the+critique+of+practical+reason-第8部分

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principle　of　morality；　just　on　account　of　the　universality　of　the
legislation　which　makes　it　the　formal　supreme　determining　principle　of
the　will；　without　regard　to　any　subjective　differentes；　is　declared　by
the　reason　to　be　a　law　for　all　rational　beings；　in　so　far　as　they　have
a　will；　that　is；　a　power　to　determine　their　causality　by　the
conception　of　rules；　and；　therefore；　so　far　as　they　are　capable　of
acting　according　to　principles；　and　consequently　also　according　to
practical　a　priori　principles　（for　these　alone　have　the　necessity　that
reason　requires　in　a　principle）。　It　is；　therefore；　not　limited　to
men　only；　but　applies　to　all　finite　beings　that　possess　reason　and
will；　nay；　it　even　includes　the　Infinite　Being　as　the　supreme
intelligence。　In　the　former　case；　however；　the　law　has　the　form　of
an　imperative；　because　in　them；　as　rational　beings；　we　can　suppose　a
pure　will；　but　being　creatures　affected　with　wants　and　physical
motives；　not　a　holy　will；　that　is；　one　which　would　be　incapable　of　any
maxim　conflicting　with　the　moral　law。　In　their　case；　therefore；　the
moral　law　is　an　imperative；　which　mands　categorically；　because
the　law　is　unconditioned；　the　relation　of　such　a　will　to　this　law　is
dependence　under　the　name　of　obligation；　which　implies　a　constraint　to
an　action；　though　only　by　reason　and　its　objective　law；　and　this
action　is　called　duty；　because　an　elective　will；　subject　to
pathological　affections　（though　not　determined　by　them；　and；
therefore；　still　free）；　implies　a　wish　that　arises　from　subjective
causes　and；　therefore；　may　often　be　opposed　to　the　pure　objective
determining　principle；　whence　it　requires　the　moral　constraint　of　a
resistance　of　the　practical　reason；　which　may　be　called　an　internal；
but　intellectual；　pulsion。　In　the　supreme　intelligence　the　elective
will　is　rightly　conceived　as　incapable　of　any　maxim　which　could　not　at
the　same　time　be　objectively　a　law；　and　the　notion　of　holiness；
which　on　that　account　belongs　to　it；　places　it；　not　indeed　above　all
practical　laws；　but　above　all　practically　restrictive　laws；　and
consequently　above　obligation　and　duty。　This　holiness　of　will　is；
however；　a　practical　idea；　which　must　necessarily　serve　as　a　type　to
which　finite　rational　beings　can　only　approximate　indefinitely；　and
which　the　pure　moral　law；　which　is　itself　on　this　account　called　holy；
constantly　and　rightly　holds　before　their　eyes。　The　utmost　that　finite
practical　reason　can　effect　is　to　be　certain　of　this　indefinite
progress　of　one's　maxims　and　of　their　steady　disposition　to　advance。
This　is　virtue；　and　virtue；　at　least　as　a　naturally　acquired
faculty；　can　never　be　perfect；　because　assurance　in　such　a　case
never　bees　apodeictic　certainty　and；　when　it　only　amounts　to
persuasion；　is　very　dangerous。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　VIII。　THEOREM　IV。

