笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第11部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


in　existence　now；　unless　some　cause　at　this　instant；　so　to
speak；　produces　me　anew；　that　is　to　say；　conserves　me。　　It　is
as　a　matter　of　fact　perfectly　clear　and　evident　to　all　those
who　consider　with　attention　the　nature　of　time；　that；　in　order
to　be　conserved　in　each　moment　in　which　it　endures；　a
substance　has　need　of　the　same　power　and　action　as　would　be
necessary　to　produce　and　create　it　anew；　supposing　it　did　not
yet　exist；　so　that　the　light　of　nature　shows　us　clearly　that
the　distinction　between　creation　and　conservation　is　solely　a
distinction　of　the　reason。
　　　　　All　that　I　thus　require　here　is　that　I　should　interrogate
myself；　if　I　wish　to　know　whether　I　possess　a　power　which　is
capable　of　bringing　it　to　pass　that　I　who　now　am　shall　still
be　in　the　future；　for　since　I　am　nothing　but　a　thinking　thing；
or　at　least　since　thus　far　it　is　only　this　portion　of　myself
which　is　precisely　in　question　at　present；　if　such　a　power　did
reside　in　me；　I　should　certainly　be　conscious　of　it。　　But　I　am
conscious　of　nothing　of　the　kind；　and　by　this　I　know　clearly
that　I　depend　on　some　being　different　from　myself。
　　　　　Possibly；　however；　this　being　on　which　I　depend　is　not
that　which　I　call　God；　and　I　am　created　either　by　my　parents
or　by　some　other　cause　less　perfect　than　God。　　This　cannot　be；
because；　as　I　have　just　said；　it　is　perfectly　evident　that
there　must　be　at　least　as　much　reality　in　the　cause　as　in　the
effect；　and　thus　since　I　am　a　thinking　thing；　and　possess　an
idea　of　God　within　me；　whatever　in　the　end　be　the　cause
assigned　to　my　existence；　it　must　be　allowed　that　it　is
likewise　a　thinking　thing　and　that　it　possesses　in　itself　the
idea　of　all　the　perfections　which　I　attribute　to　God。　　We　may
again　inquire　whether　this　cause　derives　its　origin　from
itself　or　from　some　other　thing。　　For　if　from　itself；　it
follows　by　the　reasons　before　brought　forward；　that　this　cause
must　itself　be　God；　for　since　it　possesses　the　virtue　of　self…
existence；　it　must　also　without　doubt　have　the　power　of
actually　possessing　all　the　perfections　of　which　it　has　the
idea；　that　is；　all　those　which　I　conceive　as　existing　in　God。
But　if　it　derives　its　existence　from　some　other　cause　than
itself；　we　shall　again　ask；　for　the　same　reason；　whether　this
second　cause　exists　by　itself　or　through　another；　until　from
one　step　to　another；　we　finally　arrive　at　an　ultimate　cause；
which　will　be　God。
　　　　　And　it　is　perfectly　manifest　that　in　this　there　can　be　no
regression　into　infinity；　since　what　is　in　question　is　not　so
much　the　cause　which　formerly　created　me；　as　that　which
conserves　me　at　the　present　time。
　　　　　Nor　can　we　suppose　that　several　causes　may　have　concurred
in　my　production；　and　that　from　one　I　have　received　the　idea
of　one　of　the　perfections　which　I　attribute　to　God；　and　from
another　the　idea　of　some　other；　so　that　all　these　perfections
indeed　exist　somewhere　in　the　universe；　but　not　as　plete　in
one　unity　which　is　God。　　On　the　contrary；　the　unity；　the
simplicity　or　the　inseparability　of　all　things　which　are　in
god　is　one　of　the　principal　perfections　which　I　conceive　to　be
in　Him。　　And　certainly　the　idea　of　this　unity　of　all　Divine
perfections　cannot　have　been　placed　in　me　by　any　cause　from
which　I　have　not　likewise　received　the　ideas　of　all　the　other
perfections；　for　this　cause　could　not　make　me　able　to
prehend　them　as　joined　together　in　an　inseparable　unity
without　having　at　the　same　time　caused　me　in　some　measure　to
know　what　they　are　＇and　in　some　way　to　recognise　each　one　of
them＇。
　　　　　Finally；　so　far　as　my　parents　＇from　whom　it　appears　I
have　sprung＇　are　concerned；　although　all　that　I　have　ever　been
able　to　believe　of　them　were　true；　that　does　not　make　it
follow　that　it　is　they　who　conserve　me；　nor　are　they　even　the
authors　of　my　being　in　any　sense；　in　so　far　as　I　am　a　thinking
being；　since　what　they　did　was　merely　to　implant　certain
dispositions　in　that　matter　in　which　the　self￥i。e。　the　mind；
which　alone　I　at　present　identify　with　myself￥is　by　me　deemed
to　exist。　　And　thus　there　can　be　no　difficulty　in　their
regard；　but　we　must　of　necessity　conclude　from　the　fact　alone
that　I　exist；　or　that　the　idea　of　a　Being　supremely
perfect￥that　is　of　God￥is　in　me；　that　the　proof　of　God's
existence　is　grounded　on　the　highest　evidence。
　　　　　It　only　remains　to　me　to　examine　into　the　manner　in　which
I　have　acquired　this　idea　from　God；　for　I　have　not　received　it
through　the　senses；　and　it　is　never　presented　to　me
unexpectedly；　as　is　usual　with　the　ideas　of　sensible　things
