the+critique+of+practical+reason-第12部分

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itself）…　I　mean　the　faculty　of　freedom。　The　moral　law；　which　itself
does　not　require　a　justification；　proves　not　merely　the　possibility　of
freedom；　but　that　it　really　belongs　to　beings　who　recognize　this　law
as　binding　on　themselves。　The　moral　law　is　in　fact　a　law　of　the
causality　of　free　agents　and；　therefore；　of　the　possibility　of　a
supersensible　system　of　nature；　just　as　the　metaphysical　law　of　events
in　the　world　of　sense　was　a　law　of　causality　of　the　sensible　system　of
nature；　and　it　therefore　determines　what　speculative　philosophy　was
pelled　to　leave　undetermined；　namely；　the　law　for　a　causality；
the　concept　of　which　in　the　latter　was　only　negative；　and　therefore
for　the　first　time　gives　this　concept　objective　reality。
　　This　sort　of　credential　of　the　moral　law；　viz。；　that　it　is　set　forth
as　a　principle　of　the　deduction　of　freedom；　which　is　a　causality　of
pure　reason；　is　a　sufficient　substitute　for　all　a　priori
justification；　since　theoretic　reason　was　pelled　to　assume　at　least
the　possibility　of　freedom；　in　order　to　satisfy　a　want　of　its　own。　For
the　moral　law　proves　its　reality；　so　as　even　to　satisfy　the　critique
of　the　speculative　reason；　by　the　fact　that　it　adds　a　positive
definition　to　a　causality　previously　conceived　only　negatively；　the
possibility　of　which　was　inprehensible　to　speculative　reason；　which
yet　was　pelled　to　suppose　it。　For　it　adds　the　notion　of　a　reason
that　directly　determines　the　will　（by　imposing　on　its　maxims　the
condition　of　a　universal　legislative　form）；　and　thus　it　is　able　for
the　first　time　to　give　objective；　though　only　practical；　reality　to
reason；　which　always　became　transcendent　when　it　sought　to　proceed
speculatively　with　its　ideas。　It　thus　changes　the　transcendent　use
of　reason　into　an　immanent　use　（so　that　reason　is　itself；　by　means
of　ideas；　an　efficient　cause　in　the　field　of　experience）。
　　The　determination　of　the　causality　of　beings　in　the　world　of
sense；　as　such；　can　never　be　unconditioned；　and　yet　for　every　series
of　conditions　there　must　be　something　unconditioned；　and　therefore
there　must　be　a　causality　which　is　determined　wholly　by　itself。　Hence；
the　idea　of　freedom　as　a　faculty　of　absolute　spontaneity　was　not　found
to　be　a　want　but；　as　far　as　its　possibility　is　concerned；　an
analytic　principle　of　pure　speculative　reason。　But　as　it　is　absolutely
impossible　to　find　in　experience　any　example　in　accordance　with　this
idea；　because　amongst　the　causes　of　things　as　phenomena　it　would　be
impossible　to　meet　with　any　absolutely　unconditioned　determination
of　causality；　we　were　only　able　to　defend　our　supposition　that　a
freely　acting　cause　might　be　a　being　in　the　world　of　sense；　in　so
far　as　it　is　considered　in　the　other　point　of　view　as　a　noumenon；
showing　that　there　is　no　contradiction　in　regarding　all　its　actions　as
subject　to　physical　conditions　so　far　as　they　are　phenomena；　and　yet
regarding　its　causality　as　physically　unconditioned；　in　so　far　as
the　acting　being　belongs　to　the　world　of　understanding；　and　in　thus
making　the　concept　of　freedom　the　regulative　principle　of　reason。　By
this　principle　I　do　not　indeed　learn　what　the　object　is　to　which
that　sort　of　causality　is　attributed；　but　I　remove　the　difficulty；
for；　on　the　one　side；　in　the　explanation　of　events　in　the　world；　and
consequently　also　of　the　actions　of　rational　beings；　I　leave　to　the
mechanism　of　physical　necessity　the　right　of　ascending　from
conditioned　to　condition　ad　infinitum；　while　on　the　other　side　I
keep　open　for　speculative　reason　the　place　which　for　it　is　vacant；
namely；　the　intelligible；　in　order　to　transfer　the　unconditioned
thither。　But　I　was　not　able　to　verify　this　supposition；　that　is；　to
change　it　into　the　knowledge　of　a　being　so　acting；　not　even　into　the
knowledge　of　the　possibility　of　such　a　being。　This　vacant　place　is　now
filled　by　pure　practical　reason　with　a　definite　law　of　causality　in　an
intelligible　world　（causality　with　freedom）；　namely；　the　moral　law。
Speculative　reason　does　not　hereby　gain　anything　as　regards　its
insight；　but　only　as　regards　the　certainty　of　its　problematical　notion
of　freedom；　which　here　obtains　objective　reality；　which；　though　only
practical；　is　nevertheless　undoubted。　Even　the　notion　of　causality…
the　application；　and　consequently　the　signification；　of　which　holds
properly　only　in　relation　to　phenomena；　so　as　to　connect　them　into
experiences　（as　is　shown　by　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason）…　is　not　so
enlarged　as　to　extend　its　use　beyond　these　limits。　For　if　reason
sought　to　do　this；　it　would　have　to　show　how　the　logical　relation　of
principle　and　consequence　can　be　used　synthetically　in　a　different
sort　of　intuition　from　the　sensible；　that　is　how　a　causa　noumenon　is
possible。　This　it　can　never　do；　and；　as　practical　reason；　it　does
not　even　concern　itself　with　it；　since　it　only　places　the
determining　principle　of　causality　of　man　as　a　sensible　creature
（which　is　given）　in　pure　reason　（which　is　therefore　called　practical）；
and　therefore　it　employs　the　notion　of　cause；　not　in　order　to　know
objects；　but　to　determine　causality　in　relation　to　objects　in　general。
It　can　abstract　altogether　from　the　application　of　this　notion　to
objects　with　a　view　to　theoretical　knowledge　（since　this　concept　is
always　found　a　priori　in　the　understanding　even　independently　of　any
intuition）。　Reason；　then；　employs　it　only　for　a　practical　purpose；　and
hence　we　can　transfer　the　determining　principle　of　the　will　into　the
intelligible　order　of　things；　admitting；　at　the　same　time；　that　we
cannot　understand　how　the　notion　of　cause　can　determine　the
knowledge　of　these　things。　But　reason　must　cognise　causality　with
respect　to　the　actions　of　the　will　in　the　sensible　world　in　a　definite
manner；　otherwise；　practical　reason　could　not　really　produce　any
action。　But　as　to　the　notion　which　it　forms　of　its　own　causality　as
noumenon；　it　need　not　determine　it　theoretically　with　a　view　to　the
cognition　of　its　supersensible　existence；　so　as　to　give　it
significance　in　this　way。　For　it　acquires　significance　apart　from
this；　though　only　for　practical　use；　namely；　through　the　moral　law。
Theoretically　viewed；　it　remains　always　a　pure　a　priori　concept　of　the
understanding；　which　can　be　applied　to　objects　whether　they　have
been　given　sensibly　or　not；　although　in　the　latter　case　it　has　no
definite　theoretical　significance　or　application；　but　is　only　a
formal；　though　essential；　conception　of　the　understanding　relating
to　an　object　in　general。　The　significance　which　reason　gives　it
through　the　moral　law　is　merely　practical；　inasmuch　as　the　idea　of　the
idea　of　the　law　of　causality　（of　the　will）　has　self　causality；　or　is
its　determining　principle。

