the+critique+of+pure+reason_纯粹理性批判-第102部分

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unconditioned　necessity　of　some　being　its　unlimited　reality。　The　track
it　pursues；　whether　rational　or　sophistical；　is　at　least　natural；
and　not　only　goes　far　to　persuade　the　mon　understanding；　but
shows　itself　deserving　of　respect　from　the　speculative　intellect；
while　it　contains；　at　the　same　time；　the　outlines　of　all　the　arguments
employed　in　natural　theology…　arguments　which　always　have　been；　and
still　will　be；　in　use　and　authority。　These；　however　adorned；　and　hid
under　whatever　embellishments　of　rhetoric　and　sentiment；　are　at　bottom
identical　with　the　arguments　we　are　at　present　to　discuss。　This　proof；
termed　by　Leibnitz　the　argumentum　a　contingentia　mundi；　I　shall　now
lay　before　the　reader；　and　subject　to　a　strict　examination。
　　It　is　framed　in　the　following　manner：　If　something　exists；　an
absolutely　necessary　being　must　likewise　exist。　Now　I；　at　least；
exist。　Consequently；　there　exists　an　absolutely　necessary　being。　The
minor　contains　an　experience；　the　major　reasons　from　a　general
experience　to　the　existence　of　a　necessary　being。*　Thus　this
argument　really　begins　at　experience；　and　is　not　pletely　a
priori；　or　ontological。　The　object　of　all　possible　experience　being
the　world；　it　is　called　the　cosmological　proof。　It　contains　no
reference　to　any　peculiar　property　of　sensuous　objects；　by　which
this　world　of　sense　might　be　distinguished　from　other　possible　worlds；
and　in　this　respect　it　differs　from　the　physico…theological　proof；
which　is　based　upon　the　consideration　of　the　peculiar　constitution
of　our　sensuous　world。

　　*This　inference　is　too　well　known　to　require　more　detailed
discussion。　It　is　based　upon　the　spurious　transcendental　law　of
causality；　that　everything　which　is　contingent　has　a　cause；　which；
if　itself　contingent；　must　also　have　a　cause；　and　so　on；　till　the
series　of　subordinated　causes　must　end　with　an　absolutely　necessary
cause；　without　which　it　would　not　possess　pleteness。

