the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第12部分

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here　possible；　or；　if　so；　in　what　cases；　we　can　regard　a　science　of
the　mere　criticism　of　pure　reason；　its　sources　and　limits；　as　the
propaedeutic　to　a　system　of　pure　reason。　Such　a　science　must　not　be
called　a　doctrine；　but　only　a　critique　of　pure　reason；　and　its　use；　in
regard　to　speculation；　would　be　only　negative；　not　to　enlarge　the
bounds　of；　but　to　purify；　our　reason；　and　to　shield　it　against
error…　which　alone　is　no　little　gain。　I　apply　the　term
transcendental　to　all　knowledge　which　is　not　so　much　occupied　with
objects　as　with　the　mode　of　our　cognition　of　these　objects；　so　far
as　this　mode　of　cognition　is　possible　a　priori。　A　system　of　such
conceptions　would　be　called　transcendental　philosophy。　But　this；
again；　is　still　beyond　the　bounds　of　our　present　essay。　For　as　such
a　science　must　contain　a　plete　exposition　not　only　of　our
synthetical　a　priori；　but　of　our　analytical　a　priori　knowledge；　it
is　of　too　wide　a　range　for　our　present　purpose；　because　we　do　not
require　to　carry　our　analysis　any　farther　than　is　necessary　to
understand；　in　their　full　extent；　the　principles　of　synthesis　a
priori；　with　which　alone　we　have　to　do。　This　investigation；　which　we
cannot　properly　call　a　doctrine；　but　only　a　transcendental　critique；
because　it　aims　not　at　the　enlargement；　but　at　the　correction　and
guidance；　of　our　knowledge；　and　is　to　serve　as　a　touchstone　of　the
worth　or　worthlessness　of　all　knowledge　a　priori；　is　the　sole　object
of　our　present　essay。　Such　a　critique　is　consequently；　as　far　as
possible；　a　preparation　for　an　organon；　and　if　this　new　organon　should
be　found　to　fail；　at　least　for　a　canon　of　pure　reason；　according　to
which　the　plete　system　of　the　philosophy　of　pure　reason；　whether　it
extend　or　limit　the　bounds　of　that　reason；　might　one　day　be　set
forth　both　analytically　and　synthetically。　For　that　this　is
possible；　nay；　that　such　a　system　is　not　of　so　great　extent　as　to
preclude　the　hope　of　its　ever　being　pleted；　is　evident。　For　we　have
not　here　to　do　with　the　nature　of　outward　objects；　which　is
infinite；　but　solely　with　the　mind；　which　judges　of　the　nature　of
objects；　and；　again；　with　the　mind　only　in　respect　of　its　cognition
a　priori。　And　the　object　of　our　investigations；　as　it　is　not　to　be
sought　without；　but；　altogether　within；　ourselves；　cannot　remain
concealed；　and　in　all　probability　is　limited　enough　to　be　pletely
surveyed　and　fairly　estimated；　according　to　its　worth　or
worthlessness。　Still　less　let　the　reader　here　expect　a　critique　of
books　and　systems　of　pure　reason；　our　present　object　is　exclusively
a　critique　of　the　faculty　of　pure　reason　itself。　Only　when　we　make
this　critique　our　foundation；　do　we　possess　a　pure　touchstone　for
estimating　the　philosophical　value　of　ancient　and　modern　writings　on
this　subject；　and　without　this　criterion；　the　inpetent　historian　or
judge　decides　upon　and　corrects　the　groundless　assertions　of　others
with　his　own；　which　have　themselves　just　as　little　foundation。
　　Transcendental　philosophy　is　the　idea　of　a　science；　for　which　the
Critique　of　Pure　Reason　must　sketch　the　whole　plan
architectonically；　that　is；　from　principles；　with　a　full　guarantee　for
the　validity　and　stability　of　all　the　parts　which　enter　into　the
building。　It　is　the　system　of　all　the　principles　of　pure　reason。　If
this　Critique　itself　does　not　assume　the　title　of　transcendental
philosophy；　it　is　only　because；　to　be　a　plete　system；　it　ought　to
contain　a　full　analysis　of　all　human　knowledge　a　priori。　Our
critique　must；　indeed；　lay　before　us　a　plete　enumeration　of　all　the
radical　conceptions　which　constitute　the　said　pure　knowledge。　But　from
the　plete　analysis　of　these　conceptions　themselves；　as　also　from
a　plete　investigation　of　those　derived　from　them；　it　abstains
with　reason；　partly　because　it　would　be　deviating　from　the　end　in　view
to　occupy　itself　with　this　analysis；　since　this　process　is　not
attended　with　the　difficulty　and　insecurity　to　be　found　in　the
synthesis；　to　which　our　critique　is　entirely　devoted；　and　partly
because　it　would　be　inconsistent　with　the　unity　of　our　plan　to
burden　this　essay　with　the　vindication　of　the　pleteness　of　such
an　analysis　and　deduction；　with　which；　after　all；　we　have　at　present
nothing　to　do。　This　pleteness　of　the　analysis　of　these　radical
conceptions；　as　well　as　of　the　deduction　from　the　conceptions　a　priori
which　may　be　given　by　the　analysis；　we　can；　however；　easily　attain；
provided　only　that　we　are　in　possession　of　all　these　radical
conceptions；　which　are　to　serve　as　principles　of　the　synthesis；　and
that　in　respect　of　this　main　purpose　nothing　is　wanting。
