the+critique+of+practical+reason-第26部分

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since　the　notion　of　creation　does　not　belong　to　the　sensible　form　of
representation　of　existence　or　to　causality；　but　can　only　be
referred　to　noumena。　Consequently；　when　I　say　of　beings　in　the　world
of　sense　that　they　are　created；　I　so　far　regard　them　as　noumena。　As　it
would　be　a　contradiction；　therefore；　to　say　that　God　is　a　creator　of
appearances；　so　also　it　is　a　contradiction　to　say　that　as　creator　He
is　the　cause　of　actions　in　the　world　of　sense；　and　therefore　as
appearances；　although　He　is　the　cause　of　the　existence　of　the　acting
beings　（which　are　noumena）。　If　now　it　is　possible　to　affirm　freedom　in
spite　of　the　natural　mechanism　of　actions　as　appearances　（by　regarding
existence　in　time　as　something　that　belongs　only　to　appearances；　not
to　things　in　themselves）；　then　the　circumstance　that　the　acting　beings
are　creatures　cannot　make　the　slightest　difference；　since　creation
concerns　their　supersensible　and　not　their　sensible　existence；　and；
therefore；　cannot　be　regarded　as　the　determining　principle　of　the
appearances。　It　would　be　quite　different　if　the　beings　in　the　world　as
things　in　themselves　existed　in　time；　since　in　that　case　the　creator
of　substance　would　be　at　the　same　time　the　author　of　the　whole
mechanism　of　this　substance。
　　Of　so　great　importance　is　the　separation　of　time　（as　well　as
space）　from　the　existence　of　things　in　themselves　which　was　effected
in　the　Critique　of　the　Pure　Speculative　Reason。
　　It　may　be　said　that　the　solution　here　proposed　involves　great
difficulty　in　itself　and　is　scarcely　susceptible　of　a　lucid
exposition。　But　is　any　other　solution　that　has　been　attempted；　or　that
may　be　attempted；　easier　and　more　intelligible？　Rather　might　we　say
that　the　dogmatic　teachers　of　metaphysics　have　shown　more　shrewdness
than　candour　in　keeping　this　difficult　point　out　of　sight　as　much　as
possible；　in　the　hope　that　if　they　said　nothing　about　it；　probably
no　one　would　think　of　it。　If　science　is　to　be　advanced；　all
difficulties　must　be　laid　open；　and　we　must　even　search　for　those　that
are　hidden；　for　every　difficulty　calls　forth　a　remedy；　which　cannot　be
discovered　without　science　gaining　either　in　extent　or　in　exactness；
and　thus　even　obstacles　bee　means　of　increasing　the　thoroughness　of
science。　On　the　other　hand；　if　the　difficulties　are　intentionally
concealed；　or　merely　removed　by　palliatives；　then　sooner　or　later　they
burst　out　into　incurable　mischiefs；　which　bring　science　to　ruin　in
an　absolute　scepticism。
　　Since　it　is；　properly　speaking；　the　notion　of　freedom　alone
amongst　all　the　ideas　of　pure　speculative　reason　that　so　greatly
enlarges　our　knowledge　in　the　sphere　of　the　supersensible；　though　only
of　our　practical　knowledge；　I　ask　myself　why　it　exclusively
possesses　so　great　fertility；　whereas　the　others　only　designate　the
vacant　space　for　possible　beings　of　the　pure　understanding；　but　are
unable　by　any　means　to　define　the　concept　of　them。　I　presently　find
that　as　I　cannot　think　anything　without　a　category；　I　must　first
look　for　a　category　for　the　rational　idea　of　freedom　with　which　I　am
now　concerned；　and　this　is　the　category　of　causality；　and　although
freedom；　a　concept　of　the　reason；　being　a　transcendent　concept；　cannot
have　any　intuition　corresponding　to　it；　yet　the　concept　of　the
understanding…　for　the　synthesis　of　which　the　former　demands　the
unconditioned…　（namely；　the　concept　of　causality）　must　have　a　sensible
intuition　given；　by　which　first　its　objective　reality　is　assured。　Now；
the　categories　are　all　divided　into　two　classes…　the　mathematical；
which　concern　the　unity　of　synthesis　in　the　conception　of　objects；　and
the　dynamical；　which　refer　to　the　unity　of　synthesis　in　the　conception
of　the　existence　of　objects。　The　former　（those　of　magnitude　and
quality）　always　contain　a　synthesis　of　the　homogeneous；　and　it　is
not　possible　to　find　in　this　the　unconditioned　antecedent　to　what　is
given　in　sensible　intuition　as　conditioned　in　space　and　time；　as
this　would　itself　have　to　belong　to　space　and　time；　and　therefore　be
again　still　conditioned。　Whence　it　resulted　in　the　Dialectic　of　Pure
Theoretic　Reason　that　the　opposite　methods　of　attaining　the
unconditioned　and　the　totality　of　the　conditions　were　both　wrong。
The　categories　of　the　second　class　（those　of　causality　and　of　the
necessity　of　a　thing）　did　not　require　this　homogeneity　（of　the
conditioned　and　the　condition　in　synthesis）；　since　here　what　we　have
to　explain　is　not　how　the　intuition　is　pounded　from　a　manifold　in
it；　but　only　how　the　existence　of　the　conditioned　object　corresponding
