the+critique+of+practical+reason-第35部分

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satisfaction　always　dependent　on　the　existence　of　its　object；　etc。；
which　cannot　be　the　case　in　the　Supreme　Being）；　from　all　this　we
abstract　in　that　case；　and　then　there　remains　of　the　notions　by
which　we　conceive　a　pure　intelligence　nothing　more　than　just　what　is
required　for　the　possibility　of　conceiving　a　moral　law。　There　is
then　a　knowledge　of　God　indeed；　but　only　for　practical　purposes；
and；　if　we　attempt　to　extend　it　to　a　theoretical　knowledge；　we　find　an
understanding　that　has　intuitions；　not　thoughts；　a　will　that　is
directed　to　objects　on　the　existence　of　which　its　satisfaction　does
not　in　the　least　depend　（not　to　mention　the　transcendental　predicates；
as；　for　example；　a　magnitude　of　existence；　that　is　duration；　which；
however；　is　not　in　time；　the　only　possible　means　we　have　of　conceiving
existence　as　magnitude）。　Now　these　are　all　attributes　of　which　we
can　form　no　conception　that　would　help　to　the　knowledge　of　the　object；
and　we　learn　from　this　that　they　can　never　be　used　for　a　theory　of
supersensible　beings；　so　that　on　this　side　they　are　quite　incapable　of
being　the　foundation　of　a　speculative　knowledge；　and　their　use　is
limited　simply　to　the　practice　of　the　moral　law。
　　This　last　is　so　obvious；　and　can　be　proved　so　clearly　by　fact；
that　we　may　confidently　challenge　all　pretended　natural　theologians　（a
singular　name）*　to　specify　（over　and　above　the　merely　ontological
predicates）　one　single　attribute；　whether　of　the　understanding　or　of
the　will；　determining　this　object　of　theirs；　of　which　we　could　not
show　incontrovertibly　that；　if　we　abstract　from　it　everything
anthropomorphic；　nothing　would　remain　to　us　but　the　mere　word；　without
our　being　able　to　connect　with　it　the　smallest　notion　by　which　we
could　hope　for　an　extension　of　theoretical　knowledge。　But　as　to　the
practical；　there　still　remains　to　us　of　the　attributes　of
understanding　and　will　the　conception　of　a　relation　to　which　objective
reality　is　given　by　the　practical　law　（which　determines　a　priori
precisely　this　relation　of　the　understanding　to　the　will）。　When　once
this　is　done；　then　reality　is　given　to　the　conception　of　the　object　of
a　will　morally　determined　（the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum）；　and
with　it　to　the　conditions　of　its　possibility；　the　ideas　of　God；
freedom；　and　immortality；　but　always　only　relatively　to　the　practice
of　the　moral　law　（and　not　for　any　speculative　purpose）。

　　*Learning　is　properly　only　the　whole　content　of　the　historical
sciences。　Consequently　it　is　only　the　teacher　of　revealed　theology
that　can　be　called　a　learned　theologian。　If；　however；　we　choose　to
call　a　man　learned　who　is　in　possession　of　the　rational　sciences
（mathematics　and　philosophy）；　although　even　this　would　be　contrary
to　the　signification　of　the　word　（which　always　counts　as　learning　only
that　which　one　must　be　〃learned〃　and　which；　therefore；　he　cannot
discover　of　himself　by　reason）；　even　in　that　case　the　philosopher
would　make　too　poor　a　figure　with　his　knowledge　of　God　as　a　positive
science　to　let　himself　be　called　on　that　account　a　learned　man。

