the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第120部分

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presents　this　conception　in　concreto；　but　only　to　the　time…conditions；
which　may　be　found　in　experience　to　correspond　to　the　conception。　My
procedure　is；　therefore；　strictly　according　to　conceptions；　I　cannot
in　a　case　of　this　kind　employ　the　construction　of　conceptions；　because
the　conception　is　merely　a　rule　for　the　synthesis　of　perceptions；
which　are　not　pure　intuitions；　and　which；　therefore；　cannot　be　given　a
priori。

　　There　is　thus　a　twofold　exercise　of　reason。　Both　modes　have　the
properties　of　universality　and　an　a　priori　origin　in　mon；　but
are；　in　their　procedure；　of　widely　different　character。　The　reason
of　this　is　that　in　the　world　of　phenomena；　in　which　alone　objects
are　presented　to　our　minds；　there　are　two　main　elements…　the　form　of
intuition　（space　and　time）；　which　can　be　cognized　and　determined
pletely　a　priori；　and　the　matter　or　content…　that　which　is
presented　in　space　and　time；　and　which；　consequently；　contains　a
something…　an　existence　corresponding　to　our　powers　of　sensation。　As
regards　the　latter；　which　can　never　be　given　in　a　determinate　mode
except　by　experience；　there　are　no　a　priori　notions　which　relate　to
it；　except　the　undetermined　conceptions　of　the　synthesis　of　possible
sensations；　in　so　far　as　these　belong　（in　a　possible　experience）　to
the　unity　of　consciousness。　As　regards　the　former；　we　can　determine
our　conceptions　a　priori　in　intuition；　inasmuch　as　we　are　ourselves
the　creators　of　the　objects　of　the　conceptions　in　space　and　time…
these　objects　being　regarded　simply　as　quanta。　In　the　one　case；　reason
proceeds　according　to　conceptions　and　can　do　nothing　more　than　subject
phenomena　to　these…　which　can　only　be　determined　empirically；　that　is；
a　posteriori…　in　conformity；　however；　with　those　conceptions　as　the
rules　of　all　empirical　synthesis。　In　the　other　case；　reason　proceeds
by　the　construction　of　conceptions；　and；　as　these　conceptions　relate
to　an　a　priori　intuition；　they　may　be　given　and　determined　in　pure
intuition　a　priori；　and　without　the　aid　of　empirical　data。　The
examination　and　consideration　of　everything　that　exists　in　space　or
time…　whether　it　is　a　quantum　or　not；　in　how　far　the　particular
something　（which　fills　space　or　time）　is　a　primary　substratum；　or　a
mere　determination　of　some　other　existence；　whether　it　relates　to
anything　else…　either　as　cause　or　effect；　whether　its　existence　is
isolated　or　in　reciprocal　connection　with　and　dependence　upon
others；　the　possibility　of　this　existence；　its　reality　and　necessity
or　opposites…　all　these　form　part　of　the　cognition　of　reason　on　the
ground　of　conceptions；　and　this　cognition　is　termed　philosophical。　But
to　determine　a　priori　an　intuition　in　space　（its　figure）；　to　divide
time　into　periods；　or　merely　to　cognize　the　quantity　of　an　intuition
in　space　and　time；　and　to　determine　it　by　number…　all　this　is　an
operation　of　reason　by　means　of　the　construction　of　conceptions；　and
is　called　mathematical。
　　The　success　which　attends　the　efforts　of　reason　in　the　sphere　of
mathematics　naturally　fosters　the　expectation　that　the　same　good
fortune　will　be　its　lot；　if　it　applies　the　mathematical　method　in
other　regions　of　mental　endeavour　besides　that　of　quantities。　Its
success　is　thus　great；　because　it　can　support　all　its　conceptions　by　a
priori　intuitions　and；　in　this　way；　make　itself　a　master；　as　it
were；　over　nature；　while　pure　philosophy；　with　its　a　priori　discursive
conceptions；　bungles　about　in　the　world　of　nature；　and　cannot　accredit
or　show　any　a　priori　evidence　of　the　reality　of　these　conceptions。
Masters　in　the　science　of　mathematics　are　confident　of　the　success
of　this　method；　indeed；　it　is　a　mon　persuasion　that　it　is　capable
of　being　applied　to　any　subject　of　human　thought。　They　have　hardly
ever　reflected　or　philosophized　on　their　favourite　science…　a　task
of　great　difficulty；　and　the　specific　difference　between　the　two　modes
of　employing　the　faculty　of　reason　has　never　entered　their　thoughts。
Rules　current　in　the　field　of　mon　experience；　and　which　mon
sense　stamps　everywhere　with　its　approval；　are　regarded　by　them　as
axiomatic。　From　what　source　the　conceptions　of　space　and　time；　with
which　（as　the　only　primitive　quanta）　they　have　to　deal；　enter　their
minds；　is　a　question　which　they　do　not　trouble　themselves　to　answer；
and　they　think　it　just　as　unnecessary　to　examine　into　the　origin　of
the　pure　conceptions　of　the　understanding　and　the　extent　of　their
validity。　All　they　have　to　do　with　them　is　to　employ　them。　In　all　this
they　are　perfectly　right；　if　they　do　not　overstep　the　limits　of　the
