笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第14部分

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　　　　　Many　other　matters　respecting　the　attributes　of　God　and
my　own　nature　or　mind　remain　for　consideration；　but　I　shall
possibly　on　another　occasion　resume　the　investigation　of
these。　　Now　（after　first　noting　what　must　be　done　or　avoided；
in　order　to　arrive　at　a　knowledge　of　the　truth）　my　principal
task　is　to　endeavour　to　emerge　from　the　state　of　doubt　into
which　I　have　these　last　days　fallen；　and　to　see　whether
nothing　certain　can　be　known　regarding　material　things。
　　　　　But　before　examining　whether　any　such　objects　as　I
conceive　exist　outside　of　me；　I　must　consider　the　ideas　of
them　in　so　far　as　they　are　in　my　thought；　and　see　which　of
them　are　distinct　and　which　confused。
　　　　　In　the　first　place；　I　am　able　distinctly　to　imagine　that
quantity　which　philosophers　monly　call　continuous；　or　the
extension　in　length；　breadth；　or　depth；　that　is　in　this
quantity；　or　rather　in　the　object　to　which　it　is　attributed。
Further；　I　can　number　in　it　many　different　parts；　and
attribute　to　each　of　its　parts　many　sorts　of　size；　figure；
situation　and　local　movement；　and；　finally；　I　can　assign　to
each　of　these　movements　all　degrees　of　duration。
　　　　　And　not　only　do　I　know　these　things　with　distinctness
when　I　consider　them　in　general；　but；　likewise　＇however　little
I　apply　my　attention　to　the　matter＇；　I　discover　an　infinitude
of　particulars　respecting　numbers；　figures；　movements；　and
other　such　things；　whose　truth　is　so　manifest；　and　so　well
accords　with　my　nature；　that　when　I　begin　to　discover　them；　it
seems　to　me　that　I　learn　nothing　new；　or　recollect　what　I
formerly　knew￥that　is　to　say；　that　I　for　the　first　time
perceive　things　which　were　already　present　to　my　mind；
although　I　had　not　as　yet　applied　my　mind　to　them。
　　　　　And　what　I　here　find　to　be　most　important　is　that　I
discover　in　myself　an　infinitude　of　ideas　of　certain　things
which　cannot　be　esteemed　as　pure　negations；　although　they　may
possibly　have　no　existence　outside　of　my　thought；　and　which
are　not　framed　by　me；　although　it　is　within　my　power　either　to
think　or　not　to　think　them；　but　which　possess　natures　which
are　true　and　immutable。　　For　example；　when　I　imagine　a
triangle；　although　there　may　nowhere　in　the　world　be　such　a
figure　outside　my　thought；　or　ever　have　been；　there　is
nevertheless　in　this　figure　a　certain　determinate　nature；
form；　or　essence；　which　is　immutable　and　eternal；　which　I　have
not　invented；　and　which　in　no　wise　depends　on　my　mind；　as
appears　from　the　fact　that　diverse　properties　of　that　triangle
can　be　demonstrated；　viz。　that　its　three　angles　are　equal　to
two　right　angles；　that　the　greatest　side　is　subtended　by　the
greatest　angle；　and　the　like；　which　now；　whether　I　wish　it　or
do　not　wish　it；　I　recognise　very　clearly　as　pertaining　to　it；
although　I　never　thought　of　the　matter　at　all　when　I　imagined
a　triangle　for　the　first　time；　and　which　therefore　cannot　be
said　to　have　been　invented　by　me。
　　　　　Nor　does　the　objection　hold　good　that　possibly　this　idea
of　a　triangle　has　reached　my　mind　through　the　medium　of　my
senses；　since　I　have　sometimes　seen　bodies　triangular　in
shape；　because　I　can　form　in　my　mind　an　infinitude　of　other
figures　regarding　which　we　cannot　have　the　least　conception　of
their　ever　having　been　objects　of　sense；　and　I　can
nevertheless　demonstrate　various　properties　pertaining　to
their　nature　as　well　as　to　that　of　the　triangle；　and　these
must　certainly　all　be　true　since　I　conceive　them　clearly。
Hence　they　are　something；　and　not　pure　negation；　for　it　is
perfectly　clear　that　all　that　is　true　is　something；　and　I　have
already　fully　demonstrated　that　all　that　I　know　clearly　is
true。　　And　even　although　I　had　not　demonstrated　this；　the
nature　of　my　mind　is　such　that　I　could　not　prevent　myself　from
holding　them　to　be　true　so　long　as　I　conceive　them　clearly；
and　I　recollect　that　even　when　I　was　still　strongly　attached
to　the　objects　of　sense；　I　counted　as　the　most　certain　those
truths　which　I　conceived　clearly　as　regards　figures；　numbers；
and　the　other　matters　which　pertain　to　arithmetic　and
geometry；　and；　in　general；　to　pure　and　abstract　mathematics。
　　　　　But　now；　if　just　because　I　can　draw　the　idea　of　something
from　my　thought；　it　follows　that　all　which　I　know　clearly　and
distinctly　as　pertaining　to　this　object　does　really　belong　to
it；　may　I　not　derive　from　this　an　argument　demonstrating　the
existence　of　God？　　It　is　certain　that　I　no　less　find　the　idea
of　God；　that　is　to　say；　the　idea　of　a　supremely　perfect　Being；
in　me；　than　that　of　any　figure　or　number　whatever　it　is；　and　I
