the+critique+of+practical+reason-第6部分

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inclination）；　it　is　really　a　higher　desire　to　which　that　which　is
pathologically　determined　is　subordinate；　and　is　really；　and　even
specifically；　distinct　from　the　latter；　so　that　even　the　slightest
admixture　of　the　motives　of　the　latter　impairs　its　strength　and
superiority；　just　as　in　a　mathematical　demonstration　the　least
empirical　condition　would　degrade　and　destroy　its　force　and　value。
Reason；　with　its　practical　law；　determines　the　will　immediately；　not
by　means　of　an　intervening　feeling　of　pleasure　or　pain；　not　even　of
pleasure　in　the　law　itself；　and　it　is　only　because　it　can；　as　pure
reason；　be　practical；　that　it　is　possible　for　it　to　be　legislative。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK　II。

　　To　be　happy　is　necessarily　the　wish　of　every　finite　rational
being；　and　this；　therefore；　is　inevitably　a　determining　principle　of
its　faculty　of　desire。　For　we　are　not　in　possession　originally　of
satisfaction　with　our　whole　existence…　a　bliss　which　would　imply　a
consciousness　of　our　own　independent　self…sufficiency　this　is　a
problem　imposed　upon　us　by　our　own　finite　nature；　because　we　have
wants　and　these　wants　regard　the　matter　of　our　desires；　that　is；
something　that　is　relative　to　a　subjective　feeling　of　pleasure　or
pain；　which　determines　what　we　need　in　order　to　be　satisfied　with
our　condition。　But　just　because　this　material　principle　of
determination　can　only　be　empirically　known　by　the　subject；　it　is
impossible　to　regard　this　problem　as　a　law；　for　a　law　being
objective　must　contain　the　very　same　principle　of　determination　of　the
will　in　all　cases　and　for　all　rational　beings。　For；　although　the
notion　of　happiness　is　in　every　case　the　foundation　of　practical
relation　of　the　objects　to　the　desires；　yet　it　is　only　a　general
name　for　the　subjective　determining　principles；　and　determines　nothing
specifically；　whereas　this　is　what　alone　we　are　concerned　with　in　this
practical　problem；　which　cannot　be　solved　at　all　without　such　specific
determination。　For　it　is　every　man's　own　special　feeling　of　pleasure
and　pain　that　decides　in　what　he　is　to　place　his　happiness；　and　even
in　the　same　subject　this　will　vary　with　the　difference　of　his　wants
according　as　this　feeling　changes；　and　thus　a　law　which　is
subjectively　necessary　（as　a　law　of　nature）　is　objectively　a　very
contingent　practical　principle；　which　can　and　must　be　very　different
in　different　subjects　and　therefore　can　never　furnish　a　law；　since；　in
the　desire　for　happiness　it　is　not　the　form　（of　conformity　to　law）
that　is　decisive；　but　simply　the　matter；　namely；　whether　I　am　to
expect　pleasure　in　following　the　law；　and　how　much。　Principles　of
self…love　may；　indeed；　contain　universal　precepts　of　skill　（how　to
find　means　to　acplish　one's　purpose）；　but　in　that　case　they　are
merely　theoretical　principles；*　as；　for　example；　how　he　who　would　like
to　eat　bread　should　contrive　a　mill；　but　practical　precepts　founded　on
them　can　never　be　universal；　for　the　determining　principle　of　the
desire　is　based　on　the　feeling　pleasure　and　pain；　which　can　never　be
supposed　to　be　universally　directed　to　the　same　objects。

　　*Propositions　which　in　mathematics　or　physics　are　called　practical
ought　properly　to　be　called　technical。　For　they　For　they　have
nothing　to　do　with　the　determination　of　the　theoretical　they　only
point　out　how　the　certain　must　is　to　be　produced　and　are；　therefore；
just　as　theoretical　as　any　propositions　which　express　the　connection
of　a　cause　with　an　effect。　Now　whoever　chooses　the　effect　must　also
choose　the　cause。

　　Even　supposing；　however；　that　all　finite　rational　beings　were
thoroughly　agreed　as　to　what　were　the　objects　of　their　feelings　of
pleasure　and　pain；　and　also　as　to　the　means　which　they　must　employ
to　attain　the　one　and　avoid　the　other；　still；　they　could　by　no　means
set　up　the　principle　of　self…love　as　a　practical　law；　for　this
unanimity　itself　would　be　only　contingent。　The　principle　of
determination　would　still　be　only　subjectively　valid　and　merely
empirical；　and　would　not　possess　the　necessity　which　is　conceived　in
every　law；　namely；　an　objective　necessity　arising　from　a　priori
grounds；　unless；　indeed；　we　hold　this　necessity　to　be　not　at　all
practical；　but　merely　physical；　viz。；　that　our　action　is　as　inevitably
determined　by　our　inclination；　as　yawning　when　we　see　others　yawn。
It　would　be　better　to　maintain　that　there　are　no　practical　laws　at
all；　but　only　counsels　for　the　service　of　our　desires；　than　to　raise
merely　subjective　principles　to　the　rank　of　practical　laws；　which　have
objective　necessity；　and　not　merely　subjective；　and　which　must　be
known　by　reason　a　priori；　not　by　experience　（however　empirically
universal　this　may　be）。　Even　the　rules　of　corresponding　phenomena
are　only　called　laws　of　nature　（e。g。；　the　mechanical　laws）；　when　we
either　know　them　really　a　priori；　or　（as　in　the　case　of　chemical　laws）
suppose　that　they　would　be　known　a　priori　from　objective　grounds　if
our　insight　reached　further。　But　in　the　case　of　merely　subjective
practical　principles；　it　is　expressly　made　a　condition　that　they　rest；
not　on　objective；　but　on　subjective　conditions　of　choice；　and　hence
that　they　must　always　be　represented　as　mere　maxims；　never　as
practical　laws。　This　second　remark　seems　at　first　sight　to　be　mere
verbal　refinement；　but　it　defines　the　terms　of　the　most　important
distinction　which　can　e　into　consideration　in　practical
investigations。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IV。　THEOREM　II。

