the+critique+of+practical+reason-第14部分

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practical　through　the　mere　conception　of　a　law。　The　objective
reality　of　a　pure　will；　or；　what　is　the　same　thing；　of　a　pure
practical　reason；　is　given　in　the　moral　law　a　priori；　as　it　were；　by　a
fact；　for　so　we　may　name　a　determination　of　the　will　which　is
inevitable；　although　it　does　not　rest　on　empirical　principles。　Now；　in
the　notion　of　a　will　the　notion　of　causality　is　already　contained；　and
hence　the　notion　of　a　pure　will　contains　that　of　a　causality
acpanied　with　freedom；　that　is；　one　which　is　not　determinable　by
physical　laws；　and　consequently　is　not　capable　of　any　empirical
intuition　in　proof　of　its　reality；　but；　nevertheless；　pletely
justifies　its　objective　reality　a　priori　in　the　pure　practical　law；
not；　indeed　（as　is　easily　seen）　for　the　purposes　of　the　theoretical；
but　of　the　practical　use　of　reason。　Now　the　notion　of　a　being　that　has
free　will　is　the　notion　of　a　causa　noumenon；　and　that　this　notion
involves　no　contradiction；　we　are　already　assured　by　the　fact…　that
inasmuch　as　the　concept　of　cause　has　arisen　wholly　from　pure
understanding；　and　has　its　objective　reality　assured　by　the　deduction；
as　it　is　moreover　in　its　origin　independent　of　any　sensible
conditions；　it　is；　therefore；　not　restricted　to　phenomena　（unless　we
wanted　to　make　a　definite　theoretic　use　of　it）；　but　can　be　applied
equally　to　things　that　are　objects　of　the　pure　understanding。　But；
since　this　application　cannot　rest　on　any　intuition　（for　intuition　can
only　be　sensible）；　therefore；　causa　noumenon；　as　regards　the　theoretic
use　of　reason；　although　a　possible　and　thinkable；　is　yet　an　empty
notion。　Now；　I　do　not　desire　by　means　of　this　to　understand
theoretically　the　nature　of　a　being；　in　so　far　as　it　has　a　pure
will；　it　is　enough　for　me　to　have　thereby　designated　it　as　such；　and
hence　to　bine　the　notion　of　causality　with　that　of　freedom　（and
what　is　inseparable　from　it；　the　moral　law；　as　its　determining
principle）。　Now；　this　right　I　certainly　have　by　virtue　of　the　pure；
not…empirical　origin　of　the　notion　of　cause；　since　I　do　not　consider
myself　entitled　to　make　any　use　of　it　except　in　reference　to　the　moral
law　which　determines　its　reality；　that　is；　only　a　practical　use。
　　If；　with　Hume；　I　had　denied　to　the　notion　of　causality　all　objective
reality　in　its　＇theoretic＇　use；　not　merely　with　regard　to　things　in
themselves　（the　supersensible）；　but　also　with　regard　to　the　objects　of
the　senses；　it　would　have　lost　all　significance；　and　being　a
theoretically　impossible　notion　would　have　been　declared　to　be　quite
useless；　and　since　what　is　nothing　cannot　be　made　any　use　of；　the
practical　use　of　a　concept　theoretically　null　would　have　been
absurd。　But；　as　it　is；　the　concept　of　a　causality　free　from
empirical　conditions；　although　empty；　i。e。；　without　any　appropriate
intuition）；　is　yet　theoretically　possible；　and　refers　to　an
indeterminate　object；　but　in　pensation　significance　is　given　to
it　in　the　moral　law　and　consequently　in　a　practical　sense。　I　have；
indeed；　no　intuition　which　should　determine　its　objective　theoretic
reality；　but　not　the　less　it　has　a　real　application；　which　is
exhibited　in　concreto　in　intentions　or　maxims；　that　is；　it　has　a
practical　reality　which　can　be　specified；　and　this　is　sufficient　to
justify　it　even　with　a　view　to　noumena。
　　Now；　this　objective　reality　of　a　pure　concept　of　the　understanding
in　the　sphere　of　the　supersensible；　once　brought　in；　gives　an
objective　reality　also　to　all　the　other　categories；　although　only　so
far　as　they　stand　in　necessary　connexion　with　the　determining
principle　of　the　will　（the　moral　law）；　a　reality　only　of　practical
application；　which　has　not　the　least　effect　in　enlarging　our
theoretical　knowledge　of　these　objects；　or　the　discernment　of　their
nature　by　pure　reason。　So　we　shall　find　also　in　the　sequel　that
these　categories　refer　only　to　beings　as　intelligences；　and　in　them
only　to　the　relation　of　reason　to　the　will；　consequently；　always
only　to　the　practical；　and　beyond　this　cannot　pretend　to　any　knowledge
of　these　beings；　and　whatever　other　properties　belonging　to　the
theoretical　representation　of　supersensible　things　may　be　brought　into
connexion　with　these　categories；　this　is　not　to　be　reckoned　as
knowledge；　but　only　as　a　right　（in　a　practical　point　of　view；　however；
it　is　a　necessity）　to　admit　and　assume　such　beings；　even　in　the　case
where　we　＇conceive＇　supersensible　beings　（e。g。；　God）　according　to
analogy；　that　is；　a　purely　rational　relation；　of　which　we　make　a
practical　use　with　reference　to　what　is　sensible；　and　thus　the
