the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第11部分

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analytically　to　illustrate　the　conceptions　which　we　form　a　priori　of
things；　but　we　seek　to　widen　the　range　of　our　a　priori　knowledge。
For　this　purpose；　we　must　avail　ourselves　of　such　principles　as　add
something　to　the　original　conception…　something　not　identical　with；
nor　contained　in　it；　and　by　means　of　synthetical　judgements　a
priori；　leave　far　behind　us　the　limits　of　experience；　for　example；
in　the　proposition；　〃the　world　must　have　a　beginning；〃　and　such
like。　Thus　metaphysics；　according　to　the　proper　aim　of　the　science；
consists　merely　of　synthetical　propositions　a　priori。

　　VI。　The　Universal　Problem　of　Pure　Reason。

　　It　is　extremely　advantageous　to　be　able　to　bring　a　number　of
investigations　under　the　formula　of　a　single　problem。　For　in　this
manner；　we　not　only　facilitate　our　own　labour；　inasmuch　as　we　define
it　clearly　to　ourselves；　but　also　render　it　more　easy　for　others　to
decide　whether　we　have　done　justice　to　our　undertaking。　The　proper
problem　of　pure　reason；　then；　is　contained　in　the　question：　〃How　are
synthetical　judgements　a　priori　possible？〃
　　That　metaphysical　science　has　hitherto　remained　in　so　vacillating
a　state　of　uncertainty　and　contradiction；　is　only　to　be　attributed
to　the　fact　that　this　great　problem；　and　perhaps　even　the　difference
between　analytical　and　synthetical　judgements；　did　not　sooner
suggest　itself　to　philosophers。　Upon　the　solution　of　this　problem；
or　upon　sufficient　proof　of　the　impossibility　of　synthetical　knowledge
a　priori；　depends　the　existence　or　downfall　of　the　science　of
metaphysics。　Among　philosophers；　David　Hume　came　the　nearest　of　all　to
this　problem；　yet　it　never　acquired　in　his　mind　sufficient
precision；　nor　did　he　regard　the　question　in　its　universality。　On
the　contrary；　he　stopped　short　at　the　synthetical　proposition　of　the
connection　of　an　effect　with　its　cause　（principium　causalitatis）；
insisting　that　such　proposition　a　priori　was　impossible。　According
to　his　conclusions；　then；　all　that　we　term　metaphysical　science　is　a
mere　delusion；　arising　from　the　fancied　insight　of　reason　into　that
which　is　in　truth　borrowed　from　experience；　and　to　which　habit　has
given　the　appearance　of　necessity。　Against　this　assertion；　destructive
to　all　pure　philosophy；　he　would　have　been　guarded；　had　he　had　our
problem　before　his　eyes　in　its　universality。　For　he　would　then　have
perceived　that；　according　to　his　own　argument；　there　likewise　could
not　be　any　pure　mathematical　science；　which　assuredly　cannot　exist
without　synthetical　propositions　a　priori…　an　absurdity　from　which　his
good　understanding　must　have　saved　him。
　　In　the　solution　of　the　above　problem　is　at　the　same　time
prehended　the　possibility　of　the　use　of　pure　reason　in　the
foundation　and　construction　of　all　sciences　which　contain
theoretical　knowledge　a　priori　of　objects；　that　is　to　say；　the
answer　to　the　following　questions：
　　How　is　pure　mathematical　science　possible？
　　How　is　pure　natural　science　possible？
　　Respecting　these　sciences；　as　they　do　certainly　exist；　it　may　with
propriety　be　asked；　how　they　are　possible？…　for　that　they　must　be
possible　is　shown　by　the　fact　of　their　really　existing。*　But　as　to
metaphysics；　the　miserable　progress　it　has　hitherto　made；　and　the　fact
that　of　no　one　system　yet　brought　forward；　far　as　regards　its　true
aim；　can　it　be　said　that　this　science　really　exists；　leaves　any　one　at
liberty　to　doubt　with　reason　the　very　possibility　of　its　existence。

　　*As　to　the　existence　of　pure　natural　science；　or　physics；　perhaps
many　may　still　express　doubts。　But　we　have　only　to　look　at　the
different　propositions　which　are　monly　treated　of　at　the
mencement　of　proper　（empirical）　physical　science…　those；　for
example；　relating　to　the　permanence　of　the　same　quantity　of　matter；
the　vis　inertiae；　the　equality　of　action　and　reaction；　etc。…　to　be
soon　convinced　that　they　form　a　science　of　pure　physics　（physica　pura；
or　rationalis）；　which　well　deserves　to　be　separately　exposed　as　a
special　science；　in　its　whole　extent；　whether　that　be　great　or
confined。