　　A　rational　being　cannot　regard　his　maxims　as　practical　universal
laws；　unless　he　conceives　them　as　principles　which　determine　the　will；
not　by　their　matter；　but　by　their　form　only。
　　By　the　matter　of　a　practical　principle　I　mean　the　object　of　the
will。　This　object　is　either　the　determining　ground　of　the　will　or　it
is　not。　In　the　former　case　the　rule　of　the　will　is　subjected　to　an
empirical　condition　（viz。；　the　relation　of　the　determining　idea　to　the
feeling　of　pleasure　and　pain）；　consequently　it　can　not　be　a
practical　law。　Now；　when　we　abstract　from　a　law　all　matter；　i。e。；
every　object　of　the　will　（as　a　determining　principle）；　nothing　is　left
but　the　mere　form　of　a　universal　legislation。　Therefore；　either　a
rational　being　cannot　conceive　his　subjective　practical　principles；
that　is；　his　maxims；　as　being　at　the　same　time　universal　laws；　or　he
must　suppose　that　their　mere　form；　by　which　they　are　fitted　for
universal　legislation；　is　alone　what　makes　them　practical　laws。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REMARK。

　　The　monest　understanding　can　distinguish　without　instruction　what
form　of　maxim　is　adapted　for　universal　legislation；　and　what　is　not。
Suppose；　for　example；　that　I　have　made　it　my　maxim　to　increase　my
fortune　by　every　safe　means。　Now；　I　have　a　deposit　in　my　hands；　the
owner　of　which　is　dead　and　has　left　no　writing　about　it。　This　is
just　the　case　for　my　maxim。　I　desire　then　to　know　whether　that　maxim
can　also　bold　good　as　a　universal　practical　law。　I　apply　it；
therefore；　to　the　present　case；　and　ask　whether　it　could　take　the　form
of　a　law；　and　consequently　whether　I　can　by　my　maxim　at　the　same
time　give　such　a　law　as　this；　that　everyone　may　deny　a　deposit　of
which　no　one　can　produce　a　proof。　I　at　once　bee　aware　that　such　a
principle；　viewed　as　a　law；　would　annihilate　itself；　because　the
result　would　be　that　there　would　be　no　deposits。　A　practical　law　which
I　recognise　as　such　must　be　qualified　for　universal　legislation；
this　is　an　identical　proposition　and；　therefore；　self…evident。　Now；　if
I　say　that　my　will　is　subject　to　a　practical　law；　I　cannot　adduce　my
inclination　（e。g。；　in　the　present　case　my　avarice）　as　a　principle　of
determination　fitted　to　be　a　universal　practical　law；　for　this　is　so
far　from　being　fitted　for　a　universal　legislation　that；　if　put　in
the　form　of　a　universal　law；　it　would　destroy　itself。
　　It　is；　therefore；　surprising　that　intelligent　men　could　have　thought
of　calling　the　desire　of　happiness　a　universal　practical　law　on　the
ground　that　the　desire　is　universal；　and；　therefore；　also　the　maxim　by
which　everyone　makes　this　desire　determine　his　will。　For　whereas　in
other　cases　a　universal　law　of　nature　makes　everything　harmonious；
here；　on　the　contrary；　if　we　attribute　to　the　maxim　the　universality
of　a　law；　the　extreme　opposite　of　harmony　will　follow；　the　greatest
opposition　and　the　plete　destruction　of　the　maxim　itself　and　its
purpose。　For；　in　that　case；　the　will　of　all　has　not　one　and　the　same
object；　but　everyone　has　his　own　（his　private　welfare）；　which　may
accidentally　accord　with　the　purposes　of　others　which　are　equally
selfish；　but　it　is　far　from　sufficing　for　a　law；　because　the
occasional　exceptions　which　one　is　permitted　to　make　are　endless；
and　cannot　be　definitely　embraced　in　one　universal　rule。　In　this
manner；　then；　results　a　harmony　like　that　which　a　certain　satirical
poem　depicts　as　existing　between　a　married　couple　bent　on　going　to
ruin；　〃O；　marvellous　harmony；　what　he　wishes；　she　wishes　also〃；　or
like　what　is　said　of　the　pledge　of　Francis　I　to　the　Emperor　Charles　V；
〃What　my　brother　Charles　wishes　that　I　wish　also〃　（viz。；　Milan）。
Empirical　principles　of　determination　are　not　fit　for　any　universal
external　legislation；　but　just　as　little