　　To　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason；　therefore；　belongs　all　that
constitutes　transcendental　philosophy；　and　it　is　the　plete　idea
of　transcendental　philosophy；　but　still　not　the　science　itself；
because　it　only　proceeds　so　far　with　the　analysis　as　is　necessary　to
the　power　of　judging　pletely　of　our　synthetical　knowledge　a　priori。
　　The　principal　thing　we　must　attend　to；　in　the　division　of　the
parts　of　a　science　like　this；　is　that　no　conceptions　must　enter　it
which　contain　aught　empirical；　in　other　words；　that　the　knowledge　a
priori　must　be　pletely　pure。　Hence；　although　the　highest　principles
and　fundamental　conceptions　of　morality　are　certainly　cognitions　a
priori；　yet　they　do　not　belong　to　transcendental　philosophy；
because；　though　they　certainly　do　not　lay　the　conceptions　of　pain；
pleasure；　desires；　inclinations；　etc。　（which　are　all　of　empirical
origin）；　at　the　foundation　of　its　precepts；　yet　still　into　the
conception　of　duty…　as　an　obstacle　to　be　overe；　or　as　an　incitement
which　should　not　be　made　into　a　motive…　these　empirical　conceptions
must　necessarily　enter；　in　the　construction　of　a　system　of　pure
morality。　Transcendental　philosophy　is　consequently　a　philosophy　of
the　pure　and　merely　speculative　reason。　For　all　that　is　practical；
so　far　as　it　contains　motives；　relates　to　feelings；　and　these　belong
to　empirical　sources　of　cognition。
　　If　we　wish　to　divide　this　science　from　the　universal　point　of　view
of　a　science　in　general；　it　ought　to　prehend；　first；　a　Doctrine
of　the　Elements；　and；　secondly；　a　Doctrine　of　the　Method　of　pure
reason。　Each　of　these　main　divisions　will　have　its　subdivisions；　the
separate　reasons　for　which　we　cannot　here　particularize。　Only　so
much　seems　necessary；　by　way　of　introduction　of　premonition；　that
there　are　two　sources　of　human　knowledge　（which　probably　spring　from　a
mon；　but　to　us　unknown　root）；　namely；　sense　and　understanding。　By
the　former；　objects　are　given　to　us；　by　the　latter；　thought。　So　far　as
the　faculty　of　sense　may　contain　representations　a　priori；　which
form　the　conditions　under　which　objects　are　given；　in　so　far　it
belongs　to　transcendental　philosophy。　The　transcendental　doctrine　of
sense　must　form　the　first　part　of　our　science　of　elements；　because　the
conditions　under　which　alone　the　objects　of　human　knowledge　are
given　must　precede　those　under　which　they　are　thought。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　TRANSCENDENTAL　DOCTRINE　OF　ELEMENTS。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。　TRANSCENDENTAL　AESTHETIC。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　I。　Introductory。

　　In　whatsoever　mode；　or　by　whatsoever　means；　our　knowledge　may　relate
to　objects；　it　is　at　least　quite　clear　that　the　only　manner　in　which
it　immediately　relates　to　them　is　by　means　of　an　intuition。　To　this　as
the　indispensable　groundwork；　all　thought　points。　But　an　intuition　can
take　place　only　in　so　far　as　the　object　is　given　to　us。　This；　again；
is　only　possible；　to　man　at　least；　on　condition　that　the　object　affect
the　mind　in　a　certain　manner。　The　capacity　for　receiving
representations　（receptivity）　through　the　mode　in　which　we　are
affected　by　objects；　objects；　is　called　sensibility。　By　means　of
sensibility；　therefore；　objects　are　given　to　us；　and　it　alone
furnishes　us　with　intuitions；　by　the　understanding　they　are　thought；
and　from　it　arise　conceptions。　But　an　thought　must　directly；　or
indirectly；　by　means　of　certain　signs；　relate　ultimately　to
intuitions；　consequently；　with　us；　to　sensibility；　because　in　no　other
way　can　an　object　be　given　to　us。
　　The　effect　of　an　object　upon　the　faculty　of　representation；　so　far
as　we　are　affected　by　the　said　object；　is　sensation。　That　sort　of
intuition　which　relates　to　an　object　by　means　of　sensation　is　called
an　empirical　intuition。　The　undetermined　object　of　an　empirical
intuition　is　called　phenomenon。　That　which　in　the　phenomenon
corresponds　to　the　sensation；　I　term　its　matter；　but　that　which
effects　that　the　content　of　the　phenomenon　can　be　arranged　under
certain　relations；　I　call　its　form。　But　that　in　which　our　sensations
are　merely　arranged；　and　by　which　they　are　susceptible　of　assuming　a
certain　form；　cannot　be　itself　sensation。　It　is；　then；　the　matter　of
all　phenomena　that　is　given　to　us　a　posteriori；　the　form　must　lie
ready　a　priori　for　them　in　the　mind；　and　consequently　can　be
regarded　separately　from　all　sensation。
　　I　call　all　representations　pure；　in　the　transcendental　meaning　of
the　word；　wherein　nothing　is　met　with　that　belongs　to　sensation。　And
accordingly　we　find　existing　in　the　mind　a　priori；　the　pure　form　of
sensuous　intuitions　in　general；　in　which　all　t