the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第106部分

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for　some　time　the　path　of　nature　and　experience；　and　discovering
themselves　no　nearer　their　object；　they　suddenly　leave　this　path　and
pass　into　the　region　of　pure　possibility；　where　they　hope　to　reach
upon　the　wings　of　ideas　what　had　eluded　all　their　empirical
investigations。　Gaining；　as　they　think；　a　firm　footing　after　this
immense　leap；　they　extend　their　determinate　conception…　into　the
possession　of　which　they　have　e；　they　know　not　how…　over　the
whole　sphere　of　creation；　and　explain　their　ideal；　which　is　entirely　a
product　of　pure　reason；　by　illustrations　drawn　from　experience…　though
in　a　degree　miserably　unworthy　of　the　grandeur　of　the　object；　while
they　refuse　to　acknowledge　that　they　have　arrived　at　this　cognition　or
hypothesis　by　a　very　different　road　from　that　of　experience。
　　Thus　the　physico…theological　is　based　upon　the　cosmological；　and
this　upon　the　ontological　proof　of　the　existence　of　a　Supreme　Being；
and　as　besides　these　three　there　is　no　other　path　open　to
speculative　reason；　the　ontological　proof；　on　the　ground　of　pure
conceptions　of　reason；　is　the　only　possible　one；　if　any　proof　of　a
proposition　so　far　transcending　the　empirical　exercise　of　the
understanding　is　possible　at　all。

　　　　SECTION　VII。　Critique　of　all　Theology　based　upon　Speculative
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Principles　of　Reason。

　　If　by　the　term　theology　I　understand　the　cognition　of　a　primal
being；　that　cognition　is　based　either　upon　reason　alone　（theologia
rationalis）　or　upon　revelation　（theologia　revelata）。　The　former
cogitates　its　object　either　by　means　of　pure　transcendental
conceptions；　as　an　ens　originarium；　realissimum；　ens　entium；　and　is
termed　transcendental　theology；　or；　by　means　of　a　conception　derived
from　the　nature　of　our　own　mind；　as　a　supreme　intelligence；　and　must
then　be　entitled　natural　theology。　The　person　who　believes　in　a
transcendental　theology　alone；　is　termed　a　deist；　he　who
acknowledges　the　possibility　of　a　natural　theology　also；　a　theist。　The
former　admits　that　we　can　cognize　by　pure　reason　alone　the　existence
of　a　Supreme　Being；　but　at　the　same　time　maintains　that　our　conception
of　this　being　is　purely　transcendental；　and　that　all　we　can　say　of
it　is　that　it　possesses　all　reality；　without　being　able　to　define　it
more　closely。　The　second　asserts　that　reason　is　capable　of
presenting　us；　from　the　analogy　with　nature；　with　a　more　definite
conception　of　this　being；　and　that　its　operations；　as　the　cause　of　all
things；　are　the　results　of　intelligence　and　free　will。　The　former
regards　the　Supreme　Being　as　the　cause　of　the　world…　whether　by　the
necessity　of　his　nature；　or　as　a　free　agent；　is　left　undetermined；　the
latter　considers　this　being　as　the　author　of　the　world。
　　Transcendental　theology　aims　either　at　inferring　the　existence　of
a　Supreme　Being　from　a　general　experience；　without　any　closer
reference　to　the　world　to　which　this　experience　belongs；　and　in　this
case　it　is　called　cosmotheology；　or　it　endeavours　to　cognize　the
existence　of　such　a　being；　through　mere　conceptions；　without　the　aid
of　experience；　and　is　then　termed　ontotheology。
　　Natural　theology　infers　the　attributes　and　the　existence　of　an
author　of　the　world；　from　the　constitution　of；　the　order　and　unity
observable　in；　the　world；　in　which　two　modes　of　causality　must　be
admitted　to　exist…　those　of　nature　and　freedom。　Thus　it　rises　from
this　world　to　a　supreme　intelligence；　either　as　the　principle　of　all
natural；　or　of　all　moral　order　and　perfection。　In　the　former　case　it
is　termed　physico…theology；　in　the　latter；　ethical　or　moral…theology。*

　　*Not　theological　ethics；　for　this　science　contains　ethical　laws；
which　presuppose　the　existence　of　a　Supreme　Governor　of　the　world；
while　moral…theology；　on　the　contrary；　is　the　expression　of　a
conviction　of　the　existence　of　a　Supreme　Being；　founded　upon　ethical
laws。

