the+critique+of+practical+reason-第28部分

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might　occasion　needless　disputes　if　we　did　not　attend　to　it。　The
summum　may　mean　either　the　supreme　（supremum）　or　the　perfect
（consummatum）。　The　former　is　that　condition　which　is　itself
unconditioned；　i。e。；　is　not　subordinate　to　any　other　（originarium）；
the　second　is　that　whole　which　is　not　a　part　of　a　greater　whole　of　the
same　kind　（perfectissimum）。　It　has　been　shown　in　the　Analytic　that
virtue　（as　worthiness　to　be　happy）　is　the　supreme　condition　of　all
that　can　appear　to　us　desirable；　and　consequently　of　all　our　pursuit
of　happiness；　and　is　therefore　the　supreme　good。　But　it　does　not
follow　that　it　is　the　whole　and　perfect　good　as　the　object　of　the
desires　of　rational　finite　beings；　for　this　requires　happiness　also；
and　that　not　merely　in　the　partial　eyes　of　the　person　who　makes
himself　an　end；　but　even　in　the　judgement　of　an　impartial　reason；
which　regards　persons　in　general　as　ends　in　themselves。　For　to　need
happiness；　to　deserve　it；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　not　to
participate　in　it；　cannot　be　consistent　with　the　perfect　volition　of　a
rational　being　possessed　at　the　same　time　of　all　power；　if；　for　the
sake　of　experiment；　we　conceive　such　a　being。　Now　inasmuch　as　virtue
and　happiness　together　constitute　the　possession　of　the　summum　bonum
in　a　person；　and　the　distribution　of　happiness　in　exact　proportion
to　morality　（which　is　the　worth　of　the　person；　and　his　worthiness　to
be　happy）　constitutes　the　summum　bonum　of　a　possible　world；　hence　this
summum　bonum　expresses　the　whole；　the　perfect　good；　in　which；　however；
virtue　as　the　condition　is　always　the　supreme　good；　since　it　has　no
condition　above　it；　whereas　happiness；　while　it　is　pleasant　to　the
possessor　of　it；　is　not　of　itself　absolutely　and　in　all　respects　good；
but　always　presupposes　morally　right　behaviour　as　its　condition。
　　When　two　elements　are　necessarily　united　in　one　concept；　they　must
be　connected　as　reason　and　consequence；　and　this　either　so　that
their　unity　is　considered　as　analytical　（logical　connection）；　or　as
synthetical　（real　connection）　the　former　following　the　law　of
identity；　the　latter　that　of　causality。　The　connection　of　virtue　and
happiness　may　therefore　be　understood　in　two　ways：　either　the
endeavour　to　be　virtuous　and　the　rational　pursuit　of　happiness　are　not
two　distinct　actions；　but　absolutely　identical；　in　which　case　no　maxim
need　be　made　the　principle　of　the　former；　other　than　what　serves　for
the　latter；　or　the　connection　consists　in　this；　that　virtue　produces
happiness　as　something　distinct　from　the　consciousness　of　virtue；　as　a
cause　produces　an　effect。
　　The　ancient　Greek　schools　were；　properly　speaking；　only　two；　and
in　determining　the　conception　of　the　summum　bonum　these　followed　in
fact　one　and　the　same　method；　inasmuch　as　they　did　not　allow　virtue
and　happiness　to　be　regarded　as　two　distinct　elements　of　the　summum
bonum；　and　consequently　sought　the　unity　of　the　principle　by　the
rule　of　identity；　but　they　differed　as　to　which　of　the　two　was　to　be
taken　as　the　fundamental　notion。　The　Epicurean　said：　〃To　be
conscious　that　one's　maxims　lead　to　happiness　is　virtue〃；　the　Stoic
said：　〃To　be　conscious　of　one's　virtue　is　happiness。〃　With　the　former；
Prudence　was　equivalent　to　morality；　with　the　latter；　who　chose　a
higher　designation　for　virtue；　morality　alone　was　true　wisdom。
　　While　we　must　admire　the　men　who　in　such　early　times　tried　all
imaginable　ways　of　extending　the　domain　of　philosophy；　we　must　at
the　same　time　lament　that　their　acuteness　was　unfortunately　misapplied
in　trying　to　trace　out　identity　between　two　extremely　heterogeneous
notions；　those　of　happiness　and　virtue。　But　it　agrees　with　the
dialectical　spirit　of　their　times　（and　subtle　minds　are　even　now
sometimes　misled　in　the　same　way）　to　get　rid　of　irreconcilable
differences　in　principle　by　seeking　to　change　them　into　a　mere　contest
about　words；　and　thus　apparently　working　out　the　identity　of　the
notion　under　different　names；　and　this　usually　occurs　in　cases　where
the　bination　of　heterogeneous　principles　lies　so　deep　or　so　high；
or　would　require　so　plete　a　transformation　of　the　doctrines　assumed
in　the　rest　of　the　philosophical　system；　that　men　are　afraid　to
penetrate　deeply　into　the　real　difference　and　prefer　treating　it　as
a　difference　in　questions　of　form。
　　While　both　schools　sought　to　trace　out　the　identity　of　the　practical
principles　of　virtue　and　happiness；　they　were　not　agreed　as　to　the　way
in　which　they　tried　to　force　this　identity；　but　were　separated
infinitely　from　one　another；　the　one　placing　its　principle　on　the　side
of　sense；　the　other　on　that　of　reason；　the　one　in　the　consciousness　of
sensible　wants；　the　other　in　the　independence　of　practical　reason　on
all　sensible　grounds　of　determination。　According　to　the　Epicurean；　the
notion　of　virtue　was　already　involved　in　the　maxim：　〃To　promote
one's　own　happiness〃；　according　to　the　Stoics；　on　the　other　hand；
the　feeling　of　happiness　was　already　contained　in　the　consciousness　of
virtue。　Now　whatever　is　contained　in　another　notion　is　identical
with　part　of　the　containing　notion；　but　not　with　the　whole；　and
moreover　two　wholes　may　be　specifically　distinct；　although　they
consist　of　the　same　parts；　namely　if　the　parts　are　united　into　a　whole
in　totally　different　ways。　The　Stoic　maintained　that　the　virtue　was
the　whole　summum　bonum；　and　happiness　only　the　consciousness　of
possessing　it；　as　making　part　of　the　state　of　the　subject。　The
Epicurean　maintained　that　happiness　was　the　whole　summum　bonum；　and
virtue　only　the　form　of　the　maxim　for　its　pursuit；　viz。；　the
rational　use　of　the　means　for　attaining　it。
　　Now　it　is　clear　from　the　Analytic　that　the　maxims　of　virtue　and
those　of　private　happiness　are　quite　heterogeneous　as　to　their　supreme
practical　principle；　and；　although　they　belong　to　one　summum　bonum
which　together　they　make　possible；　yet　they　are　so　far　from　coinciding
that　they　restrict　and　check　one　another　very　much　in　the　same
subject。　Thus　the　question：　〃How　is　the　summum　bonum　practically
possible？〃　still　remains　an　unsolved　problem；　notwithstanding　all
the　attempts　at　coalition　that　have　hitherto　been　made。　The　Analytic
has；　however；　shown　what　it　is　that　makes　the　problem　difficult　to
solve；　namely；　that　happiness　and　morality　are　two　specifically
distinct　elements　of　the　summum　bonum　and；　therefore；　their
bination　cannot　be　analytically　cognised　（as　if　the　man　that
seeks　his　own　happiness　should　find　by　mere　analysis　of　his　conception
that　in　so　acting　he　is　virtuous；　or　as　if　the　man　that　follows　virtue
should　in　the　consciousness　of　such　conduct　find　that　he　is　already
happy　ipso　facto）；　but　must　be　a　synthesis　of　concepts。　Now　since　this
bination　is　recognised　as　a　priori；　and　therefore　as　practically
necessary；　and　consequently　not　as　derived　from　experience；　so　that
the　possibility　of　the　summum　bonum　does　not　rest　on　any　empirical
principle；　it　follows　that　the　deduction　＇legitimation＇　of　this
concept　must　be　transcendental。　It　is　a　priori　（morally）　necessary
to　produce　the　summum　bonum　by　freedom　of　will：　therefore　the
condition　of　its　possibility　must　rest　solely　on　a　priori　principles
of　cognition。