　　Yet；　in　a　certain　sense；　this　kind　of　knowledge　must
unquestionably　be　looked　upon　as　given；　in　other　words；　metaphysics
must　be　considered　as　really　existing；　if　not　as　a　science；
nevertheless　as　a　natural　disposition　of　the　human　mind　（metaphysica
naturalis）。　For　human　reason；　without　any　instigations　imputable　to
the　mere　vanity　of　great　knowledge；　unceasingly　progresses；　urged　on
by　its　own　feeling　of　need；　towards　such　questions　as　cannot　be
answered　by　any　empirical　application　of　reason；　or　principles　derived
therefrom；　and　so　there　has　ever　really　existed　in　every　man　some
system　of　metaphysics。　It　will　always　exist；　so　soon　as　reason
awakes　to　the　exercise　of　its　power　of　speculation。　And　now　the
question　arises：　〃How　is　metaphysics；　as　a　natural　disposition；
possible？〃　In　other　words；　how；　from　the　nature　of　universal　human
reason；　do　those　questions　arise　which　pure　reason　proposes　to　itself；
and　which　it　is　impelled　by　its　own　feeling　of　need　to　answer　as
well　as　it　can？
　　But　as　in　all　the　attempts　hitherto　made　to　answer　the　questions
which　reason　is　prompted　by　its　very　nature　to　propose　to　itself；
for　example；　whether　the　world　had　a　beginning；　or　has　existed　from
eternity；　it　has　always　met　with　unavoidable　contradictions；　we　must
not　rest　satisfied　with　the　mere　natural　disposition　of　the　mind　to
metaphysics；　that　is；　with　the　existence　of　the　faculty　of　pure
reason；　whence；　indeed；　some　sort　of　metaphysical　system　always
arises；　but　it　must　be　possible　to　arrive　at　certainty　in　regard　to
the　question　whether　we　know　or　do　not　know　the　things　of　which
metaphysics　treats。　We　must　be　able　to　arrive　at　a　decision　on　the
subjects　of　its　questions；　or　on　the　ability　or　inability　of　reason　to
form　any　judgement　respecting　them；　and　therefore　either　to　extend
with　confidence　the　bounds　of　our　pure　reason；　or　to　set　strictly
defined　and　safe　limits　to　its　action。　This　last　question；　which
arises　out　of　the　above　universal　problem；　would　properly　run　thus：
〃How　is　metaphysics　possible　as　a　science？〃
　　Thus；　the　critique　of　reason　leads　at　last；　naturally　and
necessarily；　to　science；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　the　dogmatical　use　of
reason　without　criticism　leads　to　groundless　assertions；　against　which
others　equally　specious　can　always　be　set；　thus　ending　unavoidably
in　scepticism。
　　Besides；　this　science　cannot　be　of　great　and　formidable　prolixity；
because　it　has　not　to　do　with　objects　of　reason；　the　variety　of
which　is　inexhaustible；　but　merely　with　Reason　herself　and　her
problems；　problems　which　arise　out　of　her　own　bosom；　and　are　not
proposed　to　her　by　the　nature　of　outward　things；　but　by　her　own
nature。　And　when　once　Reason　has　previously　bee　able　pletely
to　understand　her　own　power　in　regard　to　objects　which　she　meets
with　in　experience；　it　will　be　easy　to　determine　securely　the　extent
and　limits　of　her　attempted　application　to　objects　beyond　the　confines
of　experience。
　　We　may　and　must；　therefore；　regard　the　attempts　hitherto　made　to
establish　metaphysical　science　dogmatically　as　non…existent。　For
what　of　analysis；　that　is；　mere　dissection　of　conceptions；　is
contained　in　one　or　other；　is　not　the　aim　of；　but　only　a　preparation
for　metaphysics　proper；　which　has　for　its　object　the　extension；　by
means　of　synthesis；　of　our　a　priori　knowledge。　And　for　this　purpose；
mere　analysis　is　of　course　useless；　because　it　only　shows　what　is
contained　in　these　conceptions；　but　not　how　we　arrive；　a　priori；　at
them；　and　this　it　is　her　duty　to　show；　in　order　to　be　able
afterwards　to　determine　their　valid　use　in　regard　to　all　objects　of
experience；　to　all　knowledge　in　general。　But　little　self…denial；
indeed；　is　needed　to　give　up　these　pretensions；　seeing　the　undeniable；
and　in　the　dogmatic　mode　of　procedure；　inevitable　contradictions　of
Reason　with　herself；　have　long　since　ruined　the　reputation　of　every
system　of　metaphysics　that　has　appeared　up　to　this　time。　It　will
require　more　firmness　to　remain　undeterred　by　difficulty　from
within；　and　opposition　from　without；　from　endeavouring；　by　a　method
quite　opposed　to　all　those　hitherto　followed；　to　further　the　growth
and　fruitfulness　of　a　science　indispensable　to　human　reason…　a　science
from　which　every　branch　it　has　borne　may　be　cut　away；　but　whose
roots　remain　indestructible。

　　VII。　Idea　and　Division　of　a　Particular　Science；　under　the
　　　　　　　Name　of　a　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。

　　From　all　that　has　been　said；　there　results　the　idea　of　a
particular　science；　which　may　be　called　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason。
For　reason　is　the　faculty　which　furnishes　us　with　the　principles　of
knowledge　a　priori。　Hence；　pure　reason　is　the　faculty　which　contains
the　principles　of　cognizing　anything　absolutely　a　priori。　An　organon
of　pure　reason　would　be　a　pendium　of　those　principles　according
to　which　alone　all　pure　cognitions　a　priori　can　be　obtained。　The
pletely　extended　application　of　such　an　organon　would　afford　us　a
system　of　pure　reason。　As　this；　however；　is　demanding　a　great　deal；
and　it　is　yet　doubtful　whether　any　extension　of　our　knowledge　be
here　possible；　or；　if　so；　in　what　cases；　we　can　regard　a　science　of
the　m