　　II。　Of　the　Right　that　Pure　Reason　in　its　Practical　use　has　to　an
Extension　which　is　not　possible　to　it　in　its　Speculative　Use。

　　We　have　in　the　moral　principle　set　forth　a　law　of　causality；　the
determining　principle　of　which　is　set　above　all　the　conditions　of
the　sensible　world；　we　have　it　conceived　how　the　will；　as　belonging　to
the　intelligible　world；　is　determinable；　and　therefore　we　therefore　we
have　its　subject　（man）　not　merely　conceived　as　belonging　to　a　world　of
pure　understanding；　and　in　this　respect　unknown　（which　the　critique　of
speculative　reason　enabled　us　to　do）；　but　also　defined　as　regards
his　causality　by　means　of　a　law　which　cannot　be　reduced　to　any
physical　law　of　the　sensible　world；　and　therefore　our　knowledge　is
extended　beyond　the　limits　of　that　world；　a　pretension　which　the
Critique　of　Pure　Reason　declared　to　be　futile　in　all　speculation。　Now；
how　is　the　practical　use　of　pure　reason　here　to　be　reconciled　with　the
theoretical；　as　to　the　determination　of　the　limits　of　its　faculty？
　　David　Hume；　of　whom　we　may　say　that　he　menced　the　assault　on
the　claims　of　pure　reason；　which　made　a　thorough　investigation　of　it
necessary；　argued　thus：　The　notion　of　cause　is　a　notion　that
involves　the　necessity　of　the　connexion　of　the　existence　of
different　things　（and　that；　in　so　far　as　they　are　different）；　so　that；
given　A；　I　know　that　something　quite　distinct　there　from；　namely　B；
must　necessarily　also　exist。　Now　necessity　can　be　attributed　to　a
connection；　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　known　a　priori；　for　experience
would　only　enable　us　to　know　of　such　a　connection　that　it　exists；
not　that　it　necessarily　exists。　Now；　it　is　impossible；　says　he；　to
know　a　priori　and　as　necessary　the　connection　between　one　thing　and
another　（or　between　one　attribute　and　another　quite　distinct）　when
they　have　not　been　given　in　experience。　Therefore　the　notion　of　a
cause　is　fictitious　and　delusive　and；　to　speak　in　the　mildest　way；
is　an　illusion；　only　excusable　inasmuch　as　the　custom　（a　subjective
necessity）　of　perceiving　certain　things；　or　their　attributes　as
often　associated　in　existence　along　with　or　in　succession　to　one
another；　is　insensibly　taken　for　an　objective　necessity　of　supposing
such　a　connection　in　the　objects　themselves；　and　thus　the　notion　of
a　cause　has　been　acquired　surreptitiously　and　not　legitimately；　nay；
it　can　never　be　so　acquired　or　authenticated；　since　it　demands　a
connection　in　itself　vain；　chimerical；　and　untenable　in　presence　of
reason；　and　to　which　no　object　can　e