孙子兵法(中英文对照版)-第3部分
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者，勢也。
V。 ENERGY
1。 Sun Tzu said： The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men： it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers。
2。 Fighting with a large army under your mand is nowise different from fighting with a small one： it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals。
3。 To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken this is affected by maneuvers direct and indirect。
4。 That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg。 This is effected by the science of weak points and strong。
5。 In all fighting； the direct method may be used for joining battle； but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory。
6。 Indirect tactics； efficiently applied； are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth； unending as the flow of rivers and streams； like the sun and moon； they end but to begin anew； like the four seasons； they pass away to return once more。
7。 There are not more than five musical notes； yet the binations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard。
8。 There are not more than five primary colors （blue； yellow； red； white； and black）； yet in bination they produce more hues than can ever been seen。
9。 There are not more than five cardinal tastes （sour； acrid； salt； sweet； bitter）； yet binations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted。
10。 In battle； there are not more than two methods of attack； the direct and the indirect； yet these two in bination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers。
11。 The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn。 It is like moving in a circle。 You never e to an end。 Who can exhaust the possibilities of their bination？
12。 The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course。
13。 The quality of decision is like the well…timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim。
14。 Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset； and prompt in his decision。
15。 Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow； decision； to the releasing of a trigger。
16。 Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle； there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all； amid confusion and chaos； your array may be without head or tail； yet it will be proof against defeat。
17。 Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline； simulated fear postulates courage； simulated weakness postulates strength。
18。 Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision； concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy； masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions。
19。 Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances； according to which the enemy will act。 He sacrifices something that the enemy may snatch at it。
20。 By holding out baits； he keeps him on the march； then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him。
21。 The clever batant looks to the effect of bined energy； and does not require too much from individuals。 Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize bined energy。
22。 When he utilizes bined energy； his fighting men bee as it were like unto rolling logs or stones。 For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground； and to move when on a slope； if four…cornered； to e to a standstill； but if round…shaped； to go rolling down。
23。 Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height。 So much on the subject of energy。
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06《孫子兵法》虛實篇第六
孫子曰：凡先處戰地而待敵者佚，後處戰地而趨戰者勞。故善戰者，致人而不致于人。
能使敵自至者，利之也﹔能使敵不得至者，害之也。故敵佚能勞之，飽能铮材軇又�
出其所不趨，趨其所不意。行千里而不勞者，行于無人之地也。攻而必取者，攻其所不守也。守而必固者，守其所不攻也。
故善攻者，敵不知其所守。善守者，敵不知其所攻。
微乎微乎，至于無形，神乎神乎，至于無聲，故能為敵之司命。
進而不可御者，沖其虛也﹔退而不可追者，速而不可及也。故我欲戰，敵雖高壘深溝，不得不與我戰者，攻其所必救也﹔我不欲戰，雖畫地而守之，敵不得與我戰者，乖其所之也。
故形人而我無形，則我專而敵分﹔我專為一，敵分為十，是以十攻其一也，則我眾而敵寡﹔能以眾擊寡者，則吾之所與戰者，約矣。吾所與戰之地不可知，不可知，則敵所備者多，敵所備者多，則吾之所戰者，寡矣。
故備前則後寡，備後則前寡，故備左則右寡，備右則左寡，無所不備，則無所不寡。寡者備人者也，眾者使人備己者也。
故知戰之地，知戰之日，則可千里而會戰。不知戰之地，不知戰之日，則左不能救右，右不能救左，前不能救後，後不能救前，而況遠者數十里，近者數里乎？
以吾度之，越人之兵雖多，亦奚益于勝敗哉？！
故曰：勝可為也。敵雖眾，可使無鬥。
故策之而知得失之計，作之而知動靜之理，形之而知死生之地，角之而知有餘不足之處。
故形兵之極，至于無形﹔無形，則深間不能窺，智者不能帧�
因形而錯勝于眾，眾不能知﹔人皆知我所以勝之形，而莫知吾所以制勝之形。故其戰勝不復，而應形于無窮。
夫兵形象水，水之形避高而趨下，兵之形，避實而擊虛，水因地而制流，兵應敵而制勝。故兵無常勢，水無常形，能因敵變化而取勝者，謂之神。
故五行無常勝，四時無常位，日有短長，月有死生。
VI。 WEAK POINTS AND STRONG
1。 Sun Tzu said： Whoever is first in the field and awaits the ing of the enemy； will be fresh for the fight； whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted。
2。 Therefore the clever batant imposes his will on the enemy； but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him。
3。 By holding out advantages to him； he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord； or； by inflicting damage； he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near。
4。 If the enemy is taking his ease； he can harass him； if well supplied with food； he can starve him out； if quietly encamped； he can force him to move。
5。 Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend； march swiftly to places where you are not expected。
6。 An army may march great distances without distress； if it marches through country where the enemy is not。
7。 You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended。 You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked。
8。 Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend； and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack。
9。 O divine art of subtlety and secrecy！ Through you we learn to be invisible； through you inaudible； and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands。
10。 You may advance and be absolutely irresistible； if you make for the enemy's weak points； you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy。
11。 If we wish to fight； the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch。 All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve。
12。 If we do not wish to fight； we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground。 All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way。
13。 By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves； we can keep our forces concentrated； while the enemy's must be divided。
14。 We can form a single united body； while the enemy must split up into fractions。 Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole； which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few。
15。 And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one； our opponents will be in dire straits。
16。 The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known； for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points； and his forces being thus distributed in many directions； the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few。
17。 For should the enemy strengthen his van； he will weaken his rear； should he strengthen his rear； he will weaken his van； should he strengthen his left； he will weaken his right； should he strengthen his right； he will weaken his left。 If he sends reinforcements everywhere； he will everywhere be weak。
18。 Numerical weakness es from having to prepare against possible attacks； numerical strength； from pelling our adversary to make these preparations against us。
19。 Knowing the place and the time of the ing battle； we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight。
20。 But if neither time nor place be known； then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right； the right equally impotent to succor the left； the van unable to relieve the rear； or the rear to support the van。 How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart； and even the nearest are separated by several LI！
21。 Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number； that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory。 I say then that victory can be a
