the+critique+of+practical+reason-第37部分

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moral　law　gives　merely　a　mand；　and　to　doubt　the　possibility　of　that
element　would　be　the　same　as　to　call　in　question　the　moral　law　itself。
But　as　regards　the　second　element　of　that　object；　namely；　happiness
perfectly　proportioned　to　that　worthiness；　it　is　true　that　there　is　no
need　of　a　mand　to　admit　its　possibility　in　general；　for　theoretical
reason　has　nothing　to　say　against　it；　but　the　manner　in　which　we
have　to　conceive　this　harmony　of　the　laws　of　nature　with　those　of
freedom　has　in　it　something　in　respect　of　which　we　have　a　choice；
because　theoretical　reason　decides　nothing　with　apodeictic　certainty
about　it；　and　in　respect　of　this　there　may　be　a　moral　interest　which
turns　the　scale。
　　I　had　said　above　that　in　a　mere　course　of　nature　in　the　world　an
accurate　correspondence　between　happiness　and　moral　worth　is　not　to　be
expected　and　must　be　regarded　as　impossible；　and　that　therefore　the
possibility　of　the　summum　bonum　cannot　be　admitted　from　this　side
except　on　the　supposition　of　a　moral　Author　of　the　world。　I
purposely　reserved　the　restriction　of　this　judgement　to　the　subjective
conditions　of　our　reason；　in　order　not　to　make　use　of　it　until　the
manner　of　this　belief　should　be　defined　more　precisely。　The　fact　is
that　the　impossibility　referred　to　is　merely　subjective；　that　is；
our　reason　finds　it　impossible　for　it　to　render　conceivable　in　the　way
of　a　mere　course　of　nature　a　connection　so　exactly　proportioned　and　so
thoroughly　adapted　to　an　end；　between　two　sets　of　events　happening
according　to　such　distinct　laws；　although；　as　with　everything　else
in　nature　that　is　adapted　to　an　end；　it　cannot　prove；　that　is；　show　by
sufficient　objective　reason；　that　it　is　not　possible　by　universal　laws
of　nature。
　　Now；　however；　a　deciding　principle　of　a　different　kind　es　into
play　to　turn　the　scale　in　this　uncertainty　of　speculative　reason。
The　mand　to　promote　the　summum　bonum　is　established　on　an　objective
basis　（in　practical　reason）；　the　possibility　of　the　same　in　general　is
likewise　established　on　an　objective　basis　（in　theoretical　reason；
which　has　nothing　to　say　against　it）。　But　reason　cannot　decide
objectively　in　what　way　we　are　to　conceive　this　possibility；　whether
by　universal　laws　of　nature　without　a　wise　Author　presiding　over
nature；　or　only　on　supposition　of　such　an　Author。　Now　here　there　es
in　a　subjective　condition　of　reason；　the　only　way　theoretically
possible　for　it；　of　conceiving　the　exact　harmony　of　the　kingdom　of
nature　with　the　kingdom　of　morals；　which　is　the　condition　of　the
possibility　of　the　summum　bonum；　and　at　the　same　time　the　only　one
conducive　to　morality　（which　depends　on　an　objective　law　of　reason）。
Now　since　the　promotion　of　this　summum　bonum；　and　therefore　the
supposition　of　its　possibility；　are　objectively　necessary　（though　only
as　a　result　of　practical　reason）；　while　at　the　same　time　the　manner　in
which　we　would　conceive　it　rests　with　our　own　choice；　and　in　this
choice　a　free　interest　of　pure　practical　reason　decides　for　the
assumption　of　a　wise　Author　of　the　world；　it　is　clear　that　the
principle　that　herein　determines　our　judgement；　though　as　a　want　it　is
subjective；　yet　at　the　same　time　being　the　means　of　promoting　what
is　objectively　（practically）　necessary；　is　the　foundation　of　a　maxim
of　belief　in　a　moral　point　of　view；　that　is；　a　faith　of　pure　practical
reason。　This；　then；　is　not　manded；　but　being　a　voluntary
determination　of　our　judgement；　conducive　to　the　moral　（manded）
purpose；　and　moreover　harmonizing　with　the　theoretical　requirement
of　reason；　to　assume　that　existence　and　to　make　it　the　foundation　of
our　further　employment　of　reason；　it　has　itself　sprung　from　the
moral　disposition　of　mind；　it　may　therefore　at　times　waver　even　in　the
well…disposed；　but　can　never　be　reduced　to　unbelief。

　　　　IX。　Of　the　Wise　Adaptation　of　Man's　Cognitive　Faculties
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　his　Practical　Destination。