　　The　proof　proceeds　thus：　A　necessary　being　can　be　determined　only　in
one　way；　that　is；　it　can　be　determined　by　only　one　of　all　possible
opposed　predicates；　consequently；　it　must　be　pletely　determined
in　and　by　its　conception。　But　there　is　only　a　single　conception　of　a
thing　possible；　which　pletely　determines　the　thing　a　priori：　that
is；　the　conception　of　the　ens　realissimum。　It　follows　that　the
conception　of　the　ens　realissimum　is　the　only　conception　by　and　in
which　we　can　cogitate　a　necessary　being。　Consequently；　a　Supreme　Being
necessarily　exists。
　　In　this　cosmological　argument　are　assembled　so　many　sophistical
propositions　that　speculative　reason　seems　to　have　exerted　in　it　all
her　dialectical　skill　to　produce　a　transcendental　illusion　of　the　most
extreme　character。　We　shall　postpone　an　investigation　of　this　argument
for　the　present；　and　confine　ourselves　to　exposing　the　stratagem　by
which　it　imposes　upon　us　an　old　argument　in　a　new　dress；　and　appeals
to　the　agreement　of　two　witnesses；　the　one　with　the　credentials　of
pure　reason；　and　the　other　with　those　of　empiricism；　while；　in　fact；
it　is　only　the　former　who　has　changed　his　dress　and　voice；　for　the
purpose　of　passing　himself　off　for　an　additional　witness。　That　it
may　possess　a　secure　foundation；　it　bases　its　conclusions　upon
experience；　and　thus　appears　to　be　pletely　distinct　from　the
ontological　argument；　which　places　its　confidence　entirely　in　pure　a
priori　conceptions。　But　this　experience　merely　aids　reason　in　making
one　step…　to　the　existence　of　a　necessary　being。　What　the　properties
of　this　being　are　cannot　be　learned　from　experience；　and　therefore
reason　abandons　it　altogether；　and　pursues　its　inquiries　in　the　sphere
of　pure　conception；　for　the　purpose　of　discovering　what　the　properties
of　an　absolutely　necessary　being　ought　to　be；　that　is；　what　among
all　possible　things　contain　the　conditions　（requisita）　of　absolute
necessity。　Reason　believes　that　it　has　discovered　these　requisites
in　the　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum…　and　in　it　alone；　and　hence
concludes：　The　ens　realissimum　is　an　absolutely　necessary　being。　But
it　is　evident　that　reason　has　here　presupposed　that　the　conception
of　an　ens　realissimum　is　perfectly　adequate　to　the　conception　of　a
being　of　absolute　necessity；　that　is；　that　we　may　infer　the
existence　of　the　latter　from　that　of　the　former…　a　proposition　which
formed　the　basis　of　the　ontological　argument；　and　which　is　now
employed　in　the　support　of　the　cosmological　argument；　contrary　to
the　wish　and　professions　of　its　inventors。　For　the　existence　of　an
absolutely　necessary　being　is　given　in　conceptions　alone。　But　if　I
say：　〃The　conception　of　the　ens　realissimum　is　a　conception　of　this
kind；　and　in　fact　the　only　conception　which　is　adequate　to　our　idea　of
a　necessary　being；〃　I　am　obliged　to　admit；　that　the　latter　may　be
inferred　from　the　former。　Thus　it　is　properly　the　ontological　argument
which　figures　in　the　cosmological；　and　constitutes　the　whole
strength　of　the　latter；　while　the　spurious　basis　of　experience　has
been　of　no　further　use　than　to　conduct　us　to　the　conception　of
absolute　necessity；　being　utterly　insufficient　to　demonstrate　the
presence　of　this　attribute　in　any　determinate　existence　or　thing。
For　when　we　propose　to　ourselves　an　aim　of　this　character；　we　must
abandon　the　sphere　of　experience；　and　rise　to　that　of　pure
conceptions；　which　we　examine　with　the　purpose　of　discovering
whether　any　one　contains　the　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　an
absolutely　necessary　being。　But　if　the　possibility　of　such　a　being
is　thus　demonstrated；　its　existence　is　also　proved；　for　we　may　then
assert　that；　of　all　possible　beings　there　is　one　which　possesses　the
attribute　of　necessity…　in　other　words；　this　being　possesses　an
absolutely　necessary　existence。
　　All　illusions　in　an　argument　are　more　easily　detected　when　they
are　presented　in　the　formal　manner　employed　by　the　schools；　which　we
now　proceed　to　do。
　　If　the　proposition：　〃Every　absolutely　necessary　being　is　likewise　an
ens　realissimum；〃　is　correct　（and　it　is　this　which　constitutes　the
nervus　probandi　of　the　cosmological　argument）；　it　must；　like　all
affirmative　judgements；　be　capable　of　conversion…　the　conversio　per
accidens；　at　least。　It　follows；　then；　that　some　entia　realissima　are
absolutely　necessary　beings。　But　no　ens　realissimum　is　in　any
respect　different　from　another；　and　what　is　valid　of　some　is　valid
of　all。　In　this　present　case；　therefore；　I　may　employ　simple
conversion；　and　say：　〃Every　ens　realissimum　is　a　necessary　being。〃　But
as　this　proposition　is　determined　a　priori　by　the　conceptions
contained　in　it；　the　mere　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum　must
possess　the　additional　attribute　of　absolute　necessity。　But　this　is
exactly　what　was　maintained　in　the　ontological　argument；　and　not
recognized　by　the　cosmological；　although　it　formed　the　real　ground
of　its　disguised　and　illusory　reasoning。
　　Thus　the　second　mode　employed　by　speculative　reason　of　demonstrating
the　existence　of　a　Supreme　Being；　is　not　only；　like　the　first；
illusory　and　inadequate；　but　possesses　the　additional　blemish　of　an
ignoratio　elenchi…　professing　to　conduct　us　by　a　new　road　to　the
desired　goal；　but　bringing　us　back；　after　a　short　circuit；　to　the
old　path　which　we　had　deserted　at　its　call。
　　I　mentioned　above　that　this　cosmological　argument　contains　a　perfect
nest　of　dialectical　assumptions；　which　transcendental　criticism　does
not　find　it　difficult　to　expose　and　to　dissipate。　I　shall　merely
enumerate　these；　leaving　it　to　the　reader；　who　must　by　this　time　be
well　practised　in　such　matters；　to　investigate　the　fallacies
residing　therein。
　　The　following　fallacies；　for　example；　are　discoverable　in　this
mode　of　proof：　1。　The　transcendental　principle：　〃Everything　that　is
contingent　must　have　a　cause〃…　a　principle　without　significance；
except　in　the　sensuous　world。　For　the　purely　intellectual　conception
of　the　contingent　cannot　produce　any　synthetical　proposition；　like
that　of　causality；　which　is　itself　without　significance　or
distinguishing　characteristic　except　in　the　phenomenal　world。　But　in
the　present　case　it　is　employed　to　help　us　beyond　the　limits　of　its
sphere。　2。　〃From　the　impossibility　of　an　infinite　ascending　series
of　causes　in　the　world　of　sense　a　first　cause　is　inferred〃；　a
conclusion　which　the　principles　of　the　employment　of　reason　do　not
justify　even　in　the　sphere　of　experience；　and　still　less　when　an
attempt　is　made　to　pass　the　limits　of　this　sphere。　3。　Reason　allows
itself　to　be　satisfied　upon　insufficient　grounds；　with　regard　to　the
pletion　of　this　series。　It　removes　all　conditions　（without　which；
however；　no　conception　of　Necessity　can　take　place）；　and；　as　after
this　it　is　beyond　our　power　to　form　any　other　conceptions；　it
accepts　this　as　a　pletion　of　the　conception　it　wishes　to　form　of
the　series。　4。　The　logical　possibility　of　a　conception　of　the　total　of
reality　（the　criterion　of　this　possibility　being　the　absence　of
contradiction）　is　confound。　ed　with　the　transcendental；　which　requires
a　principle　of　the　practicability　of　such　a　synthesis…　a　principle
which　again　refers　us　to　the　world　of　experience。　And　so　on。
　　The　aim　of　the　cosmological　argument　is　to　avoid　the　necessity　of
proving