　　The　autonomy　of　the　will　is　the　sole　principle　of　all　moral　laws　and
of　all　duties　which　conform　to　them；　on　the　other　hand；　heteronomy
of　the　elective　will　not　only　cannot　be　the　basis　of　any　obligation；
but　is；　on　the　contrary；　opposed　to　the　principle　thereof　and　to　the
morality　of　the　will。
　　In　fact　the　sole　principle　of　morality　consists　in　the
independence　on　all　matter　of　the　law　（namely；　a　desired　object）；
and　in　the　determination　of　the　elective　will　by　the　mere　universal
legislative　form　of　which　its　maxim　must　be　capable。　Now　this
independence　is　freedom　in　the　negative　sense；　and　this
self…legislation　of　the　pure；　and　therefore　practical；　reason　is
freedom　in　the　positive　sense。　Thus　the　moral　law　expresses　nothing
else　than　the　autonomy　of　the　pure　practical　reason；　that　is；　freedom；
and　this　is　itself　the　formal　condition　of　all　maxims；　and　on　this
condition　only　can　they　agree　with　the　supreme　practical　law。　If
therefore　the　matter　of　the　volition；　which　can　be　nothing　else　than
the　object　of　a　desire　that　is　connected　with　the　law；　enters　into　the
practical　law；　as　the　condition　of　its　possibility；　there　results
heteronomy　of　the　elective　will；　namely；　dependence　on　the　physical
law　that　we　should　follow　some　impulse　or　inclination。　In　that　case
the　will　does　not　give　itself　the　law；　but　only　the　precept　how
rationally　to　follow　pathological　law；　and　the　maxim　which；　in　such
a　case；　never　contains　the　universally　legislative　form；　not　only
produces　no　obligation；　but　is　itself　opposed　to　the　principle　of　a
pure　practical　reason　and；　therefore；　also　to　the　moral　disposition；
even　though　the　resulting　action　may　be　conformable　to　the　law。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　Hence　a　practical　precept；　which　contains　a　material　（and
therefore　empirical）　condition；　must　never　be　reckoned　a　practical
law。　For　the　law　of　the　pure　will；　which　is　free；　brings　the　will　into
a　sphere　quite　different　from　the　empirical；　and　as　the　necessity
involved　in　the　law　is　not　a　physical　necessity；　it　can　only　consist
in　the　formal　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　a　law　in　general。　All
the　matter　of　practical　rules　rests　on　subjective　conditions；　which
give　them　only　a　conditional　universality　（in　case　I　desire　this　or
that；　what　I　must　do　in　order　to　obtain　it）；　and　they　all　turn　on
the　principle　of　private　happiness。　Now；　it　is　indeed　undeniable
that　every　volition　must　have　an　object；　and　therefore　a　matter；　but
it　does　not　follow　that　this　is　the　determining　principle　and　the
condition　of　the　maxim；　for；　if　it　is　so；　then　this　cannot　be
exhibited　in　a　universally　legislative　form；　since　in　that　case　the
expectation　of　the　existence　of　the　object　would　be　the　determining
cause　of　the　choice；　and　the　volition　must　presuppose　the　dependence
of　the　faculty　of　desire　on　the　existence　of　something；　but　this
dependence　can　only　be　sought　in　empirical　conditions　and；
therefore；　can　never　furnish　a　foundation　for　a　necessary　and
universal　rule。　Thus；　the　happiness　of　others　may　be　the　object　of　the
will　of　a　rational　being。　But　if　it　were　the　determining　principle
of　the　maxim；　we　must　assume　that　we　find　not　only　a　rational
satisfaction　in　the　welfare　of　others；　but　also　a　want　such　as　the
sympathetic　disposition　in　some　men　occasions。　But　I　cannot　assume　the
existence　of　this　want　in　every　rational　being　（not　at　all　in　God）。
The　matter；　then；　of　the　maxim　may　remain；　but　it　must　not　be　the
condition　of　it；　else　the　maxim　could　not　be　fit　for　a　law。　Hence；　the
mere　form　of　law；　which　limits　the　matter；　must　also　be　a　reason　for
adding　this　matter　to　the　will；　not　for　presupposing　it。　For
example；　let　the　matter　be　my　own　happiness。　This　（rule）；　if　I
attribute　it　to　everyone　（as；　in　fact；　I　may；　in　the　case　of　every
finite　being）；　can　bee　an　objective　practical　law　only　if　I　include
the　happiness　of　others。　Therefore；　the　law　that　we　should　promote　the
happiness　of　others　does　not　arise　from　the　assumption　that　this　is　an
object　of　everyone's　choice；　but　merely　from　this；　that　the　form　of
universality　which　reason　requires　as　the　condition　of　giving　to　a
maxim　of　self…love　the　objective　validity　of　a　law　is　the　principle
that　determines　the　will。　Therefore　it　was　not　the　object　（the
happiness　of　others）　that　determined　the　pure　will；　but　it　was　the
form　of　law　only；　by　which　I　restricted　my　maxim；　founded　on
inclination；　so　as　to　give　it　the　universality　of　a　law；　and　thus　to
adapt　it　to　the　practical　reason；　and　it　is　this　restriction　alone；
and　not　the　addition　of　an　external　spring；　that　can　give　rise　to
the　notion　of　the　obligation　to　extend　the　maxim　of　my　self…love　to
the　happiness　of　others。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK　II。

　　The　direct　opposite　of　the　principle　of　morality　is；　when　the
principle　of　private　happiness　is　made　the　determining　principle　of
the　will；　and　with　this　is　to　be　reckoned；　as　I　have　shown　above；
everything　that　places　the　determining　principle　which　is　to　serve
as　a　law；　anywhere　but　in　the　legislative　form　of　the　maxim。　This
contradiction；　however；　is　not　merely　logical；　like　that　which　would
arise　between　rules　empirically　conditioned；　if　they　were　raised　to
the　rank　of　necessary　principles　of　cognition；　but　is　practical；　and
would　ruin　morality　altogether　were　not　the　voice　of　reason　in
reference　to　the　will　so　clear；　so　irrepressible；　so　distinctly
audible；　even　to　the　monest　men。　It　can　only；　indeed；　be　maintained
in　the　perplexing　speculations　of　the　schools；　which　are　bold　enough
to　shut　their　ears　against　that　heavenly　voice；　in　order　to　support
a　theory　that　costs　no　trouble。
　　Suppose　that　an　acquaintance　whom　you　otherwise　liked　were　to
attempt　to　justify　himself　to　you　for　having　borne　false　witness；
first　by　alleging　the；　in　his　view；　sacred　duty　of　consulting　his
own　happiness；　then　by　enumerating　the　advantages　which　he　had
gained　thereby；　pointing　out　the　prudence　he　had　shown　in　securing
himself　against　detection；　even　by　yourself；　to　whom　he　now　reveals
the　secret；　only　in　order　that　he　may　be　able　to　deny　it　at　any
time；　and　suppose　he　were　then　to　affirm；　in　all　seriousness；　that
he　has　fulfilled　a　true　human　duty；　you　would　either　laugh　in　his
face；　or　shrink　back　from　him　with　disgust；　and　yet；　if　a　man　has
regulated　his　principles　of　action　solely　with　a　view　to　his　own
advantage；　you　woul