the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第118部分

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doctrine　a　positive；　part。

　　*I　am　well　aware　that；　in　the　language　of　the　schools；　the　term
discipline　is　usually　employed　as　synonymous　with　instruction。　But
there　are　so　many　cases　in　which　it　is　necessary　to　distinguish　the
notion　of　the　former；　as　a　course　of　corrective　training；　from　that　of
the　latter；　as　the　munication　of　knowledge；　and　the　nature　of
things　itself　demands　the　appropriation　of　the　most　suitable
expressions　for　this　distinction；　that　it　is　my　desire　that　the　former
terms　should　never　be　employed　in　any　other　than　a　negative
signification。

　　That　natural　dispositions　and　talents　（such　as　imagination　and　with；
which　ask　a　free　and　unlimited　development；　require　in　many　respects
the　corrective　influence　of　discipline；　every　one　will　readily
grant。　But　it　may　well　appear　strange　that　reason；　whose　proper　duty
it　is　to　prescribe　rules　of　discipline　to　all　the　other　powers　of
the　mind；　should　itself　require　this　corrective。　It　has；　in　fact；
hitherto　escaped　this　humiliation；　only　because；　in　presence　of　its
magnificent　pretensions　and　high　position；　no　one　could　readily
suspect　it　to　be　capable　of　substituting　fancies　for　conceptions；
and　words　for　things。
　　Reason；　when　employed　in　the　field　of　experience；　does　not　stand
in　need　of　criticism；　because　its　principles　are　subjected　to　the
continual　test　of　empirical　observations。　Nor　is　criticism　requisite
in　the　sphere　of　mathematics；　where　the　conceptions　of　reason　must
always　be　presented　in　concreto　in　pure　intuition；　and　baseless　or
arbitrary　assertions　are　discovered　without　difficulty。　But　where
reason　is　not　held　in　a　plain　track　by　the　influence　of　empirical　or
of　pure　intuition；　that　is；　when　it　is　employed　in　the
transcendental　sphere　of　pure　conceptions；　it　stands　in　great　need
of　discipline；　to　restrain　its　propensity　to　overstep　the　limits　of
possible　experience　and　to　keep　it　from　wandering　into　error。　In　fact；
the　utility　of　the　philosophy　of　pure　reason　is　entirely　of　this
negative　character。　Particular　errors　may　be　corrected　by　particular
animadversions；　and　the　causes　of　these　errors　may　be　eradicated　by
criticism。　But　where　we　find；　as　in　the　case　of　pure　reason；　a
plete　system　of　illusions　and　fallacies；　closely　connected　with
each　other　and　depending　upon　grand　general　principles；　there　seems　to
be　required　a　peculiar　and　negative　code　of　mental　legislation；　which；
under　the　denomination　of　a　discipline；　and　founded　upon　the　nature　of
reason　and　the　objects　of　its　exercise；　shall　constitute　a　system　of
thorough　examination　and　testing；　which　no　fallacy　will　be　able　to
withstand　or　escape　from；　under　whatever　disguise　or　concealment　it
may　lurk。
　　But　the　reader　must　remark　that；　in　this　the　second　division　of
our　transcendental　Critique　the　discipline　of　pure　reason　is　not
directed　to　the　content；　but　to　the　method　of　the　cognition　of　pure
reason。　The　former　task　has　been　pleted　in　the　doctrine　of
elements。　But　there　is　so　much　similarity　in　the　mode　of　employing　the
faculty　of　reason；　whatever　be　the　object　to　which　it　is　applied；
while；　at　the　same　time；　its　employment　in　the　transcendental　sphere
is　so　essentially　different　in　kind　from　every　other；　that；　without
the　warning　negative　influence　of　a　discipline　specially　directed　to
that　end；　the　errors　are　unavoidable　which　spring　from　the
unskillful　employment　of　the　methods　which　are　originated　by　reason
but　which　are　out　of　place　in　this　sphere。

　　　　　SECTION　I。　The　Discipline　of　Pure　Reason　in　the　Sphere
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Dogmatism。

