　of　a　priori　synthetical　cognitions；　as
is　proved　by　the　existence　of　the　principles　of　the　understanding；
which　anticipate　experience。　If　any　one　cannot　prehend　the
possibility　of　these　principles；　he　may　have　some　reason　to　doubt
whether　they　are　really　a　priori；　but　he　cannot　on　this　account
declare　them　to　be　impossible；　and　affirm　the　nullity　of　the　steps
which　reason　may　have　taken　under　their　guidance。　He　can　only　say：
If　we　perceived　their　origin　and　their　authenticity；　we　should　be　able
to　determine　the　extent　and　limits　of　reason；　but；　till　we　can　do
this；　all　propositions　regarding　the　latter　are　mere　random
assertions。　In　this　view；　the　doubt　respecting　all　dogmatical
philosophy；　which　proceeds　without　the　guidance　of　criticism；　is
well　grounded；　but　we　cannot　therefore　deny　to　reason　the　ability　to
construct　a　sound　philosophy；　when　the　way　has　been　prepared　by　a
thorough　critical　investigation。　All　the　conceptions　produced；　and　all
the　questions　raised；　by　pure　reason；　do　not　lie　in　the　sphere　of
experience；　but　in　that　of　reason　itself；　and　hence　they　must　be
solved；　and　shown　to　be　either　valid　or　inadmissible；　by　that　faculty。
We　have　no　right　to　decline　the　solution　of　such　problems；　on　the
ground　that　the　solution　can　be　discovered　only　from　the　nature　of
things；　and　under　pretence　of　the　limitation　of　human　faculties；　for
reason　is　the　sole　creator　of　all　these　ideas；　and　is　therefore
bound　either　to　establish　their　validity　or　to　expose　their　illusory
nature。
　　The　polemic　of　scepticism　is　properly　directed　against　the
dogmatist；　who　erects　a　system　of　philosophy　without　having　examined
the　fundamental　objective　principles　on　which　it　is　based；　for　the
purpose　of　evidencing　the　futility　of　his　designs；　and　thus　bringing
him　to　a　knowledge　of　his　own　powers。　But；　in　itself；　scepticism
does　not　give　us　any　certain　information　in　regard　to　the　bounds　of
our　knowledge。　All　unsuccessful　dogmatical　attempts　of　reason　are
facia；　which　it　is　always　useful　to　submit　to　the　censure　of　the
sceptic。　But　this　cannot　help　us　to　any　decision　regarding　the
expectations　which　reason　cherishes　of　better　success　in　future
endeavours；　the　investigations　of　scepticism　cannot；　therefore；　settle
the　dispute　regarding　the　rights　and　powers　of　human　reason。
　　Hume　is　perhaps　the　ablest　and　most　ingenious　of　all　sceptical
philosophers；　and　his　writings　have；　undoubtedly；　exerted　the　most
powerful　influence　in　awakening　reason　to　a　thorough　investigation
into　its　own　powers。　It　will；　therefore；　well　repay　our　labours　to
consider　for　a　little　the　course　of　reasoning　which　he　followed　and
the　errors　into　which　he　strayed；　although　setting　out　on　the　path
of　truth　and　certitude。
　　Hume　was　probably　aware；　although　he　never　clearly　developed　the
notion；　that　we　proceed　in　judgements　of　a　certain　class　beyond　our
conception　if　the　object。　I　have　termed　this　kind　of　judgement
synthetical。　As　regard　the　manner　in　which　I　pass　beyond　my　conception
by　the　aid　of　experience；　no　doubts　can　be　entertained。　Experience
is　itself　a　synthesis　of　perceptions；　and　it　employs　perceptions　to
increment　the　conception；　which　I　obtain　by　means　of　another
perception。　But　we　feel　persuaded　that　we　are　able　to　proceed　beyond　a
conception；　and　to　extend　our　cognition　a　priori。　We　attempt　this　in
two　ways…　either；　through　the　pure　understanding；　in　relation　to
that　which　may　bee　an　object　of　experience；　or；　through　pure
reason；　in　relation　to　such　properties　of　things；　or　of　the
existence　of　things；　as　can　never　be　presented　in　any　experience。　This
sceptical　philosopher　did　not　distinguish　these　two　kinds　of
judgements；　as　he　ought　to　have　done；　but　regarded　this　augmentation
of　conceptions；　and；　if　we　may　so　express　ourselves；　the　spontaneous
generation　of　understanding　and　reason；　independently　of　the
impregnation　of　experience；　as　altogether　impossible。　The　so…called
a　priori　principles　of　these　faculties　he　consequently　held　to　be
invalid　and　imaginary；　and　regarded　them　as　nothing　but　subjective