　　As　we　are　wont　to　understand　by　the　term　God　not　merely　an　eternal
nature；　the　operations　of　which　are　insensate　and　blind；　but　a　Supreme
Being；　who　is　the　free　and　intelligent　author　of　all　things；　and　as　it
is　this　latter　view　alone　that　can　be　of　interest　to　humanity；　we
might；　in　strict　rigour；　deny　to　the　deist　any　belief　in　God　at　all；
and　regard　him　merely　as　a　maintainer　of　the　existence　of　a　primal
being　or　thing…　the　supreme　cause　of　all　other　things。　But；　as　no
one　ought　to　be　blamed；　merely　because　he　does　not　feel　himself
justified　in　maintaining　a　certain　opinion；　as　if　he　altogether　denied
its　truth　and　asserted　the　opposite；　it　is　more　correct…　as　it　is　less
harsh…　to　say；　the　deist　believes　in　a　God；　the　theist　in　a　living　God
（summa　intelligentia）。　We　shall　now　proceed　to　investigate　the　sources
of　all　these　attempts　of　reason　to　establish　the　existence　of　a
Supreme　Being。
　　It　may　be　sufficient　in　this　place　to　define　theoretical　knowledge
or　cognition　as　knowledge　of　that　which　is；　and　practical　knowledge　as
knowledge　of　that　which　ought　to　be。　In　this　view；　the　theoretical
employment　of　reason　is　that　by　which　I　cognize　a　priori　（as
necessary）　that　something　is；　while　the　practical　is　that　by　which　I
cognize　a　priori　what　ought　to　happen。　Now；　if　it　is　an　indubitably
certain；　though　at　the　same　time　an　entirely　conditioned　truth；　that
something　is；　or　ought　to　happen；　either　a　certain　determinate
condition　of　this　truth　is　absolutely　necessary；　or　such　a　condition
may　be　arbitrarily　presupposed。　In　the　former　case　the　condition　is
postulated　（per　thesin）；　in　the　latter　supposed　（per　hypothesin）。
There　are　certain　practical　laws…　those　of　morality…　which　are
absolutely　necessary。　Now；　if　these　laws　necessarily　presuppose　the
existence　of　some　being；　as　the　condition　of　the　possibility　of
their　obligatory　power；　this　being　must　be　postulated；　because　the
conditioned；　from　which　we　reason　to　this　determinate　condition；　is
itself　cognized　a　priori　as　absolutely　necessary。　We　shall　at　some
future　time　show　that　the　moral　laws　not　merely　presuppose　the
existence　of　a　Supreme　Being；　but　also；　as　themselves　absolutely
necessary　in　a　different　relation；　demand　or　postulate　it…　although
only　from　a　practical　point　of　view。　The　discussion　of　this　argument
we　postpone　for　the　present。
　　When　the　question　relates　merely　to　that　which　is；　not　to　that　which
ought　to　be；　the　conditioned　which　is　presented　in　experience　is
always　cogitated　as　contingent。　For　this　reason　its　condition　cannot
be　regarded　as　absolutely　necessary；　but　merely　as　relatively
necessary；　or　rather　as　needful；　the　condition　is　in　itself　and　a
priori　a　mere　arbitrary　presupposition　in　aid　of　the　cognition；　by
reason；　of　the　conditioned。　If；　then；　we　are　to　possess　a
theoretical　cognition　of　the　absolute　necessity　of　a　thing；　we
cannot　attain　to　this　cognition　otherwise　than　a　priori　by　means　of
conceptions；　while　it　is　impossible　in　this　way　to　cognize　the
existence　of　a　cause　which　bears　any　relation　to　an　existence　given　in
experience。
　　Theoretical　cognition　is　speculative　when　it　relates　to　an　object　or
certain　conceptions　of　an　object　which　is　not　given　and　cannot　be
discovered　by　means　of　experience。　It　is　opposed　to　the　cognition　of
nature；　which　concerns　only　those　objects　or　predicates　which　can　be
presented　in　a　possible　experience。
　　The　principle　that　everything　which　happens　（the　empirically
contingent）　must　have　a　cause；　is　a　principle　of　the　cognition　of
nature；　but　not　of　speculative　cognition。　For；　if　we　change　it　into　an
abstract　principle；　and　deprive　it　of　its　reference　to　experience
and　the　empirical；　we　shall　find　that　it　cannot　with　justice　be
regarded　any　longer　as　a　synthetical　proposition；　and　that　it　is
impossible　to　discover　any　mode　of　transition　from　that　which　exists
to　something　entirely　different…　termed　cause。　Nay；　more；　the
conception　of　a　cause　likewise　that　of　the　contingent…　loses；　in
this　speculative　mode　of　employing　it；　all　significance；　for　its
objective　reality　and　meaning　are　prehensible　from　experience
alone。
　　When　from　the　existence　of　the　universe　and　the　things　in　it　the
existence　of　a　cause　of　the　universe　is　inferred；　reason　is　proceeding
not　in　the　natural；　but　in　the　speculative　method。　For　the　principle
of　the　former　enounces；　not　that　things　themselves　or　substances；
but　only　that　which　happens　or　their　states…　as　empirically
contingent；　have　a　cause：　the　assertion　that　the　existence　of
substance　itself　is　contingent　is　not　justified　by　experience；　it　is
the　assertion　of　a　reason　employing　its　principles　in　a　speculative
manner。　If；　again；　I　infer　from　the　form　of　the　universe；　from　the　way
in　which　all　things　are　connected　and　act　and　react　upon　each　other；
the　existence　of　a　cause　entirely　distinct　from　the　universe…　this
would　again　be　a　judgement　of　purely　speculative　reason；　because　the
object　in　this　case…　the　cause…　can　never　be　an　object　of　possible
experience。　In　both　these　cases　the　principle　of　causality；　which　is
valid　only　in　the　field　of　experience…　useless　and　even　meaningless
beyond　this　region；　would　be　diverted　from　its　proper　destination。
　　Now　I　maintain　that　all　attempts　of　reason　to　establish　a　theology
by　the　aid　of　speculation　alone　are　fruitless；　that　the　principles
of　r