to　it　is　added　to　the　existence　of　the　condition　（added；　namely；　in
the　understanding　as　connected　therewith）；　and　in　that　case　it　was
allowable　to　suppose　in　the　supersensible　world　the　unconditioned
antecedent　to　the　altogether　conditioned　in　the　world　of　sense　（both
as　regards　the　causal　connection　and　the　contingent　existence　of
things　themselves）；　although　this　unconditioned　remained
indeterminate；　and　to　make　the　synthesis　transcendent。　Hence；　it　was
found　in　the　Dialectic　of　the　Pure　Speculative　Reason　that　the　two
apparently　opposite　methods　of　obtaining　for　the　conditioned　the
unconditioned　were　not　really　contradictory；　e。g。；　in　the　synthesis　of
causality　to　conceive　for　the　conditioned　in　the　series　of　causes
and　effects　of　the　sensible　world；　a　causality　which　has　no　sensible
condition；　and　that　the　same　action　which；　as　belonging　to　the　world
of　sense；　is　always　sensibly　conditioned；　that　is；　mechanically
necessary；　yet　at　the　same　time　may　be　derived　from　a　causality　not
sensibly　conditioned…　being　the　causality　of　the　acting　being　as
belonging　to　the　supersensible　world…　and　may　consequently　be
conceived　as　free。　Now；　the　only　point　in　question　was　to　change
this　may　be　into　is；　that　is；　that　we　should　be　able　to　show　in　an
actual　case；　as　it　were　by　a　fact；　that　certain　actions　imply　such　a
causality　（namely；　the　intellectual；　sensibly　unconditioned）；
whether　they　are　actual　or　only　manded；　that　is；　objectively
necessary　in　a　practical　sense。　We　could　not　hope　to　find　this
connections　in　actions　actually　given　in　experience　as　events　of　the
sensible　world；　since　causality　with　freedom　must　always　be　sought
outside　the　world　of　sense　in　the　world　of　intelligence。　But　things　of
sense　of　sense　in　the　world　of　intelligence。　But　things　of　sense　are
the　only　things　offered　to　our　perception　and　observation。　Hence；
nothing　remained　but　to　find　an　incontestable　objective　principle　of
causality　which　excludes　all　sensible　conditions：　that　is；　a　principle
in　which　reason　does　not　appeal　further　to　something　else　as　a
determining　ground　of　its　causality；　but　contains　this　determining
ground　itself　by　means　of　that　principle；　and　in　which　therefore　it　is
itself　as　pure　reason　practical。　Now；　this　principle　had　not　to　be
searched　for　or　discovered；　it　had　long　been　in　the　reason　of　all　men；
and　incorporated　in　their　nature；　and　is　the　principle　of　morality。
Therefore；　that　unconditioned　causality；　with　the　faculty　of　it；
namely；　freedom；　is　no　longer　merely　indefinitely　and
problematically　thought　（this　speculative　reason　could　prove　to　be
feasible）；　but　is　even　as　regards　the　law　of　its　causality
definitely　and　assertorially　known；　and　with　it　the　fact　that　a
being　（I　myself）；　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense；　belongs　also　to　the
supersensible　world；　this　is　also　positively　known；　and　thus　the
reality　of　the　supersensible　world　is　established　and　in　practical
respects　definitely　given；　and　this　definiteness；　which　for
theoretical　purposes　would　be　transcendent；　is　for　practical
purposes　immanent。　We　could　not；　however；　make　a　similar　step　as
regards　the　second　dynamical　idea；　namely；　that　of　a　necessary
being。　We　could　not　rise　to　it　from　the　sensible　world　without　the　aid
of　the　first　dynamical　idea。　For　if　we　attempted　to　do　so；　we　should
have　ventured　to　leave　at　a　bound　all　that　is　given　to　us；　and　to　leap
to　that　of　which　nothing　is　given　us　that　can　help　us　to　effect　the
connection　of　such　a　supersensible　being　with　the　world　of　sense
（since　the　necessary　being　would　have　to　be　known　as　given　outside
ourselves）。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　now　obvious　that　this
connection　is　quite　possible　in　relation　to　our　own　subject；
inasmuch　as　I　know　myself　to　be　on　the　one　side　as　an　intelligible
＇supersensible＇　being　determined　by　the　moral　law　（by　means　of
freedom）；　and　on　the　other　side　as　acting　in　the　world　of　sense。　It　is
the　concept　of　freedom　alone　that　enables　us　to　find　the　unconditioned
and　intelligible　for　the　conditioned　and　sensible　without　going　out　of
ourselves。　For　it　is　our　own　reason　that　by　means　of　the　supreme　and
unconditional　practical　law　knows　that　itself　and　the　being　that　is
conscious　of　this　law　（our　own　person）　belong　to　the　pure　world　of
understanding；　and　moreover　defines　the　manner　in　which；　as　such；　it
can　be　active。　In　this　way　it　can　be　understood　why　in　the　whole
faculty　of　reason　it　is　the　practical　reason　only　that　can　help　us
to　pass　beyond　the　world　of　sense　and　give　us　knowledge　of　a
supersensible　order　and　connection；　which；　however；　for　this　very
reason　cannot　be　extended　further　than　is　necessary　for　pure