　　　　　　　　　　I。　The　Antinomy　of　Practical　Reason。

　　In　the　summum　bonum　which　is　practical　for　us；　i。e。；　to　be
realized　by　our　will；　virtue　and　happiness　are　thought　as
necessarily　bined；　so　that　the　one　cannot　be　assumed　by　pure
practical　reason　without　the　other　also　being　attached　to　it。　Now　this
bination　（like　every　other）　is　either　analytical　or　synthetical。　It
bas　been　shown　that　it　cannot　be　analytical；　it　must　then　be
synthetical　and；　more　particularly；　must　be　conceived　as　the
connection　of　cause　and　effect；　since　it　concerns　a　practical　good；
i。e。；　one　that　is　possible　by　means　of　action；　consequently　either　the
desire　of　happiness　must　be　the　motive　to　maxims　of　virtue；　or　the
maxim　of　virtue　must　be　the　efficient　cause　of　happiness。　The　first　is
absolutely　impossible；　because　（as　was　proved　in　the　Analytic）
maxims　which　place　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　in　the　desire
of　personal　happiness　are　not　moral　at　all；　and　no　virtue　can　be
founded　on　them。　But　the　second　is　also　impossible；　because　the
practical　connection　of　causes　and　effects　in　the　world；　as　the　result
of　the　determination　of　the　will；　does　not　depend　upon　the　moral
dispositions　of　the　will；　but　on　the　knowledge　of　the　laws　of　nature
and　the　physical　power　to　use　them　for　one's　purposes；　consequently　we
cannot　expect　in　the　world　by　the　most　punctilious　observance　of　the
moral　laws　any　necessary　connection　of　happiness　with　virtue
adequate　to　the　summum　bonum。　Now；　as　the　promotion　of　this　summum
bonum；　the　conception　of　which　contains　this　connection；　is　a　priori　a
necessary　object　of　our　will　and　inseparably　attached　to　the　moral
law；　the　impossibility　of　the　former　must　prove　the　falsity　of　the
latter。　If　then　the　supreme　good　is　not　possible　by　practical　rules；
then　the　moral　law　also　which　mands　us　to　promote　it　is　directed　to
vain　imaginary　ends　and　must　consequently　be　false。

　　　II。　Critical　Solution　of　the　Antinomy　of　Practical　Reason。

　　The　antinomy　of　pure　speculative　reason　exhibits　a　similar
co