the+critique+of+practical+reason-第24部分

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


things　in　themselves　（which　is　the　mon　view）；　then　it　is　impossible
to　reconcile　the　necessity　of　the　causal　relation　with　freedom；　they
are　contradictory。　For　from　the　former　it　follows　that　every　event；
and　consequently　every　action　that　takes　place　at　a　certain　point　of
time；　is　a　necessary　result　of　what　existed　in　time　preceding。　Now
as　time　past　is　no　longer　in　my　power；　hence　every　action　that　I
perform　must　be　the　necessary　result　of　certain　determining　grounds
which　are　not　in　my　power；　that　is；　at　the　moment　in　which　I　am　acting
I　am　never　free。　Nay；　even　if　I　assume　that　my　whole　existence　is
independent　on　any　foreign　cause　（for　instance；　God）；　so　that　the
determining　principles　of　my　causality；　and　even　of　my　whole
existence；　were　not　outside　myself；　yet　this　would　not　in　the　least
transform　that　physical　necessity　into　freedom。　For　at　every　moment　of
time　I　am　still　under　the　necessity　of　being　determined　to　action　by
that　which　is　not　in　my　power；　and　the　series　of　events　infinite　a
parte　priori；　which　I　only　continue　according　to　a　pre…determined
order　and　could　never　begin　of　myself；　would　be　a　continuous
physical　chain；　and　therefore　my　causality　would　never　be　freedom。
　　If；　then；　we　would　attribute　freedom　to　a　being　whose　existence　is
determined　in　time；　we　cannot　except　him　from　the　law　of　necessity
as　to　all　events　in　his　existence　and；　consequently；　as　to　his　actions
also；　for　that　would　be　to　hand　him　over　to　blind　chance。　Now　as
this　law　inevitably　applies　to　all　the　causality　of　things；　so　far
as　their　existence　is　determinable　in　time；　it　follows　that　if　this
were　the　mode　in　which　we　had　also　to　conceive　the　existence　of
these　things　in　themselves；　freedom　must　be　rejected　as　a　vain　and
impossible　conception。　Consequently；　if　we　would　still　save　it；　no
other　way　remains　but　to　consider　that　the　existence　of　a　thing；　so
far　as　it　is　determinable　in　time；　and　therefore　its　causality；
according　to　the　law　of　physical　necessity；　belong　to　appearance；
and　to　attribute　freedom　to　the　same　being　as　a　thing　in　itself。
This　is　certainly　inevitable；　if　we　would　retain　both　these
contradictory　concepts　together；　but　in　application；　when　we　try　to
explain　their　bination　in　one　and　the　same　action；　great
difficulties　present　themselves　which　seem　to　render　such　a
bination　impracticable。
　　When　I　say　of　a　man　who　mits　a　theft　that；　by　the　law　of
causality；　this　deed　is　a　necessary　result　of　the　determining　causes
in　preceding　time；　then　it　was　impossible　that　it　could　not　have
happened；　how　then　can　the　judgement；　according　to　the　moral　law；　make
any　change；　and　suppose　that　it　could　have　been　omitted；　because　the
law　says　that　it　ought　to　have　been　omitted；　that　is；　how　can　a　man　be
called　quite　free　at　the　same　moment；　and　with　respect　to　the　same
action　in　which　he　is　subject　to　an　inevitable　physical　necessity？
Some　try　to　evade　this　by　saying　that　the　causes　that　determine　his
causality　are　of　such　a　kind　as　to　agree　with　a　parative　notion
of　freedom。　According　to　this；　that　is　sometimes　called　a　free　effect；
the　determining　physical　cause　of　which　lies　within　the　acting　thing
itself；　e。g。；　that　which　a　projectile　performs　when　it　is　in　free
motion；　in　which　case　we　use　the　word　freedom；　because　while　it　is
in　flight　it　is　not　urged　by　anything　external；　or　as　we　call　the
motion　of　a　clock　a　free　motion；　because　it　moves　its　hands　itself；
which　therefore　do　not　require　to　be　pushed　by　external　force；　so
although　the　actions　of　man　are　necessarily　determined　by　causes　which
precede　in　time；　we　yet　call　them　free；　because　these　causes　are　ideas
produced　by　our　own　faculties；　whereby　desires　are　evoked　on
occasion　of　circumstances；　and　hence　actions　are　wrought　according
to　our　own　pleasure。　This　is　a　wretched　subterfuge　with　which　some
persons　still　let　themselves　be　put　off；　and　so　think　they　have
solved；　with　a　petty　word…　jugglery；　that　difficult　problem；　at　the
solution　of　which　centuries　have　laboured　in　vain；　and　which　can
therefore　scarcely　be　found　so　pletely　on　the　surface。　In　fact；
in　the　question　about　the　freedom　which　must　be　the　foundation　of
all　moral　laws　and　the　consequent　responsibility；　it　does　not　matter
whether　the　principles　which　necessarily　determine　causality　by　a
physical　law　reside　within　the　subject　or　without　him；　or　in　the
former　case　whether　these　principles　are　instinctive　or　are
conceived　by　reason；　if；　as　is　admitted　by　these　men　themselves；　these
determining　ideas　have　the　ground　of　their　existence　in　time　and　in