application　to　the　supersensible　solely　in　a　practical　point　of　view
does　not　give　pure　theoretic　reason　the　least　encouragement　to　run
riot　into　the　transcendent。
　　CHAPTER　II。　Of　the　Concept　of　an　Object　of　Pure　Practical　Reason。

　　By　a　concept　of　the　practical　reason　I　understand　the　idea　of　an
object　as　an　effect　possible　to　be　produced　through　freedom。　To　be
an　object　of　practical　knowledge；　as　such；　signifies；　therefore；
only　the　relation　of　the　will　to　the　action　by　which　the　object　or　its
opposite　would　be　realized；　and　to　decide　whether　something　is　an
object　of　pure　practical　reason　or　not　is　only　to　discern　the
possibility　or　impossibility　of　willing　the　action　by　which；　if　we　had
the　required　power　（about　which　experience　must　decide）；　a　certain
object　would　be　realized。　If　the　object　be　taken　as　the　determining
principle　of　our　desire；　it　must　first　be　known　whether　it　is
physically　possible　by　the　free　use　of　our　powers；　before　we　decide
whether　it　is　an　object　of　practical　reason　or　not。　On　the　other　hand；
if　the　law　can　be　considered　a　priori　as　the　determining　principle
of　the　action；　and　the　latter　therefore　as　determined　by　pure
practical　reason；　the　judgement　whether　a　thing　is　an　object　of　pure
practical　reason　or　not　does　not　depend　at　all　on　the　parison
with　our　physical　power；　and　the　question　is　only　whether　we　should
will　an　action　that　is　directed　to　the　existence　of　an　object；　if
the　object　were　in　our　power；　hence　the　previous　question　is　only　as
the　moral　possibility　of　the　action；　for　in　this　case　it　is　not　the
object；　but　the　law　of　the　will；　that　is　the　determining　principle
of　the　action。　The　only　objects　of　practical　reason　are　therefore
those　of　good　and　evil。　For　by　the　former　is　meant　an　object
necessarily　desired　according　to　a　principle　of　reason；　by　the
latter　one　necessarily　shunned；　also　according　to　a　principle　of
reason。
　　If　the　notion　of　good　is　not　to　be　derived　from　an　antecedent
practical　law；　but；　on　the　contrary；　is　to　serve　as　its　foundation；　it
can　only　be　the　notion　of　something　whose　existence　promises　pleasure；
and　thus　determines　the　causality　of　the　subject　to　produce　it；　that
is　to　say；　determines　the　faculty　of　desire。　Now；　since　it　is
impossible　to　discern　a　priori　what　idea　will　be　acpanied　with
pleasure　and　what　with　pain；　it　will　depend　on　experience　alone　to
find　out　what　is　primarily　good　or　evil。　The　property　of　the
subject；　with　reference　to　which　alone　this　experiment　can　be　made；　is
the　feeling　of　pleasure　and　pain；　a　receptivity　belonging　to　the
internal　sense；　thus　that　only　would　be　primarily　good　with　which
the　sensation　of　pleasure　is　immediately　connected；　and　that　simply
evil　which　immediately　excites　pain。　Since；　however；　this　is　opposed
even　to　the　usage　of　language；　which　distinguishes　the　pleasant　from
the　good；　the　unpleasant　from　the　evil；　and　requires　that　good　and
evil　shall　always　be　judged　by　reason；　and；　therefore；　by　concepts
which　can　be　municated　to　everyone；　and　not　by　mere　sensation；
which　is　limited　to　individual　＇subjects＇　and　their　susceptibility；
and；　since　nevertheless；　pleasure　or　pain　cannot　be　connected　with　any
idea　of　an　object　a　priori；　the　philosopher　who　thought　himself
obliged　to　make　a　feeling　of　pleasure　the　foundation　of　his
practical　judgements　would　call　that　good　which　is　a　means　to　the
pleasant；　and　evil；　what　is　a　cause　of　unpleasantness　and　pain；　for
the　judgement　on　the　relation　of　means　to　ends　certainly　belongs　to
reason。　But；　although　reason　is　alone　capable　of　discerning　the
connexion　of　means　with　their　ends　（so　that　the　will　might　even　be
defined　as　the　faculty　of　ends；　since　these　are　always　determining
principles　of　the　desires）；　yet　the　practical　maxims　which　would
follow　from　the　aforesaid　principle　of　the　good　being　merely　a
means；　would　never　contain　as　the　object　of　the　will　anything　good
in　itself；　but　only　something　good　for　something；　the　good　would
always　be　merely　the　useful；　and　that　for　which　it　is　useful　must
always　lie　outside　the　will；　in　sensation。　Now　if　this　as　a　pleasant
sensation　were　to　be　distinguished　from　the　notion　of　good；　then　there
would　be　nothing　primarily　good　at　all；　but　the　good　would　have　to
be　sought　only　in　the　means　to　something　else；　namely；　some
pleasantness。
　　It　is　an　old　formula　of　the　schools：　Nihil　appetimus　nisi　sub
ratione　boni；　Nihil　aversamur　nisi　sub　ratione　mali；　and　it　is　used
often　correctly；　but　often　also　in　a　manner　injurious　to　philosophy；
because　the　expressions　boni　and　mali　are　ambiguous；　owing　to　the
poverty　of　language；　in　consequence　of　which　they　admit　a　double
sen