　　According　to　these　remarks　it　is　now　easy　to　find　the　answer　to
the　weighty　question　whether　the　notion　of　God　is　one　belonging　to
physics　（and　therefore　also　to　metaphysics；　which　contains　the　pure
a　priori　principles　of　the　former　in　their　universal　import）　or　to
morals。　If　we　have　recourse　to　God　as　the　Author　of　all　things；　in
order　to　explain　the　arrangements　of　nature　or　its　changes；　this　is　at
least　not　a　physical　explanation；　and　is　a　plete　confession　that
our　philosophy　has　e　to　an　end；　since　we　are　obliged　to　assume
something　of　which　in　itself　we　have　otherwise　no　conception；　in　order
to　be　able　to　frame　a　conception　of　the　possibility　of　what　we　see
before　our　eyes。　Metaphysics；　however；　cannot　enable　us　to　attain　by
certain　inference　from　the　knowledge　of　this　world　to　the　conception
of　God　and　to　the　proof　of　His　existence；　for　this　reason；　that　in
order　to　say　that　this　world　could　be　produced　only　by　a　God
（according　to　the　conception　implied　by　this　word）　we　should　know　this
world　as　the　most　perfect　whole　possible；　and　for　this　purpose
should　also　know　all　possible　worlds　（in　order　to　be　able　to　pare
them　with　this）；　in　other　words；　we　should　be　omniscient。　It　is
absolutely　impossible；　however；　to　know　the　existence　of　this　Being
from　mere　concepts；　because　every　existential　proposition；　that　is；
every　proposition　that　affirms　the　existence　of　a　being　of　which　I
frame　a　concept；　is　a　synthetic　proposition；　that　is；　one　by　which　I
go　beyond　that　conception　and　affirm　of　it　more　than　was　thought　in
the　conception　itself；　namely；　that　this　concept　in　the
understanding　has　an　object　corresponding　to　it　outside　the
understanding；　and　this　it　is　obviously　impossible　to　elicit　by　any
reasoning。　There　remains；　therefore；　only　one　single　process
possible　for　reason　to　attain　this　knowledge；　namely；　to　start　from
the　supreme　principle　of　its　pure　practical　use　（which　in　every　case
is　directed　simply　to　the　existence　of　something　as　a　consequence　of
reason）　and　thus　determine　its　object。　Then　its　inevitable　problem；
namely；　the　necessary　direction　of　the　will　to　the　summum　bonum；
discovers　to　us　not　only　the　necessity　of　assuming　such　a　First
Being　in　reference　to　the　possibility　of　this　good　in　the　world；
but；　what　is　most　remarkable；　something　which　reason　in　its　progress
on　the　path　of　physical　nature　altogether　failed　to　find；　namely；　an
accurately　defined　conception　of　this　First　Being。　As　we　can　know　only
a　small　part　of　this　world；　and　can　still　less　pare　it　with　all
possible　worlds；　we　may　indeed　from　its　order；　design；　and
greatness；　infer　a　wise；　good；　powerful；　etc。；　Author　of　it；　but　not
that　He　is　all…wise；　all…good；　all…powerful；　etc。　It　may　indeed　very
well　be　granted　that　we　should　be　justified　in　supplying　this
inevitable　defect　by　a　legitimate　and　reasonable　hypothesis；　namely；
that　when　wisdom；　goodness；　etc；　are　displayed　in　all　the　parts　that
offer　themselves　to　our　nearer　knowledge；　it　is　just　the　same　in　all
the　rest；　and　that　it　would　therefore　be　reasonable　to　ascribe　all
possible　perfections　to　the　Author　of　the　world；　but　these　are　not
strict　logical　inferences　in　which　we　can　pride　ourselves　on　our
insight；　but　only　permitted　conclusions　in　which　we　may　be　indulged
and　which　require　further　remendation　before　we　can　make　use　of
them。　On　the　path　of　empirical　inquiry　then　（physics）；　the
conception　of　God　remains　always　a　conception　of　the　perfection　of　the
First　Being　not　accurately　enough　determined　to　be　held　adequate　to
the　conception　of　Deity。　（With　metaphysic　in　its　transcendental　part
nothing　whatever　can　be　acplished。）
　　When　I　now　try　to　test　this　conception　by　reference　to　the　object　of
practical　reason；　I　find　that　the　moral　principle　admits　as　possible
only　the　conception　of　an　Author　of　the　world　possessed　of　the　highest
perfection。　He　must　be　omniscient；　in　order　to　know　my　conduct　up　to
the　inmost　root　of　my　mental　state　in　all　possible　cases　and　into
all　future　time；　omnipotent；　in　order　to　allot　to　it　its　fitting
consequences；　similarly　He　must　be　omnipresent；　eternal；　etc。　Thus　the
moral　law；　by　means　of　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　as　the
object　of　a　pure　practical　reason；　determines　the　concept　of　the　First
Being　as　the　Supreme　Being；　a　thing　which　the　physical　（and　in　its
higher　development　the　metaphysical）；　in　other　words；　the　whole
speculative　course　of　reason；　was　unable　to　effect。　The　conception
of　God；　then；　is　one　that　belongs　originally　not　to　physics；　i。e。；
to　speculative　reason；　but　to　morals。　The　same　may　be　said　of　the
other　conceptions　of　reason　of　which　we　have　treated　above　as
postulates　of　it　in　its　practical　use。
　　In　the　history　of　Grecian　philosophy　we　find　no　distinct　traces　of　a
pure　rational　theology　earlier　than　Anaxagoras；　but　this　is　not
because　the　older　philosophers　had　not　intelligence　or　penetration
enough　to　raise　themselves　to　it　by　the　path　of　speculation；　at
least　with　the　aid　of　a　thoroughly　reasonable　hypothesis。　What　could
have　been　easier；　what　more　natural；　than　the　thought　which　of
itself　occurs　to　everyone；　to　assume　instead　of　several　causes　of
the　world；　instead　of　an　indeterminate　degree　of　perfection；　a
single　rational　cause　having　all　perfection？　But　the　evils　in　the
world　seemed　to　them　to　be　much　too　serious　objections　to　allow　them
to　feel　themselves　justified　in　such　a　hypothesis。　They　showed
intelligence　and　penetration　then　in　this　very　point；　that　they　did
not　allow　themselves　to　adopt　it；　but　on　the　contrary　looked　about
amongst　natural　causes　to　see　if　they　could　not　find　in　them　the
qualities　and　power　required　for　a　First　Being。　But　when　this　acute
people　had　advanced　so　far　in　their　investigations　of　nature　as　to
treat　even　moral　questions　philosophically；　on　which　other　nations　had
never　done　anything　but　talk；　then　first　they　found　a　new　and
practical　want；　which　did　not　fail　to　give　definiteness　to　their
conception　of　the　First　Being：　and　in　this　the　speculative　reason
played　the　part　of　spectator；　or　at　best　had　the　merit　of　embellishing
a　conception　that　had　not　grown　on　its　o