sphere　of　nature。　But　they　pass；　unconsciously；　from　the　world　of
sense　to　the　insecure　ground　of　pure　transcendental　conceptions
（instabilis　tellus；　innabilis　unda）；　where　they　can　neither　stand
nor　swim；　and　where　the　tracks　of　their　footsteps　are　obliterated　by
time；　while　the　march　of　mathematics　is　pursued　on　a　broad　and
magnificent　highway；　which　the　latest　posterity　shall　frequent　without
fear　of　danger　or　impediment。
　　As　we　have　taken　upon　us　the　task　of　determining；　clearly　and
certainly；　the　limits　of　pure　reason　in　the　sphere　of
transcendentalism；　and　as　the　efforts　of　reason　in　this　direction
are　persisted　in；　even　after　the　plainest　and　most　expressive
warnings；　hope　still　beckoning　us　past　the　limits　of　experience　into
the　splendours　of　the　intellectual　world…　it　bees　necessary　to
cut　away　the　last　anchor　of　this　fallacious　and　fantastic　hope。　We
shall；　accordingly；　show　that　the　mathematical　method　is　unattended　in
the　sphere　of　philosophy　by　the　least　advantage…　except；　perhaps；　that
it　more　plainly　exhibits　its　own　inadequacy…　that　geometry　and
philosophy　are　two　quite　different　things；　although　they　go　band　in
hand　in　hand　in　the　field　of　natural　science；　and；　consequently；
that　the　procedure　of　the　one　can　never　be　imitated　by　the　other。
　　The　evidence　of　mathematics　rests　upon　definitions；　axioms；　and
demonstrations。　I　shall　be　satisfied　with　showing　that　none　of　these
forms　can　be　employed　or　imitated　in　philosophy　in　the　sense　in
which　they　are　understood　by　mathematicians；　and　that　the
geometrician；　if　he　employs　his　method　in　philosophy；　will　succeed
only　in　building　card…castles；　while　the　employment　of　the
philosophical　method　in　mathematics　can　result　in　nothing　but　mere
verbiage。　The　essential　business　of　philosophy；　indeed；　is　to　mark　out
the　limits　of　the　science；　and　even　the　mathematician；　unless　his
talent　is　naturally　circumscribed　and　limited　to　this　particular
department　of　knowledge；　cannot　turn　a　deaf　ear　to　the　warnings　of
philosophy；　or　set　himself　above　its　direction。
　　I。　Of　Definitions。　A　definition　is；　as　the　term　itself　indicates；
the　representation；　upon　primary　grounds；　of　the　plete　conception
of　a　thing　within　its　own　limits。*　Accordingly；　an　empirical
conception　cannot　be　defined；　it　can　only　be　explained。　For；　as
there　are　in　such　a　conception　only　a　certain　number　of　marks　or
signs；　which　denote　a　certain　class　of　sensuous　objects；　we　can
never　be　sure　that　we　do　not　cogitate　under　the　word　which　indicates
the　same　object；　at　one　time　a　greater；　at　another　a　smaller　number　of
signs。　Thus；　one　person　may　cogitate　in　his　conception　of　gold；　in
addition　to　its　properties　of　weight；　colour；　malleability；　that　of
resisting　rust；　while　another　person　may　be　ignorant　of　this
quality。　We　employ　certain　signs　only　so　long　as　we　require　them　for
the　sake　of　distinction；　new　observations　abstract　some　and　add　new
ones；　so　that　an　empirical　conception　never　remains　within　permanent
limits。　It　is；　in　fact；　useless　to　define　a　conception　of　this　kind。
If；　for　example；　we　are　speaking　of　water　and　its　properties；　we　do
not　stop　at　what　we　actually　think　by　the　word　water；　but　proceed　to
observation　and　experiment；　and　the　word；　with　the　few　signs
attached　to　it；　is　more　properly　a　designation　than　a　conception　of
the　thing。　A　definition　in　this　case　would　evidently　be　nothing　more
than　a　determination　of　the　word。　In　the　second　place；　no　a　priori
conception；　such　as　those　of　substance；　cause；　right；　fitness；　and
so　on；　can　be　defined。　For　I　can　never　be　sure；　that　the　clear
representation　of　a　given　conception　（which　is　given　in　a　confused
state）　has　been　fully　developed；　until　I　know　that　the
representation　is　adequate　with　its　object。　But；　inasmuch　as　the
conception；　as　it　is　presented　to　the　mind；　may　contain　a　number　of
obscure　representations；　which　we　do　not　observe　in　our　analysis；
although　we　employ　them　in　our　application　of　the　conception；　I　can
never　be　sure　that　my　analysis　is　plete；　while　examples　may　make
this　probable；　although　they　can　never　demonstrate　the　fact。　instead
of　the　word　definition；　I　should　rather　employ　the　term　exposition…
a　more　modest　expression；　which　the　critic　may　accept　without
surrendering　his　doubts　as　to　the　pleteness　of　the　analysis　of
any　such　conception。　As；　therefore；　neither　empirical　nor　a　priori
conceptions　are　capable　of　definition；　we　have　to　see　whether　the　only
other　kind　of　conceptions…　arbitrary　conceptions…　can　be　subjected
to　this　mental　operation。　Such　a　conception　can　always　be　defined；　for
I　must　know　thoroughly　what　I　wished　to　cogitate　in　i