　　If　human　nature　is　destined　to　endeavour　after　the　summum　bonum；
we　must　suppose　also　that　the　measure　of　its　cognitive　faculties；
and　particularly　their　relation　to　one　another；　is　suitable　to　this
end。　Now　the　Critique　of　Pure　Speculative　Reason　proves　that　this　is
incapable　of　solving　satisfactorily　the　most　weighty　problems　that　are
proposed　to　it；　although　it　does　not　ignore　the　natural　and
important　hints　received　from　the　same　reason；　nor　the　great　steps
that　it　can　make　to　approach　to　this　great　goal　that　is　set　before　it；
which；　however；　it　can　never　reach　of　itself；　even　with　the　help　of
the　greatest　knowledge　of　nature。　Nature　then　seems　here　to　have
provided　us　only　in　a　stepmotherly　fashion　with　the　faculty　required
for　our　end。
　　Suppose；　now；　that　in　this　matter　nature　had　conformed　to　our　wish
and　had　given　us　that　capacity　of　discernment　or　that　enlightenment
which　we　would　gladly　possess；　or　which　some　imagine　they　actually
possess；　what　would　in　all　probability　be　the　consequence？　Unless
our　whole　nature　were　at　the　same　time　changed；　our　inclinations；
which　always　have　the　first　word；　would　first　of　all　demand　their
own　satisfaction；　and；　joined　with　rational　reflection；　the　greatest
possible　and　most　lasting　satisfaction；　under　the　name　of　happiness；
the　moral　law　would　afterwards　speak；　in　order　to　keep　them　within
their　proper　bounds；　and　even　to　subject　them　all　to　a　higher　end；
which　has　no　regard　to　inclination。　But　instead　of　the　conflict　that
the　moral　disposition　has　now　to　carry　on　with　the　inclinations；　in
which；　though　after　some　defeats；　moral　strength　of　mind　may　be
gradually　acquired；　God　and　eternity　with　their　awful　majesty　would
stand　unceasingly　before　our　eyes　（for　what　we　can　prove　perfectly
is　to　us　as　certain　as　that　of　which　we　are　assured　by　the　sight　of
our　eyes）。　Transgression　of　the　law；　would；　no　doubt；　be　avoided；　what
is　manded　would　be　done；　but　the　mental　disposition；　from　which
actions　ought　to　proceed；　cannot　be　infused　by　any　mand；　and　in
this　case　the　spur　of　action　is　ever　active　and　external；　so　that
reason　has　no　need　to　exert　itself　in　order　to　gather　strength　to
resist　the　inclinations　by　a　lively　representation　of　the　dignity　of
the　law：　hence　most　of　the　actions　that　conformed　to　the　law　would
be　done　from　fear；　a　few　only　from　hope；　and　none　at　all　from　duty；
and　the　moral　worth　of　actions；　on　which　alone　in　the　eyes　of
supreme　wisdom　the　worth　of　the　person　and　even　that　of　the　world
depends；　would　cease　to　exist。　As　long　as　the　nature　of　man　remains
what　it　is；　his　conduct　would　thus　be　changed　into　mere　mechanism；
in　which；　as　in　a　puppet…show；　everything　would　gesticulate　well；
but　there　would　be　no　life　in　the　figures。　Now；　when　it　is　quite
otherwise　with　us；　when　with　all　the　effort　of　our　reason　we　have　only
a　very　obscure　and　doubtful　view　into　the　future；　when　the　Governor　of
the　world　allows　us　only　to　conjecture　his　existence　and　his
majesty；　not　to　behold　them　or　prove　them　clearly；　and　on　the　other
hand；　the　moral　law　within　us；　without　promising　or　threatening
anything　with　certainty；　demands　of　us　disinterested　respect；　and　only
when　this　respect　has　bee　active　and　dominant；　does　it　allow　us
by　means　of　it　a　prospect　into　the　world　of　the　supersensible；　and
then　only　with　weak　glances：　all　this　being　so；　there　is　room　for　true
moral　disposition；　immediately　devoted　to　the　law；　and　a　rational
creature　can　bee　worthy　of　sharing　in　the　summum　bonum　that
corresponds　to　the　worth　of　his　person　and　not　merely　to　his
actions。　Thus　what　the　study　of　nature　and　of　man　teaches　us
sufficiently　elsewhere　may　well　be　true　here　also；　that　the
unsearchable　wisdom　by　which　we　exist　is　not　less　worthy　of　admiration
in　what　it　has　denied　than　in　what　it　has　granted。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　PART。

　　　　　　　　　　Methodology　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　By　the　methodology　of　pure　practical　reason　we　are　not　to　understand
the　mode　of　proceeding　with　pure　practical　principles　（whether　in
study　or　in　exposition）；　with　a　view　to　a　scientific　knowledge　of
them；　which　alone　is　what　is　properly　called　method　elsewhere　in
theoretical　philosophy　（for　popular　knowledge　requires　a　manner；
science　a　method；　i。e。；　a　process　according　to　principles　of　reason　by
which　alone　the　manifold　of　any　branch　of　knowledge　can　bee　a
system）。　On　the　contrary；　by　this　methodology　is　understood　the　mode
in　which　we　can　give　the　laws　of　pure　practical　reason　access　to　the
human　mind　and　influence　on　its　maxims；　that　is；　by　which　we　can
make　the　objectively　practical　reason　subjectively　practical　also。
　　Now　it　is　clear　enough　that　those　determining　principles　of　the　will
which　alone　make　maxims　properly　moral　and　give　them　a　moral　worth；
namely；　the　direct　conception　of　the　law　and　the　objective　necessity
of　obeying　it　as　our　duty；　must　be　regarded　as　the　proper　springs　of
actions；　since　otherwise　legality　of　actions　might　be　produced；　but
not　morality　of　character。　But　it　is　not　so　clear；　on　the　contrary；　it
must　at　first　sight　seem　to　every　one　very　improbable　that　even
subjectively　that　exhibition　of　pure　virtue　can　have　more　power　over
the　human　mind；　and　supply　a　far　stronger　spring　even　for　effecting
that　legality　of　actions；　and　can　produce