　　The　science　of　mathematics　presents　the　most　brilliant　example　of
the　extension　of　the　sphere　of　pure　reason　without　the　aid　of
experience。　Examples　are　always　contagious；　and　they　exert　an　especial
influence　on　the　same　faculty；　which　naturally　flatters　itself　that　it
will　have　the　same　good　fortune　in　other　case　as　fell　to　its　lot　in
one　fortunate　instance。　Hence　pure　reason　hopes　to　be　able　to　extend
its　empire　in　the　transcendental　sphere　with　equal　success　and
security；　especially　when　it　applies　the　same　method　which　was
attended　with　such　brilliant　results　in　the　science　of　mathematics。　It
is；　therefore；　of　the　highest　importance　for　us　to　know　whether　the
method　of　arriving　at　demonstrative　certainty；　which　is　termed
mathematical；　be　identical　with　that　by　which　we　endeavour　to　attain
the　same　degree　of　certainty　in　philosophy；　and　which　is　termed　in
that　science　dogmatical。
　　Philosophical　cognition　is　the　cognition　of　reason　by　means　of
conceptions；　mathematical　cognition　is　cognition　by　means　of　the
construction　of　conceptions。　The　construction　of　a　conception　is　the
presentation　a　priori　of　the　intuition　which　corresponds　to　the
conception。　For　this　purpose　a　non…empirical　intuition　is　requisite；
which；　as　an　intuition；　is　an　individual　object；　while；　as　the
construction　of　a　conception　（a　general　representation）；　it　must　be
seen　to　be　universally　valid　for　all　the　possible　intuitions　which
rank　under　that　conception。　Thus　I　construct　a　triangle；　by　the
presentation　of　the　object　which　corresponds　to　this　conception；
either　by　mere　imagination；　in　pure　intuition；　or　upon　paper；　in
empirical　intuition；　in　both　cases　pletely　a　priori；　without
borrowing　the　type　of　that　figure　from　any　experience。　The
individual　figure　drawn　upon　paper　is　empirical；　but　it　serves；
notwithstanding；　to　indicate　the　conception；　even　in　its　universality；
because　in　this　empirical　intuition　we　keep　our　eye　merely　on　the
act　of　the　construction　of　the　conception；　and　pay　no　attention　to　the
various　modes　of　determining　it；　for　example；　its　size；　the　length
of　its　sides；　the　size　of　its　angles；　these　not　in　the　least　affecting
the　essential　character　of　the　conception。
　　Philosophical　cognition；　accordingly；　regards　the　particular　only　in
the　general；　mathematical　the　general　in　the　particular；　nay；　in　the
individual。　This　is　done；　however；　entirely　a　priori　and　by　means　of
pure　reason；　so　that；　as　this　individual　figure　is　determined　under
certain　universal　conditions　of　construction；　the　object　of　the
conception；　to　which　this　individual　figure　corresponds　as　its　schema；
must　be　cogitated　as　universally　determined。
　　The　essential　difference　of　these　two　modes　of　cognition　consists；
therefore；　in　this　formal　quality；　it　does　not　regard　the　difference
of　the　matter　or　objects　of　both。　Those　thinkers　who　aim　at
distinguishing　philosophy　from　mathematics　by　asserting　that　the
former　has　to　do　with　quality　merely；　and　the　latter　with　quantity；
have　mistaken　the　effect　for　the　cause。　The　reason　why　mathematical
cognition　can　relate　only　to　quantity　is　to　be　found　in　its　form
alone。　For　it　is　the　conception　of　quantities　only　that　is　capable
of　being　constructed；　that　is；　presented　a　priori　in　intuition；
while　qualities　cannot　be　given　in　any　other　than　an　empirical
intuition。　Hence　the　cognition　of　qualities　by　reason　is　possible　only
through　conceptions。　No　one　can　find　an　intuition　which　shall
correspond　to　the　conception　of　reality；　except　in　experience；　it
cannot　be　presented　to　the　mind　a　priori　and　antecedently　to　the
empirical　consciousness　of　a　reality。　We　can　form　an　intuition；　by
means　of　the　mere　conception　of　it；　of　a　cone；　without　the　aid　of
experience；　but　the　colour　of　the　cone　we　cannot　know　except　from
experience。　I　cannot　present　an　intuition　of　a　cause；　except　in　an
example　which　experience　offers　to　me。　Besides；　philosophy；　as　well　as
mathematics；　treats　of　quantities；　as；　for　example；　of　totality；
infinity；　and　so　on。　Mathematics；　too；　treats　of　the　difference　of
lines　and　surfaces…　as　spaces　of　different　quality；　of　the
continuity　of　extension…　as　a　quality　thereof。　But；　although　in　such
cases　they　have　a　mon　object；　the　mode　in　which　reason　considers
that　object　is　very　different　in　philosophy　from　what　it　is　in
mathematics。　The　former　confines　itself　to　the　general　conceptions；
the　latter　can　do　nothing　with　a　mere　conception；　it　hastens　to
intuition。　In　this　intuition　it　regards　the　conception　in　concreto；
not　empirically；　but　in　an　a　priori　intuition；　which　it　has
constructed；　and　in　which；　all　the　results　which　follow　from　the
general　conditions　of　the　construction　of　the　conception　are　in　all
cases　valid　for　the　object　of　the　constructed　conception。
　　Suppose　that　the　conception　of　a　triangle　is　given　to　a
philosopher　and　that　he　is　required　to　discover；　by　the
philosophical　method；　what　relation　the　sum　of　its　angles　bears　to　a
right　angle。　He　has　nothing　before　him　but　the　conception　of　a
figure　enclosed　within　three　right　lines；　and；　consequently；　with
the　same　number　of　angles。　He　may　analyse　the　conception　of　a　right
line；　of　an　angle；　or　of　the　number　three　as　long　as　he　pleases；　but
he　will　not　discover　any　properties　not　contained　in　these
conceptions。　But；　if　this　question　is　proposed　to　a　geometrician；　he
at　once　begins　by　constructing　a　triangle。　He　knows　that　two　right
angles　are　equal　to　the　sum　of　all　the　contiguous　angles　which　proceed
from　one　point　in　a　straight　line；　and　he　goes　on　to　produce　one
side　of　his　triangle；　thus　forming　two　adjacent　angles　which　are
together　equal　to　two