when　these　things　present　themselves；　or　seem　to　present
themselves；　to　the　external　organs　of　my　senses；　nor　is　it
likewise　a　fiction　of　my　mind；　for　it　is　not　in　my　power　to
take　from　or　to　add　anything　to　it；　and　consequently　the　only
alternative　is　that　it　is　innate　in　me；　just　as　the　idea　of
myself　is　innate　in　me。
　　　　　And　one　certainly　ought　not　to　find　it　strange　that　God；
in　creating　me；　placed　this　idea　within　me　to　be　like　the　mark
of　the　workman　imprinted　on　his　work；　and　it　is　likewise　not
essential　that　the　mark　shall　be　something　different　from　the
work　itself。　　For　from　the　sole　fact　that　God　created　me　it　is
most　probable　that　in　some　way　he　has　placed　his　image　and
similitude　upon　me；　and　that　I　perceive　this　similitude　（in
which　the　idea　of　God　is　contained）　by　means　of　the　same
faculty　by　which　I　perceive　myself￥that　is　to　say；　when　I
reflect　on　myself　I　not　only　know　that　I　am　something
＇imperfect＇；　inplete　and　dependent　on　another；　which
incessantly　aspires　after　something　which　is　better　and
greater　than　myself；　but　I　also　know　that　He　on　whom　I　depend
possesses　in　Himself　all　the　great　things　towards　which　I
aspire　＇and　the　ideas　of　which　I　find　within　myself＇；　and　that
not　indefinitely　or　potentially　alone；　but　really；　actually
and　infinitely；　and　that　thus　He　is　God。　　And　the　whole
strength　of　the　argument　which　I　have　here　made　use　of　to
prove　the　existence　of　God　consists　in　this；　that　I　recognise
that　it　is　not　possible　that　my　nature　should　be　what　it　is；
and　indeed　that　I　should　have　in　myself　the　idea　of　a　God；　if
God　did　not　veritably　exist￥a　God；　I　say；　whose　idea　is　in　me；
i。e。　who　possesses　all　those　supreme　perfections　of　which　our
mind　may　indeed　have　some　idea　but　without　understanding　them
all；　who　is　liable　to　no　errors　or　defect　＇and　who　has　none　of
all　those　marks　which　denote　imperfection＇。　　From　this　it　is
manifest　that　He　cannot　be　a　deceiver；　since　the　light　of
nature　teaches　us　that　fraud　and　deception　necessarily　proceed
from　some　defect。
　　　　　But　before　I　examine　this　matter　with　more　care；　and　pass
on　to　the　consideration　of　other　truths　which　may　be　derived
from　it；　it　seems　to　me　right　to　pause　for　a　while　in　order　to
contemplate　God　Himself；　to　ponder　at　leisure　His　marvellous
attributes；　to　consider；　and　admire；　and　adore；　the　beauty　of
this　light　so　resplendent；　at　least　as　far　as　the　strength　of
my　mind；　which　is　in　some　measure　dazzled　by　the　sight；　will
allow　me　to　do　so。　　For　just　as　faith　teaches　us　that　the
supreme　felicity　of　the　other　life　consists　only　in　this
contemplation　of　the　Divine　Majesty；　so　we　continue　to　learn
by　experience　that　a　similar　meditation；　though　inparably
less　perfect；　causes　us　to　enjoy　the　greatest　satisfaction　of
which　we　are　capable　in　this　life。
　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　IV。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　True　and　the　False。
　　　　　
　　　　　I　have　been　well　accustomed　these　past　days　to　detach　my
mind　from　my　senses；　and　I　have　accurately　observed　that　there
are　very　few　things　that　one　knows　with　certainty　respecting
corporeal　objects；　that　there　are　many　more　which　are　known　to
us　respecting　the　human　mind；　and　yet　more　still　regarding　God
Himself；　so　that　I　shall　now　without　any　difficulty　abstract
my　thoughts　from　the　consideration　of　＇sensible　or＇　imaginable
objects；　and　carry　them　to　those　which；　being　withdrawn　from
all　contact　with　matter；　are　purely　intelligible。　　And
certainly　the　idea　which　I　possess　of　the　human　mind　inasmuch
as　it　is　a　thinking　thing；　and　not　extended　in　length；　width
and　depth；　nor　participating　in　anything　pertaining　to　body；
is　inparably　more　distinct　than　is　the　idea　of　any
corporeal　thing。　　And　when　I　consider　that　I　doubt；　that　is　to
say；　that　I　am　an　inplete　and　dependent　being；　the　idea　of
a　being　that　is　plete　and　independent；　that　is　of　God；
presents　itself　to　my　mind　with　so　much　distinctness　and
clearness￥and　from　the　fact　alone　that　this　idea　is　found　in
me；　or　that　I　who　possess　this　idea　exist；　I　conclude　so
certainly　that　God　exists；　and　that　my　existence　depends
entirely　on　Him　in　every　moment　of　my　life￥that　I　do　not　think
that　the　human　mind　is　capable　of　knowing　anything　with　more
evidence　and　certitude。　　And　it　seems　to　me　that　I　now　have
before　me　a　road　which　will　lead　us　from　the　contemplation　of
the　true　God　（in　whom　all　the　treasures　of　science　and　wisdom
are　contained）　to　the　knowledge　of　the　other　objects　of　the
universe。
　　　　　For；　first　of　all；　I　recognise　it　to　be　impossible　that
He　should　ever　deceive　me；　for　in　all　fraud　and　deception　some
imperfection　is