do　not　know　any　less　clearly　and　distinctly　that　an　＇actual
and＇　eternal　existence　pertains　to　this　nature　than　I　know
that　all　that　which　I　am　able　to　demonstrate　of　some　figure　or
number　truly　pertains　to　the　nature　of　this　figure　or　number；
and　therefore；　although　all　that　I　concluded　in　the　preceding
Meditations　were　found　to　be　false；　the　existence　of　God　would
pass　with　me　as　at　least　as　certain　as　I　have　ever　held　the
truths　of　mathematics　（which　concern　only　numbers　and　figures）
to　be。
　　　　　This　indeed　is　not　at　first　manifest；　since　it　would　seem
to　present　some　appearance　of　being　a　sophism。　　For　being
accustomed　in　all　other　things　to　make　a　distinction　between
existence　and　essence；　I　easily　persuade　myself　that　the
existence　can　be　separated　from　the　essence　of　God；　and　that
we　can　thus　conceive　God　as　not　actually　existing。　　But；
nevertheless；　when　I　think　of　it　with　more　attention；　I
clearly　see　that　existence　can　no　more　be　separated　from　the
essence　of　God　than　can　its　having　its　three　angles　equal　to
two　right　angles　be　separated　from　the　essence　of　a
＇rectilinear＇　triangle；　or　the　idea　of　a　mountain　from　the
idea　of　a　valley；　and　so　there　is　not　any　less　repugnance　to
our　conceiving　a　God　（that　is；　a　Being　supremely　perfect）　to
whom　existence　is　lacking　（that　is　to　say；　to　whom　a　certain
perfection　is　lacking）；　than　to　conceive　of　a　mountain　which
has　no　valley。
　　　　　But　although　I　cannot　really　conceive　of　a　God　without
existence　any　more　than　a　mountain　without　a　valley；　still
from　the　fact　that　I　conceive　of　a　mountain　with　a　valley；　it
does　not　follow　that　there　is　such　a　mountain　in　the　world；
similarly　although　I　conceive　of　God　as　possessing　existence；
it　would　seem　that　it　does　not　follow　that　there　is　a　God
which　exists；　for　my　thought　does　not　impose　any　necessity
upon　things；　and　just　as　I　may　imagine　a　winged　horse；
although　no　horse　with　wings　exists；　so　I　could　perhaps
attribute　existence　to　God；　although　no　God　existed。
　　　　　But　a　sophism　is　concealed　in　this　objection；　for　from
the　fact　that　I　cannot　conceive　a　mountain　without　a　valley；
it　does　not　follow　that　there　is　any　mountain　or　any　valley　in
existence；　but　only　that　the　mountain　and　the　valley；　whether
they　exist　or　do　not　exist；　cannot　in　any　way　be　separated　one
from　the　other。　　While　from　the　fact　that　I　cannot　conceive
God　without　existence；　it　follows　that　existence　is
inseparable　from　Him；　and　hence　that　He　really　exists；　not
that　my　thought　can　bring　this　to　pass；　or　impose　any
necessity　on　things；　but；　on　the　contrary；　because　the
necessity　which　lies　in　the　thing　itself；　i。e。　the　necessity
of　the　existence　of　God　determines　me　to　think　in　this　way。
For　it　is　not　within　my　power　to　think　of　God　without
existence　（that　is　of　a　supremely　perfect　Being　devoid　of　a
supreme　perfection）　though　it　is　in　my　power　to　imagine　a
horse　either　with　wings　or　without　wings。
　　　　　And　we　must　not　here　object　that　it　is　in　truth　necessary
for　me　to　assert　that　God　exists　after　having　presupposed　that
He　possesses　every　sort　of　perfection；　since　existence　is　one
of　these；　but　that　as　a　matter　of　fact　my　original　supposition
was　not　necessary；　just　as　it　is　not　necessary　to　consider
that　all　quadrilateral　figures　can　be　inscribed　in　the　circle；
for　supposing　I　thought　this；　I　should　be　constrained　to　admit
that　the　rhombus　might　be　inscribed　in　the　circle　since　it　is
a　quadrilateral　figure；　which；　however；　is　manifestly　false。
＇We　must　not；　I　say；　make　any　such　allegations　because＇
although　it　is　not　necessary　that　I　should　at　any　time
entertain　the　notion　of　God；　nevertheless　whenever　it　happens
that　I　think　of　a　first　and　a　sovereign　Being；　and；　so　to
speak；　derive　the　idea　of　Him　from　the　storehouse　of　my　mind；
it　is　necessary　that　I　should　attribute　to　Him　every　sort　of
perfection；　although　I　do　not　get　so　far　as　to　enumerate　them
all；　or　to　apply　my　mind　to　each　one　in　particular。　　And　this
necessity　suffices　to　make　me　conclude　（after　having
recognised　that　existence　is　a　perfection）　that　this　first　and
sovereign　Being　really　exists；　just　as　though　it　is　not
necessary　for　me　ever　to　imagine　any　triangle；　yet；　whenever　I
wish　to　consider　a　rectilinear　figure　posed　only　of　three
angles；　it　is　absolutely　essential　that　I　should　attribute　to
it　all　those　properties　which　serve　to　bring　about　the
conclusion　that　its　three　angles　are　not　greater　than　two
right　angles；　even　although　I　may　not　then　be　considering　this
point　in　particular。　　But　when　I　consider　which　figures　are
capable　of　being　inscribed　in　the　circle；　it　is　in　no　wise
necessary　that　I　should　thin