habits　of　thought　originating　in　experience；　and　therefore　purely
empirical　and　contingent　rules；　to　which　we　attribute　a　spurious
necessity　and　universality。　In　support　of　this　strange　assertion；　he
referred　us　to　the　generally　acknowledged　principle　of　the　relation
between　cause　and　effect。　No　faculty　of　the　mind　can　conduct　us　from
the　conception　of　a　thing　to　the　existence　of　something　else；　and
hence　he　believed　he　could　infer　that；　without　experience；　we
possess　no　source　from　which　we　can　augment　a　conception；　and　no
ground　sufficient　to　justify　us　in　framing　a　judgement　that　is　to
extend　our　cognition　a　priori。　That　the　light　of　the　sun；　which　shines
upon　a　piece　of　wax；　at　the　same　time　melts　it；　while　it　hardens　clay；
no　power　of　the　understanding　could　infer　from　the　conceptions　which
we　previously　possessed　of　these　substances；　much　less　is　there　any
a　priori　law　that　could　conduct　us　to　such　a　conclusion；　which
experience　alone　can　certify。　On　the　other　hand；　we　have　seen　in　our
discussion　of　transcendental　logic；　that；　although　we　can　never
proceed　immediately　beyond　the　content　of　the　conception　which　is
given　us；　we　can　always　cognize　pletely　a　priori…　in　relation；
however；　to　a　third　term；　namely；　possible　experience…　the　law　of
its　connection　with　other　things。　For　example；　if　I　observe　that　a
piece　of　wax　melts；　I　can　cognize　a　priori　that　there　must　have　been
something　（the　sun's　heat）　preceding；　which　this　law；　although；
without　the　aid　of　experience；　I　could　not　cognize　a　priori　and　in　a
determinate　manner　either　the　cause　from　the　effect；　or　the　effect
from　the　cause。　Hume　was；　therefore；　wrong　in　inferring；　from　the
contingency　of　the　determination　according　to　law；　the　contingency
of　the　law　itself；　and　the　passing　beyond　the　conception　of　a　thing　to
possible　experience　（which　is　an　a　priori　proceeding；　constituting　the
objective　reality　of　the　conception）；　he　confounded　with　our　synthesis
of　objects　in　actual　experience；　which　is　always；　of　course；
empirical。　Thus；　too；　he　regarded　the　principle　of　affinity；　which　has
its　seat　in　the　understanding　and　indicates　a　necessary　connection；　as
a　mere　rule　of　association；　lying　in　the　imitative　faculty　of
imagination；　which　can　present　only　contingent；　and　not　objective
connections。
　　The　sceptical　errors　of　this　remarkably　acute　thinker　arose
principally　from　a　defect；　which　was　mon　to　him　with　the
dogmatists；　namely；　that　he　had　never　made　a　systematic　review　of
all　the　different　kinds　of　a　priori　synthesis　performed　by　the
understanding。　Had　he　done　so；　he　would　have　found；　to　take　one
example　among　many；　that　the　principle　of　permanence　was　of　this
character；　and　that　it；　as　well　as　the　principle　of　causality；
anticipates　experience。　In　this　way　he　might　have　been　able　to
describe　the　determinate　limits　of　the　a　priori　operations　of
understanding　and　reason。　But　he　merely　declared　the　understanding
to　be　limited；　instead　of　showing　what　its　limits　were；　he　created　a
general　mistrust　in　the　power　of　our　faculties；　without　giving　us
any　determinate　knowledge　of　the　bounds　of　our　necessary　and
unavoidable　ignorance；　he　examined　and　condemned　some　of　the
principles　of　the　understanding；　without　investigating　all　its
powers　with　the　pleteness　necessary　to　criticism。　He　denies；　with
truth；　certain　powers　to　the　understanding；　but　he　goes　further；　and
declares　it　to　be　utterly　inadequate　to　the　a　priori　extension　of
knowledge；　although　he　has　not　fully　examined　all　the　powers　which
reside　in　the　faculty；　and　thus　the　fate　which　always　overtakes
scepticism　meets　him　too。　That　is　to　say；　his　own　declarations　are
doubted；　for　his　objections　were　based　upon　facta；　which　are
contingent；　and　not　upon　principles；　which　can　alone　demonstrate　the
necessary　invalidity　of　all　dogmatical　assertions。
　　As　Hume　makes　no　distinction　between　the　well…grounded　claims　of　the
understanding　and　the　dialectical　pretensions　of　reason；　against
which；　however；　his　a