the　antecedent　state；　and　this　again　in　an　antecedent；　etc。　Then　it
matters　not　that　these　are　internal；　it　matters　not　that　they　have　a
psychological　and　not　a　mechanical　causality；　that　is；　produce　actions
by　means　of　ideas　and　not　by　bodily　movements；　they　are　still
determining　principles　of　the　causality　of　a　being　whose　existence
is　determinable　in　time；　and　therefore　under　the　necessitation　of
conditions　of　past　time；　which　therefore；　when　the　subject　has　to　act；
are　no　longer　in　his　power。　This　may　imply　psychological　freedom　（if
we　choose　to　apply　this　term　to　a　merely　internal　chain　of　ideas　in
the　mind）；　but　it　involves　physical　necessity　and；　therefore；　leaves
no　room　for　transcendental　freedom；　which　must　be　conceived　as
independence　on　everything　empirical；　and；　consequently；　on　nature
generally；　whether　it　is　an　object　of　the　internal　sense　considered　in
time　only；　or　of　the　external　in　time　and　space。　Without　this
freedom　（in　the　latter　and　true　sense）；　which　alone　is　practical　a
priori；　no　moral　law　and　no　moral　imputation　are　possible。　just　for
this　reason　the　necessity　of　events　in　time；　according　to　the　physical
law　of　causality；　may　be　called　the　mechanism　of　nature；　although　we
do　not　mean　by　this　that　things　which　are　subject　to　it　must　be　really
material　machines。　We　look　here　only　to　the　necessity　of　the
connection　of　events　in　a　time…series　as　it　is　developed　according
to　the　physical　law；　whether　the　subject　in　which　this　development
takes　place　is　called　automaton　materiale　when　the　mechanical　being　is
moved　by　matter；　or　with　Leibnitz　spirituale　when　it　is　impelled　by
ideas；　and　if　the　freedom　of　our　will　were　no　other　than　the　latter
（say　the　psychological　and　parative；　not　also　transcendental；
that　is；　absolute）；　then　it　would　at　bottom　be　nothing　better　than　the
freedom　of　a　turnspit；　which；　when　once　it　is　wound　up；　acplishes
its　motions　of　itself。
　　Now；　in　order　to　remove　in　the　supposed　case　the　apparent
contradiction　between　freedom　and　the　mechanism　of　nature　in　one　and
the　same　action；　we　must　remember　what　was　said　in　the　Critique　of
Pure　Reason；　or　what　follows　therefrom；　viz。；　that　the　necessity　of
nature；　which　cannot　co…exist　with　the　freedom　of　the　subject；
appertains　only　to　the　attributes　of　the　thing　that　is　subject　to
time…conditions；　consequently　only　to　those　of　the　acting　subject　as　a
phenomenon；　that　therefore　in　this　respect　the　determining
principles　of　every　action　of　the　same　reside　in　what　belongs　to
past　time　and　is　no　longer　in　his　power　（in　which　must　be　included　his
own　past　actions　and　the　character　that　these　may　determine　for　him　in
his　own　eyes　as　a　phenomenon）。　But　the　very　same　subject；　being　on　the
other　side　conscious　of　himself　as　a　thing　in　himself；　considers　his
existence　also　in　so　far　as　it　is　not　subject　to　time…conditions；
and　regards　himself　as　only　determinable　by　laws　which　he　gives
himself　through　reason；　and　in　this　his　existence　nothing　is
antecedent　to　the　determination　of　his　will；　but　every　action；　and
in　general　every　modification　of　his　existence；　varying　according　to
his　internal　sense；　even　the　whole　series　of　his　existence　as　a
sensible　being　is　in　the　consciousness　of　his　supersensible
existence　nothing　but　the　result；　and　never　to　be　regarded　as　the
determining　principle；　of　his　causality　as　a　noumenon。　In　this　view
now　the　rational　being　can　justly　say　of　every　unlawful　action　that　he
performs；　that　he　could　very　well　have　left　it　undone；　although　as
appearance　it　is　sufficiently　determined　in　the　past；　and　in　this
respect　is　absolutely　necessary；　for　it；　with　all　the　past　which
determines　it；　belongs　to　the　one　single　phenomenon　of　his　character
which　he　makes　for　himself；　in　consequence　of　which　he　imputes　the
causality　of　those　appearances　to　himself　as　a　cause　independent　of
sensibility。
　　With　this　agree　perfectly　the　judicial　sentences　of　that　wonderful
faculty　in　us　which　we　call　conscience。　A　man　may　use　as　much　art　as
he　likes　in　order　to　paint　to　himself　an　unlawful　act；　that　he
remembers；　as　an　unintentional　error；　a　mere　oversight；　such　as　one
can　never　altogether　avoid；　and　therefore　as　something　in　which　he　was
carried　away　by　the　stream　of　physical　necessity；　and　thus　to　make
himself　out　innocent；　yet　he　finds　that　the　advocate　who　speaks　in　his
favour　can　by　no　means　silence　the　accuser　within；　if　only　he　is
conscious　that　at　the　time　when　he　did　this　wrong　he　was　in　his
senses；　that　is；　in　possession　of　his　freedom；　and；　nevertheless；　he
accounts　for　his　error　from　some　bad　habits；　which　by　gradual
neglect　of　attention　he　has　allowed